Todd v. Northeastern Poultry Producers Council

• Decision Date: 08 June 1950
• Citation: 9 N.J.Super. 348,73 A.2d 863
• Parties: TODD v. NORTHEASTERN POULTRY PRODUCERS COUNCIL, Inc.
• Court: New Jersey County Court

Page 348

9 N.J.Super. 348

73 A.2d 863

TODD v. NORTHEASTERN POULTRY PRODUCERS COUNCIL, Inc.

Mercer County Court, Law Division, New Jersey.

June 8, 1950.

Louis H. Roth, Trenton, for petitioner-appellant.

Samuel D. Lenox, Trenton, for respondent-appellee.

HUGHES, J.C.C.

This is an appeal from a determination and judgment entered in the Workmen's Compensation Bureau, New Jersey Department of Labor, awarding compensation to petitioner-appellant (hereinafter referred to as petitioner) under our Workmen's Compensation Act. Under the facts and stipulations, the following elements are not in dispute:

1. That petitioner was, on the date of the claimed accident, in the employ of respondent-appellee, (hereinafter referred to as respondent).

2. That petitioner's wages were such as to make effective a compensation rate of $25 per week.

3. That respondent had due and timely notice of injury, i.e., the alleged accident, although respondent contests the fact of accident within the intendment of the law.

4. That petitioner received his full salary during his temporary incapacitation, and no compensation is due him for temporary disability.

The sole remaining issues, on which the case turned below, are whether there did, in fact, occur an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, and, if so, the extent of partial permanent disability resulting therefrom.

Narrowing the issues further, it may be noted that the medical cases of petitioner and respondent agree that the former suffered a coronary occlusion with anterior myocardial infarction. There is some difference of opinion as to the time when the occlusion occurred. The petitioner's proofs identified this attack, as to time, with a long and burdensome automobile trip which concluded an energetic day in a distant city spent on respondent's business. The respondent's medical witness thought this occlusion, the 'damaging attack', occurred when, a short time after his arrival home, petitioner was prostrated with the severe pain caused thereby. The opposing medical cases further seem to coincide on the principle that the petitioner's present disability is caused by underlying residual damage, of a permanent nature, stemming from the coronary occlusion.

The crucial point of variance, however, seems to be whether, and, if so, to what extent, there should be attributed to the employment of the petitioner, an aggravation of residual damage to the heart structure, claimed by petitioner to be caused by the unusual strain of the work in which he was employed during, and shortly after, the original coronary occlusion.

Upon the basis of the whole of the record, including the transcript of the evidence taken below, I find the facts and conclude the law applicable thereto to be as follows:

Petitioner was the managing director of the respondent, his duties involving the promotion and marketing of poultry products. On July 30, he drove in his automobile to Ithaca, New York and thence, on the following day to Saratoga Springs. His immediate business was to arrange for the approaching convention of poultry producers sponsored by his organization. On the day following his arrival in Saratoga Springs, which was August 1, he completed a long list of calls and conferences on this business of his employer and having done so, departed at 2:00 o'clock, or thereabouts, in his car for the long drive home (230 miles) to the vicinity of Trenton, where he lived. He considered it as necessary to make this drive to permit him to be at his office for important duties there on the Saturday morning.

The might before his departure from Saratoga Springs, he had suffered what he called a mild digestive disturbance, which he blamed on the cigar he was smoking. On the trip itself, halfway between Saratoga Springs and Albany, New York, he felt pressure in his chest. He arrived in Newton, New Jersey, where he stopped for dinner between 6:30 and 7:00 o'clock and experienced a tingling in his arms, and for the remainder of the trip he underwent increasing weariness and continued pressure in his chest. Upon his arrival home there was a recurrence of the tingling in his arms, the chest pressure, although much more noticeable, and increasing pain and aching. Shortly, he executed himself to go to bed and the intensity of these symptoms increased to the extent that a physician was called and administered large quantities of morphine to end the pain. A long period in bed followed, during which time he was examined by the physicians, who concluded that he had suffered a recent coronary occlusion with anterior myocardial infarction. This petitioner never suffered such an experience before. His work in Saratoga Springs on the day he left for the return trip was unusually energetic and the completion of his drive home in the automobile was accomplished by the greatest effort on his part.

This petitioner usually travelled on such promotional trips by train. The average yearly mileage travelled by him by automobile was a nominal figure. Access to Ithaca and Saratoga Springs by train was difficult.

Dr. Harry A. Kaplan, who testified for petitioner, was of the opinion that the permanent disability resulted from myocardial infarction, which followed an acute coronary occlusion. This doctor believed that while it could not be said that the driving on the return trip mentioned caused the coronary occlusion, that the petitioner was developing such occlusion during such drive; that occlusion is caused by bleeding in the coronary vessel or under the wall thereof and is caused primarily by a thrombus, which is a plugging caused by coagulation of the blood, resulting in the occlusion of the vessel. The bleeding caused by the thrombus is said to organize a fibrous tissue, which is the myocardial infarction and which, primarily, is here responsible for the residual damage to the heart.

Dr. William E. Mountford for the defendant testified to his opinion that the true coronary occlusion occurred shortly after the petitioner's return to his home that evening and that the previous attacks noticed enroute were spasms of the coronary artery.

While it is clear under this testimony that the evidence does not support a finding that the coronary occlusion was caused, Per se, by the strain and unusual...