Todd v. State, 2160
Decision Date | 25 February 2005 |
Docket Number | No. 2160,2160 |
Citation | 868 A.2d 944,161 Md. App. 332 |
Parties | Lowell Hudson TODD, Jr. v. STATE of Maryland. |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Brian Saccenti (Nancy S. Forster, Public Defender, on brief), for appellant.
Michelle W. Cole (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on brief), for appellee.
Panel MURPHY, C.J., JAMES S. GETTY, (Retired, specially assigned), THEODORE G. BLOOM, (Retired, specially assigned) JJ.
At a bench trial in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County, appellant, Lowell Hudson Todd, Jr., was convicted of causing a life-threatening injury by motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, driving while intoxicated, driving while under the influence of alcohol, driving while intoxicated per se, and negligent driving.1 The court merged the lesser offenses into the greater offense and sentenced Todd to three years' imprisonment for causing a life-threatening injury by motor vehicle while intoxicated.
In this appeal, Todd argues, in essence:
Finding no merit in any of these arguments, we shall affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Todd's convictions stem from a two-car accident that occurred in Wicomico County on the early evening of August 3, 2001. Todd does not now dispute that the car he was driving crossed the center line and collided head-on with a car that was being driven by James Vance and in which Vance's three children were riding. Nor does Todd dispute that he was intoxicated at the time.
The State presented evidence that Vance and all three of his children suffered injuries. The most seriously injured was 12-year old Sarah Vance, who had been riding in the back seat, on the passenger side.
Immediately after the crash, James Vance turned to check on his children and saw that Sarah had "a big hole in her head." Wallace Bennett, an emergency medical technician who was driving behind Vance and saw the accident occur, testified that he stopped to help. Bennett told the court that Sarah was his "priority patient" because "she was in and out of consciousness, she had a cut on her forehead that was pretty well deep around, her eyes were turning black and blue." Another witness, Jack Bozek, was standing by the side of the road and witnessed the crash. Bozek approached the vehicles to try to help. He noticed that Sarah's "head was all split wide open" and he "thought she was dead...."
Trooper George Noonan of the Maryland State Police arrived on the scene within minutes of the accident. He testified that, because "all of the injuries ... seemed to be life threatening at the time," his first priority was "to make sure they get them to the hospital." More emergency medical personnel arrived, and the Vances as well as Todd were then taken to Peninsula Regional Medical Center ("Peninsula") in Salisbury.
Kathy Vance, the wife of James Vance and mother of the three injured children, met her family at Peninsula. As to Sarah's condition, Mrs. Vance testified:
Mrs. Vance then explained that the physicians at Peninsula "couldn't stabilize" Sarah, and because Sarah had bleeding on her brain they "had no choice but to ... take her to surgery right away...." Mrs. Vance testified that, after the physicians at Peninsula operated, "they did not close the wound, they just pulled the skin up over the wound and put a bandage on her and left her like that." The next day, after Sarah's condition was sufficiently stabilized, "she was flown to Johns Hopkins where they were waiting for her to take her into surgery." At Johns Hopkins Hospital ("Hopkins"), "they pulled [the] skin back and operated on her head more for the bleed on the brain."
Mrs. Vance testified that Sarah "was taken to the ICU" immediately after the surgery at Hopkins, and then "was taken to ... a step-down unit for several days." She added that since then Sarah has undergone several additional surgeries to repair portions of her face that were "completely crushed" in the accident.
Sarah's medical records from both Peninsula and Hopkins were admitted into evidence. The emergency room physician at Peninsula who treated Sarah upon her arrival wrote in his report: "THIS IS A 12-YEAR-OLD WITH SEVERE CRANIAL INJURY, EPIDURAL BLEED, WHO NEED[S] EMERGENT CRANIOTOMY." He added," Once she is stable from a neurosurgical standpoint, she will be transferred to a specialty center for attention to her orbital fracture."
Todd was found guilty of, inter alia, violating former Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 2000 Cum.Supp.), § 388B(b) and (c) of Art. 27 in connection with Sarah Vance's injuries. The statute provided:
Section 388B became effective on October 1, 1996. See 1996 Laws of Maryland, Chapter 427. Todd points out that, prior to the enactment of that statute, there was some discussion among legislators concerning whether the term "life-threatening injury" should be defined and, if so, how it should be defined. See bill files for Senate Bill 277 (1996) and House Bill 32 (1996). At least one lawmaker urged that the term be defined as "an injury that creates an immediate and substantial risk of death." See bill file for Senate Bill 277 (1996). The 1996 General Assembly ultimately decided not to define the term, however.2 Todd argues that the legislature's failure to include a definition of "life-threatening injury" in the statute left the term "impermissibly ambiguous because reasonable people can and do reach widely divergent conclusions on what it means." He therefore concludes that the statute is void for vagueness.
"The void-for-vagueness doctrine as applied to the analysis of penal statutes requires that the statute be `sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.' "Galloway v. State, 365 Md. 599, 614, 781 A.2d 851 (2001) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 990, 122 S.Ct. 1547, 152 L.Ed.2d 472 (2002). As the Court of Appeals has summarized:
In determining the constitutionality of statutes, "[t]he basic rule is that there is a presumption" that the statute is valid.... We are reluctant to find a statute unconstitutional if, "by any construction, it can be sustained." ... If, however, a statute violates a "mandatory provision" of the Constitution, "we are required to declare such an act unconstitutional and void." ... Therefore, if it is established that a statute is vague — offends due process — and/or overbroad — sweeps within the ambit of constitutionally "protected expressive or associational rights" — then the statute is unconstitutional. The party attacking the statute has the burden of establishing its unconstitutionality....
Id. at 610-11, 781 A.2d 851 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 615, 781 A.2d 851 (citations omitted) (emphasis omitted). See also Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 436, 459, 569 A.2d 604 (1990)
().
...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Smith v. State
...which could fairly convince a trier of fact of the defendant's guilt of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt.Todd v. State, 161 Md. App. 332, 348 (2005) (internal quotations omitted). Smith contends the court erred in not granting his motion for acquittal because the State failed ......