Todd v. State
Decision Date | 21 June 1996 |
Docket Number | Nos. S-6709,S-6807,s. S-6709 |
Parties | Robyn TODD, Petitioner, v. STATE of Alaska, Respondent. Joseph HARVEY, Petitioner, v. STATE of Alaska, Respondent. |
Court | Alaska Supreme Court |
Petition for Hearing from the Court of Appeals of the State of Alaska, on Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Rene J. Gonzalez, Judge.
G. Blair McCune, Assistant Public Defender, and John B. Salemi, Public Defender, Anchorage, for Petitioner Todd.
Mitchel J. Schapira, Anchorage, for Petitioner Harvey.
Kenneth M. Rosenstein, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney General, Juneau, for Respondent.
Before COMPTON, C.J., and RABINOWITZ, MATTHEWS and EASTAUGH, JJ.
As Revised on Rehearing
Robyn Todd and Joseph Harvey seek review of the court of appeals' opinion affirming their convictions and corresponding sentences for both second-degree (felony) murder and first-degree robbery in connection with an armed robbery during which a man was killed. They assert that the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Alaska Constitutions bar conviction and punishment for both felony murder and the predicate felony. We affirm.
The underlying facts are not in dispute. Armed and wearing ski masks, Todd and Harvey entered a bar in downtown Anchorage early one morning while the bar's owner, Lloyd Dahl, and his employees, George Gillis and Nancy Lee Jourdan, were cleaning up and counting the evening's receipts.
While Todd guarded Gillis in the kitchen area at the back of the bar, Harvey went into the bar office where Dahl was counting the money. Dahl tried to prevent Harvey from taking the money and was shot and killed. Jourdan heard the gunshot from outside the office. She fled the bar and flagged down a passing community patrol van. The police were alerted. They confronted Todd and Harvey as the pair left the bar and apprehended them a short time later.
At a joint trial, Todd and Harvey were convicted of the first-degree robbery of Dahl, the second-degree (felony) murder of Dahl, the third-degree assault of Gillis, and Misconduct Involving Weapons in the First Degree. Todd also was convicted of the third-degree assault on police officer Pam Nelson.
At sentencing, Harvey and Todd argued that the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States 1 and Alaska Constitutions 2 barred separate convictions for second-degree (felony) murder and the predicate offense of first-degree robbery. The court disagreed. Todd was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment for the second-degree murder charge, consecutive to twelve years imprisonment for the first-degree robbery charge. Harvey was sentenced to thirty years for the murder, consecutive to twelve years for the robbery.
On appeal, the court of appeals determined that the underlying felony "may be" a lesser-included offense of felony murder under Alaska law, Todd v. State, 884 P.2d 668, 686 (Alaska App.1994), but held that Todd's and Harvey's convictions and consecutive sentences for felony murder and the predicate robbery were fully consistent with federal double jeopardy law and the Alaska Constitution as interpreted in Whitton v. State, 479 P.2d 302 (Alaska 1970). Todd, 884 P.2d at 682, 685-86. The court of appeals observed that its holding at least facially conflicted with Tuckfield v. State, 621 P.2d 1350 (Alaska 1981), in which this court observed that "double jeopardy is violated by conviction of both an offense and a lesser included offense, unless the convictions arise from separate conduct," and its own holding in Hughes v. State, 668 P.2d 842 (Alaska App.1983). Todd, 884 P.2d at 680-82. However, the court interpreted more recent Supreme Court decisions to supersede Tuckfield 's analysis and therefore declined to follow Tuckfield and overruled Hughes. Todd, 884 P.2d at 682, 686.
Todd and Harvey separately petitioned this court for review of the court of appeals' decision. Appellate Rule 302(a). We granted the petitions and consolidated the cases for review.
The issue before the court involves questions of constitutional law and statutory interpretation which we resolve by applying our independent judgment. Arco Alaska, Inc. v. State, 824 P.2d 708, 710 (Alaska 1992); Norton v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, 695 P.2d 1090, 1092 (Alaska 1985). Our duty is to adopt the rule of law which is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason and policy. Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1284 n. 6 (Alaska 1979).
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects against multiple prosecutions and multiple punishments for the same offense. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). As Todd and Harvey were convicted of all charges in a single proceeding, the only issue is whether their consecutive sentences impermissibly subject them to multiple punishments for the same offense. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 365-66, 103 S.Ct. 673, 678, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983).
In Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), the Supreme Court laid out the test to determine whether the violation of two statutory provisions constitutes two offenses or only one. It is "whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not." Id. The Supreme Court consistently has applied the Blockburger test for this limited purpose. See Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 693-94, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 1439, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980) ( ); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 2226, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977) ( ); see also U.S. v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993) ( ); Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 338-39, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 1142, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981) ( ).
Any indication the Court once may have given that Blockburger provided a unitary test for determining whether offenses were the same and whether the Double Jeopardy Clause was violated has since been disavowed. In a series of cases beginning with Brown v. Ohio and culminating with Missouri v. Hunter, the Supreme Court has stated that, at least in multiple punishment cases, the role of the Double Jeopardy Clause is limited to protecting a defendant against receiving more punishment than the legislature intended. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. at 165, 97 S.Ct. at 2225 (); Whalen v. U.S., 445 U.S. at 688, 100 S.Ct. at 1436 (); Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. at 366, 103 S.Ct. at 678 (); see also United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 450, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1902-03, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989). 3
In the later cases, the Supreme Court has employed the Blockburger test as a statutory interpretation screening tool to educe the intent of the legislature. See Hunter, 459 U.S. at 366-67, 103 S.Ct. at 678; Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 340, 101 S.Ct. at 1143; Whalen, 445 U.S. at 691, 693-95, 100 S.Ct. at 1437, 1438-39. If the statutes pass muster under the Blockburger test, cumulative punishment is presumptively allowable. See Hunter, 459 U.S. at 367, 103 S.Ct. at 678-79 (). If they fail it, cumulative punishment is presumptively barred. See Whalen, 445 U.S. at 691-92, 100 S.Ct. at 1437-38 (). The presumption against multiple punishment is, however, rebuttable. Thus, the analysis continues with a determination of whether the legislature intended to allow multiple punishments for those offenses that fail the Blockburger test. See Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 779, 105 S.Ct. 2407, 2411, 85 L.Ed.2d 764 (1985) (); Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 340, 344, 101 S.Ct. at 1143, 1145 ; Whalen, 445 U.S. at 692, 100 S.Ct. at 1438 (...
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