Todd v. Stewart
| Decision Date | 17 March 1925 |
| Docket Number | 35901 |
| Citation | 202 N.W. 844,199 Iowa 821 |
| Parties | SAMUEL W. TODD, Appellee, v. SAMUEL M. STEWART et al., Appellants |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Van Buren District Court.--F. M. HUNTER, Judge.
ACTION in partition. The facts will be found stated in the opinion. The defendants Stewart and Newbold, guardian ad litem for the minor defendants William S. and Albert L. Todd appeal.--Modified and affirmed.
Modified and affirmed.
Starr & Jordan and Cornell & McBeth, for Stewart, appellant.
Newbold & Newbold, for Newbold, guardian ad litem, appellant.
H. B Sloan and J. C. Calhoun, for appellee.
The historical background of this controversy is to be found in the case of Stewart v. Todd, 190 Iowa 283, 173 N.W. 619. Under the final decision in that case, a tract of 136 acres of the land involved was held not to pass under the contract there considered, but to descend under the law, or pass by the will of Emma A. Stewart, deceased; and the disposition of it was not adjudicated in that action.
The present action is for the partition of 86 acres of that tract, situated in Iowa. Samuel W. Todd, the appellee, brought the action, claiming to be the owner in fee of an undivided two thirds, under the will of Emma A. Stewart, against Samuel M. Stewart, the surviving husband of the testatrix, who had rejected the provisions of the will and elected to take under the law, and who is conceded by all parties to be the owner of an undivided one third of the land. The controversy as between these parties relates (1) to the right of the appellee to have partition at all, and (2) to the terms and manner of partition, if it should be decreed.
The right of the appellee to partition depends upon whether he is the owner in fee of an undivided two-thirds interest in the land, or has but a life estate; and this is a matter of dispute between Todd and his minor children, who were made parties at the instance of the appellant Stewart, and who assert, through a guardian ad litem, the claim that appellee has but a life estate in an undivided two thirds of the land, and that they are the owners of the remainder in fee. This claim is predicated on the will of Emma A. Stewart.
The will is a lengthy and somewhat intricate and involved document. The land in question is a part of what is there referred to as the "Blackledge Farm. " The sixth paragraph of the will gives to the appellee, Samuel W. Todd, a life estate in the Blackledge farm, subject to life estates therein in Mrs. J. D. Blackledge and the appellant Stewart. Mrs. J. D. Blackledge is dead, and Stewart, as has been noted, rejected the provisions of the will; so that the life estates given to them require no attention. Paragraph 13 is as follows:
"Subject to the life estates therein in Mrs. J. D. Blackledge, S. M. Stewart and Samuel W. Todd I hereby will, devise and bequeath the 'Blackledge Farm' to the beneficiaries named in the residuary clause, being Paragraph 14 hereof, the same to be the property of such beneficiaries absolutely and in fee simple and as therein directed."
Paragraph 14, so far as here material, is as follows:
"All the rest, residue and remainder of my property * * * I hereby will devise and bequeath to the legal heirs of my father Samuel Blackledge and my mother Mrs. J. D. Blackledge equally, that is: One half to the heirs of my father and one half to the heirs of my mother, in ascending and descending lines, as provided in the statutes of inheritance now in force in the state of Iowa, it being expressly understood and provided, however, that the legal heirs of any of the heirs of my father or mother who are now deceased, or who may die prior to my death shall share equally share and share alike in the proportion which would fall to such heir had they survived me."
It is admitted in the answer of the appellant Stewart, and is not questioned by any of the parties, that Samuel W. Todd is the grandson and only heir at law of Samuel and J. D. Blackledge, and as such is the residuary legatee, under the fourteenth paragraph of the will.
It is clear that the will first, in Paragraph 6, gives to Samuel W. Todd a life estate in the Blackledge farm, subject to two prior life estates that are now of no moment. This does not dispose of the remainder. The thirteenth paragraph puts the remainder in the Blackledge farm, after the life estates to Todd and the others, in the residuary estate disposed of in Paragraph 14, and provides that it shall be the property of the beneficiaries therein named, absolutely and in fee simple. Paragraph 14 disposes of the remainder and residue of the estate to the heirs of Samuel and J. D. Blackledge, as a class. The record does not disclose what persons might have been, had they survived, heirs of the Blackledges, other than Todd and, in the event of his death, his children; but the language of the will indicates that it was in the contemplation of the testatrix that there might be others than Todd who would take as members of the class. But Todd, by force of circumstances, is the only person in the class designated as residuary devisees. There is no devise, directly or by any possible implication, to the children or heirs of the body of Todd.
Paragraph 15 provides, in substance, that, in case of the death of Todd without heirs of his body, or the death of Todd and the heirs of his body, then any and all portions of the estate willed to Todd by any clause of the will shall go to the heirs of the testatrix's father and mother, the Blackledges, except the father and mother of Todd or their heirs; and that all rights given by any clause of the will to Todd are not to vest in Todd, except subject to these limitations and conditions. This paragraph, so far from amounting to a devise of any interest or estate in the Blackledge farm to the children of Todd, would seem to expressly exclude them, as heirs of Todd's father and mother, their grandparents.
The intention of the testator being ever the polestar in the interpretation of wills, the object is always to discover that intention, as expressed in the will, under established and recognized canons of construction. But, as has frequently been said, there are some things that even a testator cannot do. It is settled by an unbroken line of decisions that, where a will gives an absolute title in fee, any attempt in a subsequent clause to defeat, destroy, or limit the title or estate so given, is held to be inconsistent with the disposition so made, and does not affect it. The two provisions are, in their nature and under the law, repugnant; and the subsequent attempted limitation upon what has once been expressly given, must fail. Alden v. Johnson, 63 Iowa 124, 18 N.W. 696; Bills v. Bills, 80 Iowa 269, 45 N.W. 748; Talbot v. Snodgrass, 124 Iowa 681, 100 N.W. 500; Luckey v. McCray, 125 Iowa 691, 101 N.W. 516; Ogle v. Burmister, 146 Iowa 33, 124 N.W. 758; Canaday v. Baysinger, 170 Iowa 414, 152 N.W. 562; Bellamy v. Bellamy, 184 Iowa 1193, 169 N.W. 621.
The difficulty that has been experienced in applying this unquestioned rule of construction has been in determining whether the estate first given was an estate in fee; and the inquiry has not infrequently been whether, in a particular will, the language relied upon as limiting the estate to less than a fee was so closely connected with, or related to, the language of the devise itself as to in fact so limit it, or whether it was either merely precatory, and therefore not controlling, or was repugnant to the devise in fee, and therefore ineffectual. See Lowrie, Bowman & Boyer v. Ryland & Troutman, 65 Iowa 584, 22 N.W. 686; Stivers v. Gardner, 88 Iowa 307, 55 N.W. 516; Pool v. Napier, 145 Iowa 699, 124 N.W. 755; Richards v. Richards, 155 Iowa 394, 136 N.W. 132; and the cases above cited.
The will in question presents no such difficulty. In the thirteenth paragraph, the land in question is given to the beneficiaries named in the residuary clause, absolutely and in fee simple. Stronger or more emphatic or appropriate language could not have been employed. The attempt in the fifteenth clause to direct the disposition of the land upon the death of Todd without heirs of his body, or upon the death of both Todd and the heirs of his body, is clearly repugnant to the prior devise in fee. Moreover, to give it effect would result, not in giving the fee to the children of Todd,--for it is...
To continue reading
Request your trial