Toland v. Robinson

• Decision Date: 12 December 2019
• Docket Number: No. CV-19-65,CV-19-65
• Citation: 2019 Ark. 368,590 S.W.3d 146
• Parties: James TOLAND and First Arkansas Bail Bonds, Inc., Appellants v. Mike ROBINSON, in his Official Capacity as District Judge of Saline County, Benton [Department]; and Stephanie Casady, in her Official Capacity as District Judge of Saline County, Bryant [Department], Appellees
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

2019 Ark. 368

590 S.W.3d 146

James TOLAND and First Arkansas Bail Bonds, Inc., Appellants

v.Mike ROBINSON, in his Official Capacity as District Judge of Saline County, Benton [Department]; and Stephanie Casady, in her Official Capacity as District Judge of Saline County, Bryant [Department], Appellees

No. CV-19-65

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Opinion Delivered: December 12, 2019

Worsham Law Firm, P.A., Little Rock, by: Richard E. Worsham, for appellants.

Leslie Rutledge, Att'y Gen., by: Daniel L. McFadden, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellees.

JOHN DAN KEMP, Chief Justice

Appellants James Toland (Toland) and First Arkansas Bail Bonds, Inc. (First Arkansas) (collectively, appellants), appeal an order of the Saline County Circuit Court granting a motion to dismiss filed by appellees Mike Robinson (Robinson), in his official capacity as District Judge of Saline County, Benton [Department];¹ and Stephanie Casady (Casady), in her official capacity as District Judge of Saline County, Bryant [Department] (collectively, appellees). For reversal, appellants argue that the circuit court erred in granting appellees' motion to dismiss for lack of standing and for failure to state a cause of action. We dismiss the appeal as moot.

I. Facts

Toland was arrested on a felony charge. On September 2, 2014, Toland appeared before Robinson for his pretrial-release decision. Robinson set a "sheriff's bond" under Rule 9.2(b)(ii) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure and ordered that Toland post bond in the amount of $25,000. Someone on Toland's behalf paid 10 percent of the bond to the Saline County Sheriff, and Toland was released from the Saline County Detention Center. At no point did Toland object to the bond prior to posting it and being released. Ninety percent of his bond amount was refunded when he appeared at his next court date. Toland pleaded guilty to his criminal charge and was taken into the custody of the Arkansas Department of Correction.

On October 14, 2014, appellants filed a complaint against appellees and separate defendant Saline County (dismissed below), alleging that the circuit court should have issued (1) a writ of mandamus to compel appellees to allow defendants to obtain a surety bond pursuant to article 2, section 8 of the Arkansas Constitution, (2) a writ of prohibition preventing appellees from violating the rights of individuals incarcerated in the Saline County Detention Center by refusing to allow them to use a bail-bond company to obtain their release, and (3) a writ of certiorari finding that appellees had exceeded their judicial authority by requiring Rule 9.2(b)(ii) bonds. Appellants sought a declaratory judgment finding that appellees had violated article 2, section 8 of the Arkansas Constitution by failing to allow the defendants to use a licensed bail-bond company. Appellants also alleged two civil-rights violations: (1) that appellees violated Toland's constitutional right to use a bail-bond company pursuant to article 2, section 2 of the Arkansas Constitution ; and (2) that appellees violated First Arkansas's constitutional rights under article 2, sections 2, 22, and 29 of the Arkansas Constitution. Appellants also requested damages, attorney's fees, and costs.

Appellees responded by filing a motion to dismiss and argued that appellants' claims were barred by judicial immunity and sovereign immunity,² that Toland had waived his right to challenge the bail decision by accepting the bond, that First Arkansas lacked standing to challenge the bond, and that the extraordinary writs did not apply in this case.

Appellants filed a motion for voluntary dismissal of their civil-rights claims pursuant to Rule 41(a) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, and the circuit court entered an order dismissing those claims without prejudice. Appellants also filed a motion for voluntary dismissal of Saline County in accordance with Rule 41(a), and the circuit court dismissed Saline County from the action without prejudice.³

The circuit court held a hearing on appellees' motion to dismiss. On October 15, 2015, the circuit court entered an order finding that (1) appellants did not have standing to seek a declaratory judgment pursuant to article 2, section 8 of the Arkansas Constitution ; (2) appellants' declaratory-judgment claim was moot because Toland had paid his sheriff's bond; 90 percent of that payment was refunded when he appeared for his court date; and Toland had pleaded guilty and remained in the custody of the Arkansas Department of Correction; (3) First Arkansas lacked standing because it had not been denied the opportunity to pay Toland's bond, and its status as a bail-bonding company had not conferred standing; (4) Casady had not ordered Toland's bond, Toland had not appeared in Casady's court, and no causal relationship existed between Casady and any injury alleged by Toland; (5) neither Toland nor First Arkansas had stated a claim for which the extraordinary writs could be granted; (6) mandamus was inappropriate because Robinson had the discretion to order a sheriff's bond; (7) prohibition was inappropriate because Robinson had jurisdiction to order the sheriff's bond; and (8) certiorari was inappropriate because Robinson had not abused his discretion in ordering the sheriff's bond pursuant to Rule 9.2(b). The circuit court granted appellees' motion to dismiss and dismissed without prejudice all claims against appellees. Appellants timely filed their notice of appeal.

In Toland v. Robinson , 2017 Ark. 41, 2017 WL 635490, we concluded that the circuit court had not provided a Rule 54(b) certification that the civil-rights claims had been nonsuited. We held that the circuit court's order was not final and that we did not have jurisdiction to address the merits on appeal. Accordingly, we dismissed the appeal without prejudice. Id.

On October 8, 2018, the circuit court entered a final order, finding,

1. This Court entered a judgment dismissing the case with prejudice on October 15, 2015.

2. [Toland and First Arkansas] filed a timely notice of appeal and sought review by the appellate courts.

3. On February 16, 2017, the Supreme Court issued a mandate dismissing the appeal without prejudice since there was not a final order. James Toland, et al. v. Mike Robinson, et al. , CV-16-119, 2017 WL 635490. The Supreme Court determined that there was not a final order since the Civil Rights claims raised in Count Five of the complaint [were] dismissed without prejudice.

4. The mandate has been filed with this Court and no final order has been entered based upon the findings of the Supreme Court.

5. It is the desire of [Toland and First Arkansas] to have the Civil Rights claims raised in Count Five of the complaint dismissed with prejudice in order that there will be a final order.

The circuit court dismissed with prejudice the civil-rights claims and adopted all other findings and rulings in the October 15, 2015 order. From this final order, appellants timely filed their appeal.

II. Arguments

A. First Arkansas's Standing

For their first point on appeal, appellants argue that the circuit court erred in granting appellees' motion to dismiss for lack of standing. Appellants contend that First Arkansas has a vested interest in appellees' bonding practices, and as a licensed bail-bond company, it is regulated and approved by the State of Arkansas. Appellants assert that First Arkansas conducts business in Saline County, and its business is directly affected by appellees' bond-setting practices.

Appellees respond that First Arkansas lacks standing because it cannot assert Toland's constitutional rights and did not sustain an injury. Appellees contend that an incarcerated person's right to choose a type of bond belongs to that person who seeks bail and that First Arkansas is not within a protected class afforded a right to be "bailable by sufficient sureties" guaranteed under article 2, section 8 of the Arkansas Constitution.

We treat the question of standing to sue as a threshold issue. Grand Valley Ridge, LLC v. Metro. Nat'l Bank , 2012 Ark. 121, 388 S.W.3d 24. It is a fundamental principle in American jurisprudence that in order to bring a lawsuit against an opposing party, one must have standing to do so. Id. Without standing, a party is not properly before the court to advance a cause of action. Id. Only a claimant who has a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy has standing. Pulaski Cty. v. Ark. Democrat-Gazette, Inc. , 371 Ark. 217, 220, 264 S.W.3d 465, 467 (2007). To be a proper plaintiff in an action, one must have an interest which has been adversely affected or rights which have been invaded. Reynolds v. Guardianship of Sears , 327 Ark. 770, 775, 940 S.W.2d 483, 486 (1997). A party has no standing to raise an issue regarding property in which he or she has no pecuniary interest. Wisener v. Burns , 345 Ark. 84, 92, 44 S.W.3d 289, 294 (2001). The question of standing is a matter of law for this court to decide, and this court reviews questions of law de novo. Grand Valley Ridge , 2012 Ark. 121, 388 S.W.3d 24.

For a litigant to have standing to challenge the constitutionality of a law, it must be unconstitutional as applied to him or her. Medlock v. Ft. Smith Serv. Fin. Corp. , 304 Ark. 652, 803 S.W.2d 930 (1991). The general rule is that one must have suffered injury or belong to a class which is prejudiced in order to have standing to challenge the validity of a law. Id. Constitutional rights are personal rights and may not be raised by a third party. Id.

With this well-established precedent in mind, we turn to the present case. On the issue of First Arkansas's standing, the circuit court specifically ruled,

[First Arkansas does] not have standing to seek a declaratory judgment with respect to Ark. Const. Art. II, § 8.... There is no allegation that [First Arkansas] was denied the opportunity to pay Mr. Toland's sheriff's bond. Without actual injury, any declaration as to [First Arkansas] would be advisory. The

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