Tolbert v. Greenwood Cotton Mill

• Decision Date: 06 July 1948
• Docket Number: 16099.
• Citation: 48 S.E.2d 599,213 S.C. 43
• Parties: TOLBERT v. GREENWOOD COTTON MILL.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

48 S.E.2d 599

213 S.C. 43

TOLBERT v. GREENWOOD COTTON MILL.

No. 16099.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

July 6, 1948

Grier, McDonald, Todd & Burns, of Greenwood, for appellant.

Nicholson & Nicholson, of Greenwood, for respondent.

OXNER Justice.

This is an appeal from an order overruling a demurrer by defendant on the ground that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

Plaintiff alleges that in 1904 he purchased from his brother, Robert R Tolbert, seven acres of land adjoining other lands owned by him, immediately thereafter enclosed said land with a fence and has been in open and continuous possession of said property, holding same adversely to the defendant and all others, for a period of more than forty years; that the deed to the seven acre tract was not recorded and a number of years ago was destroyed by fire when his house was burned; that about two years prior to the commencement of this action, he agreed to sell the timber on both the seven acre tract and his adjoining land, at which time the defendant made some claim to the seven acres, and when he advised the defendant of his title and ownership, he was informed that there would be no further claim, but the purchaser of the timber refused to cut it after the dispute arose; that recently he sold said timber to the Greenwood Lumber Company but when a sawmill was moved on said property defendant ordered the Greenwood Lumber Company not to cut or saw the timber and made claim thereto, whereupon the Greenwood Lumber Company refused to cut the timber while the matter was in dispute; that the Greenwood Lumber Company paid the purchase price in full but after the defendant made claim to the seven acres, the money was deposited with the Clerk of Court for Greenwood County to be held pending the determination of said dispute; that, on information and belief, within the last few years the defendant purchased some adjoining property that originally belonged to his brother, Robert R. Tolbert, but the land so purchased did not include any part of the land in dispute; and that the defendant's illegal and unwarranted action in interfering with his use and occupation of said property has 'caused him much damage'. The prayer is that said 'land be declared to be the property of the plaintiff'; that the defendant be enjoined and restrained from interfering with plaintiff's use and possession of said property; and for damages in the sum of $2000.00.

The Court below held that the complaint stated 'a cause of action to quiet title to the lands in question'.

It is well established that a complaint is not subject to demurrer if it contains any allegations entitling the plaintiff to relief either on the law or the equity side of the court. Board of Directors v. Lowrance et al., 111 S.C. 295, 97 S.E. 830; Flowers v. Price, 190 S.C. 392, 3 S.E.2d 38; and that 'a demurrer will not be sustained to a complaint even if it states a cause of action different from that to which the plaintiff supposes himself entitled.' Spigner v. Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co., 148 S.C. 249, 146 S.E. 8, 9.

We think the complaint states a cause of action authorized by Section 878 of the Code of 1942, which is as follows: 'Any person in possession of real property, by himself or his tenant, or any person having or claiming title to vacant or unoccupied real property, may bring an action against any person who claims, or who may or could claim, an estate or interest therein, or a lien thereon, adverse to him for the purpose of determining such adverse claim and the rights of the parties, respectively.'

Statutes of similar import have been enacted in a number of states. The purpose and effect of such statutes are to enlarge the power of the court to determine adverse claims to land so as to authorize the quieting of title in cases where an action would not lie under the strict rules of equity practice. They are designed to afford an easy and expeditious mode of quieting title to real estate. The statutory remedy is broader and more comprehensive than that formerly afforded by a court of equity. 44 Am.Jur., Quieting Title, Section 5, page 6; 51 C.J., Quieting...