Toledo Area AFL-CIO Council v. Pizza

Decision Date22 August 1995
Docket NumberNo. 3:95 CV 7417.,3:95 CV 7417.
Citation898 F. Supp. 554
PartiesTOLEDO AREA AFL-CIO COUNCIL, etc., et al., Plaintiffs, v. Anthony G. PIZZA, etc., et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of West Virginia

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Stewart R. Jaffy, Stewart Jaffy & Associates, Columbus, OH, Theodore Sachs, Sachs, Kadushin, O'Hare, Helveston & Waldman, Detroit, MI, Jennifer L. Brunner, Brunner & Brunner, Columbus, OH, for plaintiffs.

Ralph C. Zychowicz, Jr., Office Of The Prosecuting Attorney, Toledo, OH, for Anthony Pizza, Lucas County, Ohio, Board of Elections.

Elise Porter, Office Of The Attorney General, Health and Human Services Section, Columbus, OH, Jeffrey S. Sutton, Diane R. Richards, Office Of The Attorney General, Chief Counsel's Staff, Columbus, OH, for Bob Taft, Ohio Elections Commission.

Janet Elizabeth Hales, Cooper, Straub, Walinski & Cramer, Toledo, OH, for Ohio Farm Bureau Federation and Ohio Chapter of the National Federation of Independent Business amicus curiae.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

KATZ, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and Defendants' opposition thereto. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) in that an actual controversy exists entitling the Plaintiffs to a declaration of their rights with respect to the significant questions raised related to the validity of newly-enacted amendments to those sections of the Ohio Revised Code governing state regulation of political contributions and expenditures, otherwise known as the Ohio Campaign Finance Reform Act, as those sections are impacted by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Because this Court does not deem it necessary at this stage of the litigation to reach the issue raised in the complaint relating to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, jurisdiction respecting that statute is not discussed herein.

Venue is proper in this District and Division pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) and (2).

BACKGROUND
Parties

Plaintiffs Toledo Area AFL-CIO council, the Ohio State AFL-CIO, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees ("AFSME"), and Seafarers International Union of North America are each voluntary, unincorporated labor associations. Plaintiff William Burga is President of the Ohio State AFL-CIO, while Plaintiff Dal Lawrence is President of the Toledo Area AFL-CIO council. Both individual plaintiffs sue in their official union and individual capacities.

Defendant Anthony G. Pizza is the Lucas County, Ohio, Prosecutor; Defendant Bob Taft is the Ohio Secretary of State. Additional Defendants are the Board of Elections of Lucas County, Ohio and the Ohio Elections Commission. Defendant Pizza is the public official responsible for prosecution of violations of the questioned statutes upon reference by the Board of Elections and/or Ohio Elections Committee; the Defendant entities have the responsibility to investigate irregularities, violations, etc. with respect to the impacted legislation and refer any such alleged violations to the appropriate prosecutorial authority for potential prosecution. Defendant Taft is the Chief election officer of the State of Ohio, whose duties include, inter alia, the administration of those sections of the Ohio Revised Code pertaining to political contributions and/or campaign finance regulation.

No objections have been raised with respect to the standing of any party. It, therefore, is clear that all parties Plaintiff have standing before this Court, and that all parties Defendant are appropriate parties in this action and are properly before the Court. Further, all parties Plaintiff have in the past engaged in and represent that they will in the future engage in political conduct prohibited by various sections here in question, thus subjecting them to exposure to significant criminal penalties.

Factual Background

This action challenges the constitutionality of several sections of Ohio Amended Substitute Senate Bill No. 8 ("S.B. 8"), enacted by the Ohio legislature on April 25, 1995, signed by the Governor on May 24, 1995 and scheduled to become effective August 23, 1995. The several sections amend Ohio's statutory regulation scheme governing political contributions, solicitations and expenditures. Plaintiffs allege that there is no record or legislative history of actual or threatened corruption which led to these proposed reforms in campaign finance regulation. Rather, it is contended that the sole thrust of the new statutory provisions is significantly to restrict labor organizations, their agents and representatives in the exercise of their rights of political speech protected by the First Amendment, and in violation of their rights to Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. As a matter of fact, the Ohio legislature has no formal, or, to the Court's knowledge, informal legislative history; this makes inquiry into legislative intent outside the language of the statute an exercise in futility. Many cases cited by the parties turn on protecting a legitimate stated public interest which a state, state agency or local body addressed through legislation being analyzed for constitutionality by a Court. Such analysis is made difficult by the absence of legislative history in Ohio.

Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief, including a preliminary injunction to bar enforcement of several provisions of the Ohio Revised Code intended to be amended by S.B. 8, to-wit: Sections 3517.082(B)(1) and (3); 3517.09(C); 3517.092(F)(1) and (2); 3517.102(D)(1); 3599.03(A) and (B); and 3599.031(H) and (I).

Defendants have responded that as to each section attacked by Plaintiffs there is ample legal justification and that none of the sections violate Plaintiffs' constitutional rights, including those granted by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Further, Defendants deny that O.R.C. § 3599.03(I) is an unconstitutional abrogation of contracts, prohibited by Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution.

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

There are four factors which the Court must consider in determining whether a preliminary injunction should issue:

(1) the likelihood of plaintiff's success on the merits; (2) whether the injunction will save the plaintiff from irreparable injury; (3) whether the injunction would harm others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served.

International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local Union No. 1937 v. Norfolk Southern Corp. 927 F.2d 900, 903 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 813, 112 S.Ct. 63, 116 L.Ed.2d 38 (1991). The four factors are not prerequisites to be met, but the Court must attempt to balance them. While the preliminary injunction standard is a flexible test, the finding of irreparable harm is essential. Friendship Materials, Inc. v. Michigan Brick, Inc., 679 F.2d 100 (6th Cir.1982); In re DeLorean Motor Co., 755 F.2d 1223, 1228 (6th Cir.1985).

A hearing was held on July 27, 1995 on a motion by Plaintiffs for a temporary restraining order sought to restrain Defendant Taft from pursuing another action. Defendant Taft filed an action in Common Pleas Court, Franklin County, Ohio, on July 21, 1995 (nine days after the filing of this case), seeking interpretation of the subject statutes under both Federal and Ohio Constitutions. This Court issued a temporary restraining order on July 28, 1995 enjoining Taft from pursuing the state Court action with respect to federal constitutional issues. Counsel for Defendant subsequently advised this Court that the state Court action in Franklin County was dismissed by action of the Judge, sua sponte. The temporary restraining order was, therefore, permitted to expire at the end of ten days.

The issues in this case have been fully briefed by the parties and a hearing was held on August 16, 1995, at which time both affidavit and live testimony was offered, and both sides presented oral argument in amplification of their respective positions. Additionally, an amicus brief has been filed and reviewed by the Court.

The Defendants continue to argue that this Court should abstain from ruling on the constitutionality of these provisions affecting significant First Amendment rights of the Plaintiffs; various reasons are advanced for such abstention. As noted on the record at the hearing on the motion for temporary restraining order, this Court does not agree that abstention is appropriate in this, a significant First Amendment case. Non-compliance with or violation of the questioned statutory provisions subjects the violator to consequential criminal liability. Further, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently definitively held that where First Amendment rights are the subject of possible violation by state statute, a Federal District Court should not abstain from hearing the case and ruling on the issues raised. G & V Lounge v. Michigan Liquor Control Comm'n, 23 F.3d 1071 (6th Cir.1994).

Defendants have also urged the Court to abstain from ruling herein until after the adoption of regulations by Secretary of State Bob Taft. O.R.C. § 3517.15 directs the Secretary to adopt rules necessary for the enforcement and administration of, inter alia, the sections here at issue. Chapter 119 of the Ohio Revised Code provides, in brief, that the rules or regulations be submitted and a period of ninety days is provided for public hearings and comments. Counsel for Defendants have submitted to the Court for in camera inspection proposed administrative rules propounded by Secretary Taft pursuant to § 3517.15(A). The Court has reviewed pertinent portions of the proposed rules, including but not limited to the definitions of "Labor Organization", "Member", and "Affiliation", as well as that section which indicates who may be solicited for contributions to a labor organization's Ohio PAC. Those sections address several of the infirmities which appear in the statutes involved in this...

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