Toler v. Dostal, A118793 (Cal. App. 4/30/2009), A118793
Decision Date | 30 April 2009 |
Docket Number | A118793 |
Parties | JOEL THOMAS TOLER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. JANET DOSTAL et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Solano County, Super. Ct. No. FCS 028734.
This appeal has been taken from an order of the trial court that granted defendants' anti-SLAPP motion (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16).1 We conclude that the motion was properly granted and affirm the judgment.
Plaintiff and defendants are residents of American Canyon and members of the Spurs Trail Homeowner's Association (the Association). The membership of the Association consists of 16 owners of property in a rural area of Solano County. The record does not disclose how many more people occupy the community. When the events that are at issue in the case before us occurred, defendant Janet Dostal was president of the Association.
On October 21, 2006, Dave Boykin, a resident of Spurs Trail, observed two dogs attack and inflict injuries on his pet goat before they were confronted by him and fled. After the attack he followed the dogs to plaintiff's residence. Boykin told other residents of the area, including Dostal, that he thought the dogs responsible for the attack belonged to plaintiff.
At a regularly scheduled meeting of the Association on November 8, 2006, one of the topics discussed and recorded in the minutes was "the dog attack." The next day, the Association published and disseminated to its members the minutes of the meeting in the form of a newsletter which stated:
Plaintiff filed the present action for defamation on November 16, 2006. Defendants subsequently filed an anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuits against public participation) motion to strike plaintiff's complaint (§ 425.16, subd. (b)). After a hearing the trial court granted the motion. This appeal followed.
Plaintiff presents several challenges to the trial court's ruling on the anti-SLAPP motion, the first of which is that he failed to receive proper notice of the motion. He claims that the document served on him failed to contain "a notice of the motion [or] the motion itself." Defendants do not dispute that the notice of the motion to strike was defective, but argue that plaintiff "waived the procedural defects" by appearing at the hearing on the motion and opposing it on the merits.
The record indicates that plaintiff was served with the "Anti-SLAPP Motion" pursuant to section 425.16, which specified a hearing date of January 23, 2007. He filed opposition to the motion, which included argument that the complaint was not subject to the anti-SLAPP statute. He also filed a supporting declaration from a fellow member of the Association, Linda Layton, directed at the issue of prevailing on the merits of the defamation action. Plaintiff's counsel then appeared at the hearing — which was continued twice and did not occur until May 31, 2007 — and pointed out to the court that in the proof of service "there was no notice of motion, no notice, no motion," only a "points and authorities" and a "declaration from Janet Dostal." Counsel asserted that "procedurally the motion is void," although he acknowledged that a claim of defective service was not raised in the written opposition. Plaintiff's counsel then proceeded to argue the merits of the motion.
We find that plaintiff waived any claim of inadequate or defective notice. " " (Eliceche v. Federal Land Bank Assn. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1349, 1375, quoting from Tate v. Superior Court (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 925, 930; see also Urshan v. Musicians' Credit Union (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 758, 768; Alliance Bank v. Murray (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 1, 7-8.) (De Luca v. Board of Supervisors (1955) 134 Cal.App.2d 606, 609; see also Carlton v. Quint (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 690, 697.)
Plaintiff did not make a special appearance at the hearing on the motion to contest the validity of the notice. Nor did he seek a continuance of the hearing — which had already been continued for four months to prepare opposition. Instead, he prepared and filed written opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion, which included a supporting declaration, then appeared at the scheduled hearing and presented further argument on the merits of the motion. He is therefore foreclosed from claiming that he received inadequate service or was denied a reasonable opportunity to oppose the motion. (Eliceche v. Federal Land Bank Assn., supra, 103 Cal.App.4th 1349, 1375; Carlton v. Quint, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th 690, 697-698.)
Plaintiff claims that the cases finding a waiver of defective notice are "inapposite here" because he did not fail to "object at the hearing," but rather raised the issue "at oral argument." Although we agree that plaintiff did not forfeit his claim in the trial court by failing to object, he has confused forfeiture with waiver. (See City of Hollister v. Monterey Ins. Co. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 455, 487.) "[F]orfeiture results from the failure to invoke a right, while waiver denotes an express relinquishment of a known right; the two are not the same." (People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 411.) Where, as here, a party appears and contests a motion in the court below, a waiver of any defects or irregularities in the notice of the motion occurs. (Eliceche v. Federal Land Bank Assn., supra, 103 Cal.App.4th 1349, 1374-1375; Pacific Std. Life Ins. Co. v. Tower Industries, Inc. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1881, 1888.) And, (Reedy v. Bussell (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1272, 1288-1289, italics omitted, citing Carlton v. Quint, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th 690, 697.)
In addition, the record demonstrates to us that no prejudice to plaintiff resulted from defective notice of the motion. " (Reedy v. Bussell, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th 1272, 1289, italics omitted.) The record before us negates rather than proves prejudice to plaintiff. The hearing on the anti-SLAPP motion was continued for four months, and in the interim plaintiff filed written opposition, complete with a supporting declaration, that thoroughly argued the merits of the motion. Plaintiff's counsel appeared at the hearing and presented additional argument without any specific complaint that the defective notice prevented him from more effectively contesting the motion.2 Any defect in the notice was harmless to plaintiff and does not require reversal of the judgment. (Id. at pp. 1289-1290.)
Plaintiff complains that the statements in the Association newsletter do not qualify as protected activity under section 425.16, subdivision (e). Specifically, he claims that the "small neighborhood" newsletter of a "private association" is not a "public forum," and the commentary in the newsletter does concern an issue of "public interest," as required by the statute.
"Determination of a special motion to strike involves a two-part inquiry." (Feldman v. 1100 Park Lane Associates (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1477.) (Hailstone v. Martinez (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 728, 735.) ...
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