Toler v. Steed
| Decision Date | 29 July 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:98cv224-D-A.,1:98cv224-D-A. |
| Parties | DAREN TOLER, PLAINTIFF, v. MARK STEED in his individual capacity, DEFENDANT. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
Presently before the court is the Defendant's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. After careful consideration, the court finds that the Defendant's motion should be granted. This section 1983 action, arising from the Defendant's conduct during a traffic stop, is barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity.
At all times relevant to this action, the Defendant Mark Steed was a trooper with the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol. At approximately 6:00 p.m. on October 17, 1997, the Defendant was on duty and driving eastbound on State Highway 82 in Lowndes County, Mississippi. The Plaintiff Daren Toler, a black male, also an officer in the United States Air Force, was traveling westbound on Highway 82 in a 1998 Toyota Camry. Using a radar speed-detection unit, the Defendant concluded that the Plaintiff was driving 88 miles per hour in a 70 mile-per-hour zone. The Defendant turned on his blue lights, crossed the median, and pursued the Plaintiff a short time until the Plaintiff pulled his vehicle to the shoulder of the highway.
Approaching the Plaintiff's vehicle, the Defendant requested the Plaintiff's driver's license and vehicle registration papers. The Plaintiff complied with the request, displaying both documents, which were issued in North Carolina. The Plaintiff's tag was also issued in North Carolina. However, the Plaintiff commented that the tag was improper in that it was issued for the Plaintiff's previous vehicle, a 1997 Toyota Camry. The Plaintiff explained that he had purchased his current vehicle the previous month in North Carolina and that he had only obtained a valid tag for the current vehicle four days ago.
After reviewing the Plaintiff's license and registration papers, the Defendant returned to the patrol car to write a citation for speeding. However, while writing the citation, the Plaintiff discovered that, according to the Defendant's computer records, the tag was not registered to a 1997 or 1998 Toyota Camry, but to a white Oldsmobile. Also, according to the Defendant, the tag was dirty, which aroused suspicion in the Defendant because the Plaintiff's vehicle was clean. Therefore, the Defendant approached the vehicle to shine his flashlight through its windows. Then he returned to the patrol car to call for backup.
When he learned that backup was coming, the Defendant returned to the Plaintiff's vehicle and asked the Plaintiff to step out of it. The Plaintiff asked why, and the Defendant replied "because I said so." The Defendant then searched the Plaintiff's person, handcuffed him, and placed him in the back of the patrol car. According to the Plaintiff, the search of the Plaintiff's person was conducted in a "verbally abusive manner." (Amended Complaint ¶ 16). While the Plaintiff was detained in the patrol car, the Defendant searched the Plaintiff's vehicle, including his glove box, trunk, and a suitcase in the trunk. Neither this search, nor the search of the Plaintiff's person, revealed any weapon or incriminating item. However, during a search of the vehicle, the Defendant did discover the valid tag1 on the Plaintiff's back seat, as well as a receipt reflecting the Plaintiff's purchase of the vehicle.2 Despite this fact, the Defendant left the Plaintiff handcuffed in the back of the patrol car, shined a flashlight in his eyes, and, according to the Plaintiff, "verbally harass[ed]" him for displaying an incorrect tag on his vehicle. (Amended Complaint ¶ 19). When the Plaintiff asked the Defendant why he was being held, the Defendant said, "I'm running the show."
The Defendant ticketed the Plaintiff for speeding, switching tags, and disobeying a lawful order. The Defendant then drove the Plaintiff to the Adult Detention Center in Columbus, Mississippi. It is unclear from the record how long the Plaintiff was detained at the detention center, although the Plaintiff never alleges that he was detained overnight. Some time after being released, the Plaintiff pled guilty to speeding and paid a fine. The remaining charges were eventually dismissed.
In his amended complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that "[t]he only reason [he] was subjected to the above-described harassment was because he is black, driving a new car, and in Mississippi." (Amended Complaint ¶ 25). Citing provisions of the United States Constitution, the Plaintiff alleges in particular that the Defendant violated the Plaintiff's right under the Fourth and Fourteen Amendments to be secure in his person and effects against an unreasonable search and seizure, his right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and his due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Amended Complaint ¶ 28). For these alleged violations, the Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At this juncture, the Defendant asserts qualified immunity as to each of the Plaintiff's claims.
Under section 1983,
[a] police officer who, acting under color of state law, subjects a United States citizen to a deprivation of his constitutional rights is liable for damages to the injured party. The Supreme Court has read section 1983 in harmony with general principles of tort immunities and defenses rather than in derogation of them. Thus, a police officer may interpose a defense of qualified immunity when faced with a section 1983 action.
Petta v. Rivera, 133 F.3d 330, 333 (5th Cir.1998). "A police officer is entitled to claim the cloak of qualified immunity `unless it is shown that, at the time of the incident, he violated a clearly established constitutional right.'" Mangieri v. Clifton, 29 F.3d 1012, 1015 (5th Cir.1994) (quoting Spann v. Rainey, 987 F.2d 1110, 1114 (5th Cir.1993)). Stated differently, qualified immunity provides "ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S. Ct. 1092, 1096, 89 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1986). Because qualified immunity is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S.Ct. 534, 536, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991) (citations and quotations omitted).
Once a defendant pleads qualified immunity, the district court first must determine whether, under current law, he has alleged a constitutional violation at all. The second prong requires courts to make two separate inquiries: whether the allegedly violated right was "clearly established" at the time of the incident; and if so, whether the defendant's conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of the clearly established law.
Evans v. Ball, 168 F.3d 856, 860 (5th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). See also Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231-32, 111 S. Ct. 1789, 1793, 114 L. Ed. 2d 277 (1991) (). Accordingly, this court shall first examine whether, under current law, the Plaintiff has alleged a constitutional violation at all. Only to the degree that the Plaintiff has successfully alleged a constitutional violation need the court proceed to examine whether the Defendant's conduct was objectively reasonable in light of the clearly established law at the time of the incident in question.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. One of the Plaintiff's claims under the Fourth Amendment is that the Defendant falsely arrested him. "[T]he right to be free from arrest without probable cause is a clearly established constitutional right." Mangieri v. Clifton, 29 F.3d 1012, 1015 (5th Cir. 1994) (). However, "[t]here is no cause of action for `false arrest' under section 1983 unless the arresting officer lacked probable cause." Fields v. City of South Houston, Tex., 922 F.2d 1183, 1189 (5th Cir.1989) (quoting Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368, 372-73 (4th Cir. 1974)). See also Sorenson v. Ferrie, 134 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 1998) (). Whether an officer had probable cause depends on whether, at the time of the arrest, the "facts and circumstances within [his] knowledge and of which [he] had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that [the arrested] had committed or was committing an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S. Ct. 223, 225, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1964). "Even if there was not probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for the crime charged, proof of probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for a related offense is also a defense." Pfannstiel v. City of Marion, 918 F.2d 1178, 1183 (5th Cir.1990).
In this case, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact regarding whether the Defendant had probable cause to arrest the Plaintiff for speeding. See Amended Complaint ("Plaintiff had deserved a . . . speeding ticket for going in excess of the posted limit."). See also Miss. Code Ann. § 45-3-21(1)(a)(vi) (); Miss. Code Ann. § 63-3-201 (). Indeed, the Plaintiff pled guilty to speeding,...
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