Toler v. Wyrick, 77-47C(2).
| Decision Date | 04 April 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 77-47C(2).,77-47C(2). |
| Citation | 430 F. Supp. 545 |
| Parties | Earl William TOLER, Jr., Petitioner, v. Donald H. WYRICK, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
Earl William Toler, Jr., pro se.
John D. Ashcroft, Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Mo., for respondent.
Petitioner Earl William Toler, Jr., a Missouri state prisoner, pled guilty on January 20, 1975 in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County to two counts of robbery in the first degree with a dangerous and deadly weapon. He was sentenced to two concurrent terms of thirteen years imprisonment. Toler commenced this action in forma pauperis for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent Donald W. Wyrick, Warden, Missouri State Penitentiary, has filed copies of the state court records.
Petitioner alleges that his state imprisonment is unlawful, being in violation of the Constitution of the United States, because his guilty pleas were the products "of coercion and duress that resulted from the state trial court involving itself in plea discussions and passing judgment upon movant prior to any trial."
On October 2, 1975 petitioner filed a motion under Missouri Supreme Court Rule 27.26 to set aside these convictions upon the same allegations. The motion was denied without a hearing on October 7, 1975. On August 31, 1976 the denial of relief was affirmed on appeal. Toler v. State of Missouri, 542 S.W.2d 80 (Mo.App.1976). A motion for a rehearing and for transfer to the Supreme Court of Missouri was denied by the Court of Appeals on September 30, 1976. On November 8, 1976 the Supreme Court of Missouri denied a motion to transfer. Therefore, petitioner has exhausted all available state remedies, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c).
Petitioner argues that the trial court's participation in the plea bargain process coerced him into pleading guilty. He argues that it was error for the Rule 27.26 trial court not to grant him a hearing on this allegation and he seeks a hearing in this Court. Of course, a federal habeascourt must grant an evidentiary hearing, if the facts are in dispute and the petitioner did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing in the state court. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963). A hearing is not required when the record of the state court proceedings is uncontested and provides all the necessary data for a satisfactory determination of the issues. United States ex rel. McGrath v. La Vallee, 319 F.2d 308, 312 (2nd Cir. 1963). Although it is his position that the participation of the state trial court in the plea bargaining was inherently coercive, he argues that the denial of a hearing precluded him from establishing his mental state at the time of the guilty plea. In his brief before the Missouri Court of Appeals, when making this argument, petitioner stated:
The movant was not allowed to present any evidence in court or to testify himself as to his memory of the incidents complained of. He was not allowed a forum to express or establish his frame of mind at the time of the plea. The movant's entire contention rests on the question of whether or not he acted under duress. It is not enough that defendant at the time of the plea states that he is not under threats or being coerced. The fact that the defendant in open court states that the plea is not coerced does not foreclose inquiry as to its involuntariness. The movant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing and the denial of such a hearing was error. Citations omitted.
(Resp. Exh. C, 13).
As shown below, the resolution of petitioner's allegations hinges upon whether or not his guilty pleas were made voluntarily. In a voluntariness determination the focus of attention is turned upon the subjective mind of the person making the guilty plea. Griffith v. Wyrick, 527 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1975). This focus, however, is not so much influenced by a defendant's after the fact testimony concerning the state of his mind at the time of the plea as it is by an examination of those factors which allegedly made the plea involuntary. United States ex rel. Robinson v. Housewright, 525 F.2d 988, 991-992 (7th Cir. 1975); Calabrese v. United States, 507 F.2d 259, 260 (1st Cir. 1974); Ford v. United States, 418 F.2d 855, 858 (8th Cir. 1969).
Nowhere in the entire record of the state post-conviction proceedings and in the pleadings filed in this action does petitioner allege any facts relating to his guilty pleas which the denial of an evidentiary hearing prevented him from proving, other than his mental state at the time of the guilty pleas.
Petitioner's plea hearing transcript, quoted liberally below, indicates with apparent completeness all the plea bargain factors considered by the court, the prosecutor, and by petitioner when the pleas were entered. Petitioner has alleged the existence of no other conversations or representations to him which affected his decision to plead guilty. Therefore, the Court is of the opinion that the claim of involuntariness may be resolved without further evidentiary hearing.
Attached to the instant petition as an exhibit is a photocopy of the opinion in United States v. Werker, 535 F.2d 198 (2nd Cir. 1976). In Werker the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit granted the United States a writ of mandamus which prevented the District Court from informing the defendant in a pending criminal action what sentence would be imposed, if he should plead guilty, prior to the actual entry of the plea. The writ was granted by the Court of Appeals in the exercise of its supervisory authority over the District Court. The Court was not only concerned with the possible adverse effect which the trial court's participation in the guilty plea might have upon the plea's voluntariness, but also with possible delays in the action while awaiting a pre-sentence investigation report and the possible need for substitution of judges should the defendant reject the plea bargain. In its procedural aspects and facts Werker is inapposite to the instant case.
It cannot be doubted that the influence of a trial judge in plea bargaining negotiations may have a profound effect upon the ability of the defendant to make a reasoned choice. United States v. Tateo, 214 F.Supp. 560, 567 (S.D.N.Y.1963); United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F.Supp. 244, 254 (S.D.N.Y.1966). But not all judicial participation in plea bargaining is improper and causes a guilty plea to be involuntary. United States ex rel. Robinson v. Housewright, supra, at 991. The real issue is whether or not the plea was voluntarily made as indicated by its factual context. Id.
Petitioner argued before the Missouri Court of Appeals that from his colloquy with the state court judge he believed the judge had determined that the evidence and the seriousness of the offense were substantial, and that, if he did not plead guilty and stood trial, he faced a greater sentence than that for which he plea bargained (Resp. Exh. C, 8-11). The law is very clear that a guilty plea entered to avoid a possibly greater punishment is not by that very fact alone made involuntary. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); Moore v. Swenson, 487 F.2d 1020 (8th Cir. 1973); Earin v. Beto, 453 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied 406 U.S. 909, 92 S.Ct. 1618, 31 L.Ed.2d 819 (1972).
In Brady, supra, defendant pleaded guilty to kidnapping to avoid the possibility of a jury verdict death penalty. Without a jury the maximum punishment was life imprisonment. Before accepting the plea the trial court twice inquired as to the voluntariness of the plea. The Supreme Court stated:
The voluntariness of Brady's plea can be determined only by considering all of the relevant circumstances surrounding it. One of these circumstances was the possibility of a heavier sentence following a guilty verdict after a trial. It may be that Brady, faced with a strong case against him and recognizing that his chances for acquittal were slight, preferred to plead guilty and thus limit the penalty to life imprisonment rather than to elect a jury trial which could result in a death penalty. But even if we assume that Brady would not have pleaded guilty except for the death penalty provision of § 1201(a), this assumption merely identifies the penalty provision as a "but for" cause of his plea. That the statute caused the plea in this sense does not necessarily prove that the plea was coerced and invalid as an involuntary act.
397 U.S. at 749-750, 90 S.Ct. at 1469 (citations, footnote omitted). The court further stated that the plea must not be caused by mental coercion which overbears the will of the defendant, or by actual or threatened physical harm. Id. Brady was able with the aid of counsel to determine the advantages of trial against the advantages of a guilty plea. The following standard for the voluntariness of a guilty plea was stated:
A plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e. g. bribes).
Id., at 755, 90 S.Ct. at 1472 (emphasis added), quoting Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101, at 115 (5th Cir. 1957). The court further stated "Under this standard, a plea of guilty is not invalid merely because entered to avoid the possibility of a death penalty." Id.
An examination of the plea hearing transcript shows that petitioner was informed by the trial court that each robbery charge carried a possible maximum penalty of life imprisonment and a minimum penalty of five years imprisonment. The court then stated the plea bargain...
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