Toles v. State
| Decision Date | 26 April 2002 |
| Citation | 854 So.2d 1171 |
| Parties | Clarence J. TOLES v. STATE of Alabama. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Robert M. Beno, Montgomery, for appellant.
William H. Pryor, Jr., atty. gen., and Andy Scott Poole, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
Alabama Supreme Court 1011854.
On August 10, 2001, Clarence J. Toles was convicted of reckless manslaughter, a violation of § 13A-6-3(a)(1), Ala.Code 1975. On September 10, 2001, the trial court sentenced Toles, as a habitual felony offender, to serve 15 years in prison. See § 13A-5-9(a)(2), Ala.Code 1975. The trial court split the sentence, ordered Toles to serve three years, and suspended the remainder of the sentence. This appeal followed.
At trial, Toles presented three witnesses to testify to his good character. After the presentation of all of the evidence, and at the conclusion of the jury charge, Toles's defense counsel attempted to object to the omission of some of his requested jury charges, in particular requested charges 2 and 3, which read:
(C.R.37-38.) Toles's defense counsel could not complete his objection because the trial court discontinued the discussion in order to retire the jury.
After the jury had retired, the trial court proceeded to hear defense counsel's objections. At that point, Toles objected to the trial court's refusal to charge the jury on his requested instructions 2 and 3:
(R. 787-88.)
"`An objection ... should fairly and specifically point out the particular grounds on which an alleged error occurred in order to inform the trial judge of the legal basis of the objection, thereby affording the trial judge an opportunity to reevaluate his or her initial ruling in light of the grounds alleged and to change it, if deemed necessary.'"
Covington v. State, 620 So.2d 122, 127 (Ala.Crim.App.1993) (quoting Ex parte Webb, 586 So.2d 954, 957 (Ala.1991)). This principle of appellate procedure certainly applies to alleged errors in charging the jury. See Rule 21.3, Ala. R.Crim. P. However, this Court has consistently reviewed issues, though in the technical sense not preserved by a proper objection at trial, where "[i]t is clear that the trial court understood the basis for the objection." Covington v. State, 620 So.2d at 127 (citing Ex parte McCall, 594 So.2d 628, 631 (Ala. 1991); Ex parte Pettway, 594 So.2d 1196, 1200 (Ala.1991)); Felder v. State, 593 So.2d 121, 122-23 (Ala.Crim.App.1991); and Marshall v. State, 570 So.2d 832, 834 (Ala. Crim.App.1990).
We find support for the proposition that Toles preserved his jury charge argument in Ex parte Weaver, 763 So.2d 982 (Ala. 1999). In Weaver, at the close of the jury charge, but before the jury retired to deliberate, the following exchange took place:
Weaver, 763 So.2d at 984. The State argued on appeal that Weaver's claim that the trial court erred in refusing to give the requested jury instruction was not preserved for appellate review because, it argued, the objection was not sufficiently specific. The Alabama Supreme Court stated that Weaver "did not make a proper objection to the refusal of the requested charge." Weaver, 763 So.2d at 986. However, the Alabama Supreme Court, quoting Felder, stated: "`Although the "magic words" were never employed and although defense counsel should have been specific in stating the grounds of his objection, it is apparent that both defense counsel and the trial court understood [the objection to the jury charge].'" Weaver, 763 So.2d at 985 (quoting Felder v. State, 593 So.2d 121, 122-23 (Ala.Crim.App.1991)).
The Alabama Supreme Court further noted that, unlike Felder, there had been no charge conference in Weaver's case, so the requested charges were not discussed prior to the jury charge. In this case, Toles, like Weaver, did not have the benefit of a charge conference and therefore "objected after the court had already given its instructions to the jury." Weaver, 763 So.2d at 986.
Additionally, in the present case, there is further proof that Toles preserved his jury charge argument because the trial court terminated the discussion with the statement: "I'm refusing [those requested charges] and your objection is noted and overruled." (R. 788.) (Emphasis added.) The trial court expressed an understanding of the appellant's objection when it overruled the objection by stating that the objection was "noted." The trial court also made it clear that no further discussion was necessary, expected, or allowed. Therefore, from the discourse between the trial court and defense counsel, it is clear that the trial court understood the appellant's objection to its refusal to give the requested charges, and "it would be `unreasonable and both realistically and practically indefensible to hold that the appellant waived this issue,'" Weaver, 763 So.2d at 986 (quoting Felder, 593 So.2d at 123). Thus, Toles has preserved his arguments regarding requested jury instructions 2 and 3.
"A trial court has broad discretion in formulating its jury instructions, provided they are an accurate reflection of the law and facts of the case." Coon v. State, 494 So.2d 184, 186 (Ala.Crim.App. 1986). "The trial court's refusal to give written requested charges does not constitute error when the charges are covered in the trial court's oral charge, are confusing or misleading, are inapplicable or abstract, or are an incorrect statement of the applicable law." Stout v. State, 547 So.2d 894, 898-99 (Ala.Crim.App.1988).
A jury instruction similar to requested jury charge 2 has been held to be misleading in Beavers v. State, 32 Ala.App. 223, 23 So.2d 602 (1945). The Court of Appeals had held that the trial court's refusal to give the following jury instruction amounted to reversible error: "`The court charges the jury that proof of good character, if proved to your reasonable satisfaction, may be sufficient to authorize you to acquit the defendant when taken in connection with all the other testimony.'" Beavers, 32 Ala.App. at 224, 23 So.2d 602, 603 (Ala.App.), rev'd, 247 Ala. 181, 23 So.2d 604 (1945). However, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and upheld the trial court's refusal to give the charge based on the fact that such charges are misleading and tend to confuse the jury. Beavers v. State, 247 Ala. 181, 23 So.2d 604 (1945). We hold similarly in this case. The trial court's refusal to give that charge was correct.
However, requested jury charge 3 is a correct statement of the law, is not...
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