Tolliver v. Standard Oil Co.

• Decision Date: 08 July 1968
• Docket Number: No. 52587,No. 1,52587,1
• Citation: 431 S.W.2d 159
• Parties: Clinton O. TOLLIVER et al., Appellants, v. STANDARD OIL COMPANY et al., Respondents
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 159

431 S.W.2d 159

Clinton O. TOLLIVER et al., Appellants, v. STANDARD OIL COMPANY et al., Respondents.

No. 52587.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

July 8, 1968.

Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Court En Banc Denied

Sept. 9, 1968.

John B. Ewing, Jr., John M. Gibson, Kansas City, for appellants, Ewing, Yonke, Shackleford & Gibson, Kansas City, of counsel.

James E. Burke, F. Russell Millin, Kansas City, for respondents, Burke, Jackson & Millin, Kansas City, of counsel.

STOCKMAN, Judge.

This is a suit for damages in two counts. The eleven plaintiffs originally filed separate suits of identical nature which were consolidated by court order. Since the consolidation is not under attack, the cases will sometimes be referred to as one action. Count 1 of the petition purports to state a cause of action against Standard Oil Company only for its alleged failure to furnish a service letter in compliance with § 290.140, RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S. The damages sought on this count in each case are $5,000 actual and $5,000 punitive. Count 1 was dismissed by the trial court for failure to state a claim. Count 2 of the petition undertakes to charge Standard and its plant managers with conspiracy to injure the plaintiffs, to cause them to be discharged from their employment and to prevent them from obtaining suitable employment elsewhere. The damages sought on Count 2 are $50,000 actual and $100,000 punitive. On defendants' motion, judgment was rendered for them on Count 2 based on the pleadings, admissions of the parties, and affidavits and exhibits on file. From these sources we state the salient facts giving rise to this litigation.

On July 8, 1959, employees of Standard at its Sugar Creek Refinery in Jackson County, represented by the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, went on strike and established picket lines at the plant entrances. The plaintiffs were among the strikers. On August 11, 1959, the Circuit Court of Jackson County issued a temporary injunction against fourteen named individual defendants, including the plaintiffs, and others acting in concert with them, enjoining them from committing or attempting to commit certain acts of violence and interference with employees and others undertaking to enter the Sugar Creek Plant or doing business with the Company. Thereafter, an information was filed charging these plaintiffs, among others, with criminal contempt for violation of the injunction and an order to show cause was issued September 16, 1959. The parties were served and a hearing was had at which these plaintiffs appeared in person and were represented by counsel. On the evidence adduced, the court made detailed findings that the parties had committed forbidden acts ranging from threats and intimidation to acts of extreme violence such as damaging and overturning automobiles and the assaulting and beating of other employees attempting to report for work. By its order entered October 23, 1959, the Circuit Court of Jackson County found these plaintiffs guilty of criminal contempt and assessed their punishment at imprisonment in the county jail for terms ranging from thirty days to six months. No appeal was taken; however, the convicted employees sought release from custody by petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed in the Supreme Court of Missouri and in the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri. These attempts were unsuccessful and the terms of imprisonment were served as ordered.

On November 11, 1959, letters signed by the defendant Livesay on behalf of Standard were sent to the plaintiffs informing them that their services with the Company were terminated effective that date. The letters were all similar and stated: 'This action is being taken as a consequence of your improper conduct during the strike.' These discharge letters were prepared and mailed after the plant manager, R. C. Livesay, had reviewed the judgment of the Circuit Court of Jackson County rendered October 23, 1959, which found these plaintiffs guilty of criminal contempt and ordered them committed.

Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed claims for unemployment benefits with the Division of Employment Security of the State of Missouri. At the hearing of these claims the employer, Standard Oil Company, introduced into evidence the Judgment and Order of Commitment rendered by the Circuit Court of Jackson County on October 23, 1959. Mr. Livesay, the plant manager, testified that each of the claimants was discharged because of improper conduct during the strike after he had reviewed the findings and judgment of the court in the action for criminal contempt. On January 22, 1960, a deputy of the Division of Employment Security found that the claimants had been discharged by Standard for misconduct connected with their work.

The claimants appealed and a hearing was had at which claimants appeared and were represented by counsel. The referee found as did the deputy that each of the claimants had committed acts of misconduct connected with his work for which he had been discharged. The decision of the appeals tribunal rendered September 2, 1960, referred to § 288.050, RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S., which provides that a claimant may be denied certain benefits if it is found that he has been suspended or discharged for misconduct connected with his work. In this regard, the decision of the appeals tribunal further states: 'It is not misconduct connected with work for a worker to strike against his employer in a lawful way, but it is misconduct connected with work for a worker to commit unlawful acts in connection with a strike. Where a court has properly issued a temporary injunction to restrain striking workers from committing certain acts a final conviction by the court of the violation of the injunction by a worker is evidence of a law violation by the worker. Such a law violation under such circumstances constitutes an act of misconduct connected with work because a striking worker is under an obligation to his employer to refrain from law violation in connection with the strike. Thus, under the circumstances the Referee finds that each of the claimants committed an act of misconduct connected with his work for wich he was discharged.' The claimants did not seek a further review of the findings of the Division of Employment Security and the decision became final.

The plaintiffs filed their petitions in the instant cases on October 19, 1960. Count 1 of plaintiffs' petition was dismissed on defendants' motion on July 6, 1961. On the same day the defendants' motion for a more definite statement was sustained. On September 4, 1962, the plaintiffs filed an amended petition as to Count 2 to which the defendants filed their answer. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on September 26, 1966; a judgment for the defendants was entered on October 11, 1966. This appeal is from the dismissal and judgment for the defendants on both counts.

The first count of plaintiffs' petition, directed against Standard alone, purports to seek damages for failure to furnish a statutory service letter stating the 'true reason' for their discharges. This count of the petition alleged that a service letter was requested and one was furnished, but 'that the letter issued to plaintiff by defendant as aforesaid fails to comply with the requirements of Section 290.140, RSMo 1949, in the following respect, to-wit: Said letter failed to state the true reason for which plaintiff was discharged from the service and employment of defendant.'

The defendants filed a combination motion to dismiss both Counts 1 and 2 or in the alternative, for a more definite statement. Attached to the motion was a copy of the letter of November 11, 1959, terminating the employment, a copy of the Decision of the Appeals Tribunal of the Division of Employment Security, a copy of the service letter furnished, a copy of the Judgment and Order of Commitment for Criminal Contempt rendered by the Circuit Court of Jackson County. The termination letter states the discharge was on account of the employee's 'improper conduct during the strike.' The service letter dated September 16, 1960, states that the employee's 'services were terminated on November 11, 1959 for misconduct during our recent strike.' The decision of the Appeals Tribunal ruled, inter alia, that the employee 'committed an act of misconduct connected with his work for which he was discharged.' The trial court sustained the motion to dismiss Count 1, overruled the motion to dismiss Count 2, and sustained the motion for a more definite statement as to Count 2. The plaintiffs amended Count 2 on September 4, 1962, but no offer was made to amend Count 1 or request for leave to do so although the case was pending in that condition for more than five years before final judgment was rendered on both counts.

The motion to dismiss as related to Count 1 asserted a failure to state a claim on which any relief could be granted. It pointed out that the plaintiffs did not attach a copy of the service letter and did not set out the relevant contents or true reason in the petition. The motion further alleged that the truth of the reasons given for the discharge had been finally and conclusively determined by the decision of the Appeals Tribunal of the Division of Employment Security and the judgment of the Circuit Court in the contempt proceedings. In support of thier contention that the trial court erred in dismissing Count 1, the plaintiffs cite five cases, all of which involve evidentiary questions such as the sufficiency of the evidence to make a submissible case. None of them have anything to do with the sufficiency of the pleadings; hence, they are of no assistance in solving the present problem.

Supreme Court Rule 55.06, V.A.M.R., provides that a pleading which sets forth a claim for relief shall contain 'a short and plain statement of the facts showing that the pleader is...