Toltec Ranch Company v. George Cook

• Decision Date: 21 December 1903
• Docket Number: No. 48,48
• Citation: 48 L.Ed. 291,191 U.S. 532,24 S.Ct. 166
• Parties: TOLTEC RANCH COMPANY, Plff. in Err. , v. GEORGE COOK, S. N. Cook, Alfred Ward, George Ward, G. J. Wells, C. F. Wells, Joseph Dudley, and Charles Dudley
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

191 U.S. 532

24 S.Ct. 166

48 L.Ed. 291

TOLTEC RANCH COMPANY, Plff. in Err.,

v GEORGE COOK, S. N. Cook, Alfred Ward, George Ward, G. J. Wells, C. F. Wells, Joseph Dudley, and Charles Dudley.

No. 48.

Argued and submitted November 3, 1903.

Decided December 21, 1903.

The Toltec Ranch Company, a California corporation, brought this action in 1901 in the district court of the first judicial district, Box Elder county, state of Utah, to quiet title to the S.E. 1/4 of the S.E. 1/4 of section 27, township 8, north or range 2 west, Salt Lake meridian, United States survey. Title in fee was alleged. The defendants answered separately claiming different portions of the land, and each alleged peaceable, continuous, and adverse possession under claim of title in himself and grantors adversely to the plaintiff for more than thirty years, and that plaintiff's cause was 'barred by the statute of limitations as provided by §§ 2856 and 2872 inclusive, of the Revised Statutes of Utah.' Under these sections to constitute a bar there must be an adverse holding for at least seven years.

The title of plaintiff, it was admitted, was derived as follows: Patent from the United States dated January 20, 1900, to the Central Pacific Railroad Company; the railroad company by deed dated October 17, 1895, to D. P. Tarpey; the latter and wife to M. F. Tarpey by deed December 8, 1895; M. F. Tarpey to plaintiff, October 17, 1896. The patent to the company was issued in pursuance of the grant to the company made by the act of Congress approved July 1, 1862, as amended by the act of July 2, 1864, to aid in the construction of a railroad and telegraph line from the Missouri to the Pacific ocean. 12 Stat. at L. 489, chap. 120; 13 Stat. at L. 356, chap. 216.

It was admitted that the land in controversy was within the 10 mile limit of the grant to the company, and that the map of location of the railroad was filed in the office of the Secretary of the Interior on the 20th of October, 1868.

It was also admitted that no claim of any right or title to or in the right of way of the railroad company across the lands in controversy was made by any or either of the defendants.

The defendants introduced evidence to sustain the averments of their answers.

The case was submitted to a jury on special interrogatories, and the jury found that the defendants had been in possession of the land claimed by them, either by themselves or their predecessors and grantors, from some time in 1868 to the commencement of the action. The jury also returned the following verdict: 'We, the jury empaneled in the above-entitled cause, find the issues joined herein in favor of the said defendants and against the plaintiff, no cause of action.' Judgment was entered upon the verdict. It was affirmed by the supreme court of the state. The court said, after discussing questions with which we are not concerned:

'The next question for consideration is whether the statute of limitations can prevail as a bar to the action when it appears that the patent of the United States government was not issued to the plaintiff until January 20, 1900.' [24 Utah, 453, 67 Pac. 1123.]

The question was answered in the affirmative. The chief justice of the state granted this writ of error.

Messrs. Maxwell Evarts, Lindsay R. Rogers, and T. D. Johnson for plaintiff in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 534-536 intentionally omitted] Mr. B. H. Jones for defendants in error.

Statement by Mr. Justice McKenna:

Mr. Justice McKenna, after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court:

The case is in narrow compass. The question presented is whether adverse possession under claim of right for the period prescribed by the statute of limitations of Utah before patent was issued by the United States can prevail against the latter. It has been decided by this court that adverse possession of land gives title to it and all of the remedies which attach to the title. This was expressly ruled in Sharon v. Tucker, 144 U. S. 533, 36 L. ed. 532, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 720. The suit was a bill in equity to establish, as matter of record, a title acquired by adverse possession, and it was brought against those who, but for such acquisition, would have been the owners. Mr. Justice Field, speaking for the court, said:

'It is now well settled that by adverse possession for the period designated by the statute, not only is the remedy of the former owner gone, but his title has passed to the occupant, so that the latter can maintain ejectment for the possession against such former owner should he intrude upon the premises. In several of the states this doctrine has become a positive rule by their statutes of limitations declaring that uninterrupted possession for the period designated to bar an action for the recovery of land shall of itself constitute a complete title. Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 599, 17 L. ed. 261; Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. S. 620, 623, 29 L. ed. 483, 485, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 209.' See also Shelby v. Guy, 11 Wheat. 361, 6 L. ed. 495.

Adverse possession, therefore, may be said to transfer the title as effectually as a conveyance from the owner; it may be considered as tantamount to a conveyance. And the Central Pacific Railroad Company had the title. Deseret Salt Co. v. Tarpey, 142 U. S. 241, 35 L. ed. 999, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 158. It would seem, therefore, an irresistible conclusion that it could have been transferred by any of the means which the law provided. It is, however, contended otherwise, and Ankeny v. Clark, 148 U. S. 345, 37 L. ed. 475. 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617; Barden v. northern P. R. Co. 154 U. S. 288, 38 L. ed. 992, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1030, and Nelson v. Northern P. R. Co. 188 U. S. 108, 47 L. ed. 406, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 302, are urged to support the contention. A comparison of those cases with Deseret Salt Co. v. Tarpey becomes necessary.

Deseret Salt Co. v. Tarpey was an action of ejectment. Tarpey was the plaintiff in the trial court. He relied for his title upon a lease from the Central Pacific Railroad Company, and it became necessary to consider the nature of the congressional grant to that company. The issue made was direct and unmistakable, and the decision was equally so. The plaintiff contended that the grant vested in the company the legal title. It was asserted on the other hand that the title to the land was retained until the cost of selecting, surveying, and conveying all the granted lands was paid, and, also, that by other provisions of the granting act the title remained in the government until patent issued. Both contentions were rejected. The court said that the terms of the grant 'import the transfer of a present title, not one to be made in the future. They are that 'there be and is hereby granted' to the company every alternate section of the lands. No partial or limited interest is designated, but the lands themselves are granted, as they are described by the sections mentioned. Whatever interest the United States possessed in the lands was covered by those terms, unless they were qualified by subsequent provisions, a position to be presently considered.' Those provisions were considered, and it was determined that they did not qualify the terms of the grant conveying the title, or essentially limit them. Anticipating the question that, if such be the import of the act, what was the necessity of patents, it was said, there were many reasons why the issue of patents would be of great service to the patentees. 'While not essential to transfer the legal right, the patents would be evidence that the grantee had complied with the conditions of the grant, and to that extent the grant was relieved from the possibility of forfeiture for breach of its conditions, . . . they would thus be in the grantee's hands deeds of further assurance of his title, and therefore a source of quiet and peace to him in his...