Tomas v. Buckley

Decision Date22 May 2020
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 19-cv-12079-ADB
PartiesJOSEPH TOMAS, Plaintiff, v. SAGE M. BUCKLEY, COREY K. HODSON, and PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS OR TRANSFER

BURROUGHS, D.J.

On October 7, 2019, Plaintiff Joseph Tomas ("Plaintiff"), appearing pro se, filed a complaint against Defendants Sage M. Buckley ("Buckley"), Corey K. Hodson ("Hodson"), and Progressive Casualty Insurance Company ("Progressive") (collectively, "Defendants"), [ECF No. 1 ("Compl.")], which he later amended, [ECF No. 25 ("Am. Compl.")]. Plaintiff seeks $300,000 in damages for injuries sustained in an accident in which Buckley allegedly struck Plaintiff's vehicle with Hodson's car while Buckley was driving under the influence. [Am. Compl. at 1, 4]. Plaintiff also requests $300,000 in punitive damages against Progressive for evading liability in connection with expenses arising from the accident. [Id. at 4]. Currently before the Court is Buckley and Hodson's motion to dismiss or transfer. [ECF No. 32-1]. For the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss or transfer, [ECF No. 32-1], is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.1

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the complaint, [Compl.], and amended complaint, [Am. Compl.], the factual allegations of which are assumed to be true when considering the motion to dismiss, Ruivo v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 766 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 2014). Typically, an amended complaint supersedes an original complaint, however, "that does not mean that the original complaint is a nullity and can be relevant for no purpose whatever." Ultra-Temp Corp. v. Advanced Vacuum Sys., 194 F.R.D. 378, 382 (D. Mass. 2000); see also Fiorillo v. United Techs. Corp., No. 3:13-cv-1287, 2015 LEXIS 133221, at *3 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2015) ("[T]he Court may still credit admissions in the original complaint and attached exhibits." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

Plaintiff's amended complaint, even construed generously, fails to establish this Court's jurisdiction or to explain why venue is proper here. See [Am. Compl.]. In addition, the amended complaint contains scant details about the accident at issue. [Id. (stating only the date and time of the accident and the parties involved)]. Accordingly, the Court must rely on Plaintiff's original complaint, [Compl.], and the exhibits attached thereto to discern the factual allegations that support Plaintiff's claims. The Court will refer to the original complaint only to review additional facts and allegations about jurisdiction and venue, but not to alter Plaintiff's claims. See Barrigas v. United States, No. 17-cv-10232, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38694, at *18 (D. Mass. Mar. 9, 2018) ("A district court may examine facts outside the complaint to determine whether its venue is proper." (quoting Universal Trading & Inv. Co. v. Bureau of Representing Ukrainian Interest in Int'l & Foreign Cts., 898 F. Supp. 23 301, 317 (D. Mass. 2012))); Ultra-Temp Corp., 194 F.R.D. at 382 ("[C]laims alleged in an original complaint and not contained in an amended complaint are waived."); see also Bobola v. F/V Expectation, 204 F. Supp. 3d 382,387 (D. Mass. 2016) ("A document filed by a pro se party 'is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007))).

The accident at issue occurred during the early morning hours of October 14, 2018 on the Douglas Turnpike in Burrillville, Rhode Island. [Am. Compl. at 1; ECF No. 1-1 at 3 ("Police Report")]. A Police Report documenting the accident, attached as an exhibit to Plaintiff's original complaint, indicates that Buckley turned her vehicle left, hitting Plaintiff's vehicle as he turned right. [Police Report at 8]. Buckley was driving a vehicle owned by Hodson and insured by Progressive. [Id. at 5-6]. Both Buckley and Hodson are residents of Rhode Island. [Compl. at 2-3 (listing Rhode Island as Buckley and Hodson's state of residence); Police Report at 3 (listing Rhode Island as Buckley and Hodson's state of residence); ECF No. 32-2 at 1 ("At all times relevant to this case, defendants, Sage Buckley and Corey K. Hodson, were and remained residents of Pascoag, Rhode Island.")]. The Burrillville Police Department issued Buckley a summons for committing a "laned roadway violation," a "manner of turning at intersect[ion]" violation, and for refusing to submit to a chemical test and preliminary breath test. [Police Report at 4]. Buckley was also charged with driving under the influence. [Id. at 5]. Plaintiff was described as "[a]pparently [n]ormal" and was not administered a chemical test. [Id. at 9].

Plaintiff alleges that Buckley caused the accident, [Compl. at 4; Am. Compl. at 1], and that Hodson is liable for damages because he permitted Buckley to use his car while she was under the influence of drugs and alcohol, [Am. Compl. at 2]. As for Progressive, Plaintiff alleges that the insurer intentionally caused Plaintiff to be denied medical treatment for injuries sustained in the accident by contacting his doctors and making them doubt that they would receive reimbursement for their services. [Id. at 3]. Prior to Progressive's communication withPlaintiff's healthcare providers, his primary care physician had ordered an MRI and recommended rehabilitative therapy. [Id. at 3]. Plaintiff also states that his car was a rented vehicle and that Progressive "caused [him] an issue with the car rental company." [Id. at 2].2

Plaintiff is seeking $150,000 in damages for medical expenses related to back and neck pain, and frequent headaches, [Am. Compl. at 4; Compl. at 4], and $150,000 for pain and suffering, [Am. Compl. at 4]. He is also seeking $300,000 in punitive damages from Progressive "for the [insensitive] insurance practices of . . . [repeatedly] refusing to provide the medical care needed." [Compl. at 5]; see also [Am. Compl. at 4].

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Defendants Incorrectly Named in Complaint

In court filings, Plaintiff, it is assumed innocently, refers to the named Defendant sometimes as "Corey Hodson" and sometimes as "Corey Hudson."3 Due to this inconsistency, the incorrect defendant was initially served—Corey Hudson of Woonsocket, rather than the intended Corey Hodson of Burrillville. See [ECF Nos. 9, 17]. On December 23, 2019, former Defendant Hudson filed his Answer to Plaintiff's complaint in which he disputed having lent his car to anyone, that his car was involved in an accident, and that Progressive was his insurer. [ECF No. 11 at 1]. In response to the summons served to Hudson, his attorney sent a letter dated January 6, 2020 that claimed mistaken identity and was accompanied by a stipulation requestingthat Plaintiff withdraw any claims against Hudson. [ECF No. 17-1]. In addition, on December 26, 2019, Defendant Progressive filed its answer to Plaintiff's complaint, noting that it was misnamed as "Progressive Insurance" in the complaint. [ECF No. 12].

In response to these communications, on January 13, 2020, Plaintiff moved to substitute as Defendants Corey K. Hodson and Progressive Casualty Insurance Company for Corey Hudson and Progressive Insurance Company, respectively, and to add the middle initial "M" to Sage Buckley, stating that these "misspelling[s]" caused "delayed service." [ECF No. 17]. The Docket Clerk has since revised the docket to reflect the Defendants' correct names. [ECF No. 20].

B. Motion to Dismiss

On March 6, 2020, Buckley and Hodson filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. [ECF No. 32-1]. On March 11, 2020, the Court issued an Order directing Plaintiff to file his response, if any, to the motion to dismiss by March 20, 2020. [ECF No. 38]. Plaintiff failed to respond or otherwise oppose the motion. "Nevertheless, 'the mere fact that a motion to dismiss is unopposed does not relieve the district court of the obligation to examine the complaint itself to see whether it is formally sufficient to state a claim.'" Doe v. Bradshaw, No. 11-cv-11593, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131915, at *10 (D. Mass. Sep. 16, 2013) (quoting Pomerleau v. W. Springfield Pub. Sch., 362 F.3d 143, 145 (1st Cir. 2004)).

III. DISCUSSION
A. Personal Jurisdiction

Personal jurisdiction refers to a court's "power to require the parties to obey its [orders]." Hannon v. Beard, 524 F.3d 275, 279 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Daynard v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt,Richardson & Poole, P.A., 290 F.3d 42, 50 (1st Cir. 2002)). "A plaintiff consents to the personal jurisdiction of a court by bringing suit in that court." Roberts v. Jack L. Marcus Co., No. 17-cv-11782, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6373, at *4 (D. Mass. Jan. 16, 2018) (citing Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67 (1938)). As to a defendant, however, the Due Process Clause "protects an individual's liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful 'contacts, ties, or relations.'" Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)). Therefore, a court may not assert jurisdiction over a defendant unless "the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). In addition to satisfying Due Process concerns, "[t]o establish personal jurisdiction in a diversity case, a plaintiff must satisfy . . . the forum state's long-arm statute . . . ." C.W. Downer & Co. v. Bioriginal Food & Sci. Corp., 771 F.3d 59, 65 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing Ticketmaster-New York, Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 204 (1st Cir. 1994)).

As a rule, a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a court's personal jurisdiction over a...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT