Tombs v. Rackly
Decision Date | 30 August 2013 |
Docket Number | No. 2:13-cv-1341 JAM KJN P,2:13-cv-1341 JAM KJN P |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
Parties | LARRY E. TOMBS, Plaintiff, v. RON RACKLY, et al., Defendants. |
Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted.
Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff's trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated to make monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding month's income credited to plaintiff's trust account.These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff's account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).
A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "requires only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;" it must contain factual allegations sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555. However, "[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Erickson v.Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, citations and internal quotations marks omitted). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93, and construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).
Plaintiff did not set forth a complete list of the defendants at the beginning of the complaint, but it appears that he names at least 24 individuals. Review of plaintiff's complaint is also made difficult by plaintiff's inclusion of every slight against him, including facts and allegations not relevant to cognizable civil rights claims.
Plaintiff names Ron Rackly, Warden of Deuel Vocational Institution, as a defendant.
The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) ( ). "A person 'subjects' another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made." Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendantholds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979) ( ); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978) (, )cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) ( ).
In the instant complaint, plaintiff includes no charging allegations as to Warden Rackly. Plaintiff is advised that he must include factual allegations supporting an alleged violation of a constitutional right as to every individual named in an amended complaint. Moreover, in the amended complaint plaintiff may not rely on Warden Rackley's supervisory role; plaintiff must allege specific facts demonstrating a link or connection between Warden Rackley and the constitutional violation alleged.
Plaintiff contends that many of the defendants verbally abused plaintiff or said things to plaintiff that he didn't like. Plaintiff is advised that verbal abuse and threats, without more, are not sufficient to state a constitutional deprivation under § 1983. Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732 (9th Cir. 1997) (, )overruled in part on other grounds by Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2008); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1996), amended 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998) ( ); Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987) ( ); Burton v. Livingston, 791 F.2d 97, 99, 101 n.1 (8th Cir. 1986) ( ). Plaintiff's claims that individual defendants verbally abused plaintiff are not cognizable and should not be included in any amended complaint.
Plaintiff claims defendant Boyd abused plaintiff's "mail rights" and tampered with plaintiff's mail because defendant Boyd sent plaintiff a notice that the envelope was damaged and that plaintiff would have to provide another envelope to send plaintiff's letter. (ECF No. 1 at 3.)
Prisoners enjoy a First Amendment right to send and receive mail. Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995). Nonetheless, prison officials may institute procedures for inspecting legal mail, which includes mail sent between attorneys and prisoners, see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576-77 (1974), and mail sent from prisoners to the courts, see Royse v. Superior Court, 779 F.2d 573, 574-75 (9th Cir. 1986). While the deliberate delay of legal mail which adversely affects legal proceedings presents a cognizable claim for denial of access to the courts, see Jackson v. Procunier, 789 F.2d 307, 311 (5th Cir. 1986), isolated incidents of mail interference without any evidence of improper motive or resulting interference with the right to counsel or access to the courts do not give rise to a constitutional violation. See Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 944 (10th Cir. 1990); Morgan v. Montanye, 516 F.2d 1367, 1370-71 (2d Cir. 1975); Bach v. Illinois, 504 F.2d 1100, 1102 (7th Cir. 1974).
Plaintiff's allegation as to defendant Boyd is factually insufficient and based on one isolated incident, and thus fails to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Later in the complaint, plaintiff lists ten defendants, including defendant Boyd, next to the phrase "tampered...
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