Tomko Woll Group Architects, Inc. v. Superior Court
| Decision Date | 27 June 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. B097730,B097730 |
| Citation | 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 300,46 Cal.App.4th 1326 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | , 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4865, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8038 TOMKO WOLL GROUP ARCHITECTS, INC., Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent. Reza GHANEI, Real Party In Interest. |
Kirtland & Packard, Robert A. Muhlbach and Joseph Geri, Los Angeles, for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Jay S. Rothman, Alhambra, for Real Party In Interest.
Collins, Collins, Muir & Traver and Robert H. Stellwagen, Jr., as Amicus Curiae.
Plaintiff sustained injuries more than five years after substantial completion of a real property improvement on which petitioner performed work. Relying on the four-year limitations period in Code of Civil Procedure section 337.1 1, petitioner seeks a writ of mandate directing the Los Angeles County Superior Court to vacate its ruling denying petitioner's summary judgment motion and enter an order granting the motion.
We conclude that it is not plaintiff's injury resulting from a patent deficiency, but substantial completion of construction of a real property improvement, that triggers the limitation period of section 337.1. We further hold that section 337.1 applies to actions involving a patent deficiency, whether that patent deficiency exists at the time of, or after, substantial completion of construction. We also hold that under the circumstances of this case, the deficiency causing plaintiff's injury was "patent" as a matter of law. We therefore grant the petition and issue a writ of mandate ordering the trial court to set aside its denial of petitioner's summary judgment motion and to enter an order granting summary judgment in favor of petitioner.
On March 1, 1993, plaintiff Reza Ghanei ("Ghanei") filed a complaint for damages for personal injuries against defendants Ronald T. English and R.T. English Construction Company. A second amended complaint named as additional defendants Budlong & Associates, Inc., and the petitioner, Tomko Woll Group Architects ("Tomko").
The complaint's negligence cause of action alleged that defendants designed and built a lobby or patio adjacent to Rockwell International Corporation in Canoga Park. The complaint further alleged that defendants breached their duties of care by poorly designing, planning, and building this lobby or patio, which proximately caused Ghanei to trip and fall and suffer injuries and damages.
Tomko moved for summary judgment. Ronald T. English, R.T. English Construction Company, Inc., Budlong & Associates, Inc., Hanover Architectural Products (identified as Doe 4), and Tokiwa Landscape, Inc. (identified as Doe 5) joined Tomko's summary judgment motion.
The trial court denied the summary judgment motion and Tomko subsequently filed its petition for writ of mandate in this court. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (l).)
"Any party may move for summary judgment in any action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding." (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a).) The motion and the opposition "shall be supported by affidavits, declarations, admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters of which judicial notice shall or may be taken." (Id. at subd. (b).) Separate statements setting forth plainly and concisely all material facts which the parties contend are undisputed must be included. (Ibid.) The trial court shall grant the summary judgment motion if all the papers submitted show that no triable issue as to any material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In determining whether the papers show that no triable issue exists as to any material facts, the court shall consider all of the evidence and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence, except that summary judgment shall not be granted on inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence, if contradicted by other inferences or evidence, which raise a triable issue as to any material fact. (Id. at subd. (c).)
A defendant or cross-defendant meets his or her burden upon a summary judgment motion if that party has proved "one or more elements of the cause of action ... cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action." (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o)(2).) Once the defendant has met that burden, the "burden shifts to the plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists[.]" (Ibid.; Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 653.)
The parties agree that Ghanei's injury arising out of the defect in the work of improvement occurred on May 5, 1992.
The parties do not agree about the date of substantial completion. Tomko alleged that the work of improvement which Ghanei alleged to be deficient was substantially completed no later than September 30, 1986. Ghanei objected to this allegation as irrelevant, and also disputed the allegation, citing a change order, signed by representatives of Budlong & Moore Associates, Inc. and Rocketdyne, which reflected a new completion date of February 27, 1987. For purposes of this appeal, we shall use Ghanei's later date of substantial completion, February 27, 1987.
Tomko's separate statement alleged that the defect in the work of improvement is a patent deficiency. Ghanei disputed this allegation, citing his amended responses to special interrogatories, which asserted the defect was latent and that raised paving stones were a visible manifestation of an underlying latent design and construction defect.
Tomko's summary judgment motion argued that Tomko had established the affirmative defense that the limitations period in section 337.1 barred Ghanei's action. Tomko argued that the defect allegedly causing Ghanei's injury was a patent deficiency and that the work of improvement was substantially completed in 1986, more than four years before plaintiff's alleged injury in 1992.
The trial court's order denying summary judgment stated that a material triable issue of fact existed concerning when the alleged defect became patent so as to trigger the application of section 337.1. The court read the statute to require a defect to be patent at the time of substantial completion of the improvement, or at least four years before the accident. Tomko's petition followed.
Tomko claims that:
1. Section 337.1 bars Ghanei's action;
2. No case law supports the lower court's construction of the unambiguous statute;
3. Section 337.1 makes the date of substantial completion the event that triggers the commencement of the limitations period.
Section 337.1 states: "(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, no action shall be brought to recover damages from any person performing or furnishing the design, specifications, surveying, planning, supervision or observation of construction or construction of an improvement to real property more than four years after the substantial completion of such improvement for any of the following:
Tomko contends that the petition raises only a legal issue of statutory construction, that no case law supports the superior court's ruling, and that this court must resolve the question whether a patent defect must be patent at the time of substantial completion for section 337.1 to apply.
Ghanei responds that the trial court correctly construed section 337.1 and Tomko failed either to prove that the alleged defect existed when the project was completed or that the alleged defect was patent in law or fact. Ghanei further argues that the case is not simply a case of statutory construction, the facts are in dispute, and the latency or patency of a defect depends on whether or not it is apparent by reasonable inspection.
The most significant aspect of this appeal concerns whether a defect must be patent at the time of substantial completion in order to trigger the four-year limitations period, or whether a patent defect arising at some later time is the event that triggers the four-year limitations period. The trial court construed the statute...
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