Ton v. City of Chicago

• Citation: 216 Ill. 331,74 N.E. 1044
• Parties: TON et al. v. CITY OF CHICAGO.
• Decision Date: 23 June 1905
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

216 Ill. 331

74 N.E. 1044

TON et al.

v.CITY OF CHICAGO.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 23, 1905.

Appeal from Cook County Court; O. N. Carter, Judge.

Proceedings by the city of Chicago, against Mrs. John Ton and others, for the confirmation of special assessments. From a judgment of confirmation, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

The following is the plat referred to in opinion:

Image 1 (4.16" X 4.44") Available for Offline PrintSamuel J. Howe, for appellants.

Robert Redfield and Frank Johnston, Jr. (Edgar Bronson Tolman, Corp. Counsel, of counsel), for appellee.

RICKS, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the county court of Cook county confirming a special assessment levied to pave a system of streets in the city of Chicago.

But one question is raised on this record. Appellants contend that the system of streets that is provided for in the improvement under the ordinance in question was originally part of a scheme for improving a much larger system, and originated at the time that other improvements were recommended and made, and therefore should have been made under one ordinance, and referred and published.

It appears from the record that on September 24, 1900, three ordinances were recommended by the board of local improvements for the paving of the streets in question, together with other streets in the same portion of the city, and that the aggregate cost of the three improvements was $157,500. The record discloses, however, that the three ordinances were passed at different dates. The first ordinance was passed February 11, 1901, and the assessment was made and confirmed and the work completed, and the assessment is in process of collection. The second ordinance was passed June 24, 1901, and on February 24, 1904, repealed and a new recommendation made, and new ordinance substituted and passed, under which the assessment has been confirmed. The third ordinance was originally passed on October 5, 1903. This ordinance was repealed December 11, 1903, and a new recommendation having been made for this improvement on June 27, 1904, a new ordinance, being the one in question, was passed by the city council on the same day. This new ordinance and recommendation included an additional street. The contention of the appellants is that the three ordinances were all one system and originated at one time; that the cost of such system was largely in excess of $100,000, and the ordinance should have been referred and published as provided by section 11 of the act of 1897, in relation to local improvements, which was not done; and that the making of the three separate improvements was for the purpose of getting a system below $100,000, and avoiding the reference and publishing of the ordinance as provided by law.

A map of the three above systems was introduced in evidence, and shows different colors for the different systems, and shows in what manner they connect. We have examined the map and the ordinances, and have derived much assistance from the use of the map in our consideration of the case.

The three ordinances provided for the paving with slag and limestone the streets named in them, and the pavement was all of the same general character. The first ordinance covered the streets between 113th and 115th streets and Indiana avenue and Wentworth avenue. The second ordinance provided for the streets between 111th and 113th streets and Michigan avenue and Stewart avenue. And the third, ordinance now in question, provided for the paving of streets between 107th street on the north and 111th street on the south and Indiana avenue and Michigan avenue. When the three improvements are completed the two first improvements will lie mainly side by side, and the third improvement extends north from the northeast corner of the second improvement, so that the three systems of improvements lie in somewhat of an L shape. No evidence was introduced except the ordinances and proceedings of record.

This court has uniformly announced and recognized the rule that in the passage of ordinances providing for local improvements the city council is clothed with power to determine what local improvement is required, its nature and character, when it shall be made, and the manner of its construction. These are matters confided to the discretion of the city council, and that discretion, when honestly and reasonably exercised, cannot be reviewed in the courts. Myers v. City of Chicago, 196 Ill. 591, 63 N. E. 1037;Walker v. City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 531, 67 N. E. 369;English v. City of Danville, 150 Ill. 92, 36 N. E. 994;Vane v. City of Evanston, 150 Ill. 616, 37 N. E. 901; Dillon on Mun. Corp. (4th Ed.) § 94. If, however, it should be made to appear that the ordinance is unreasonable or oppressive, or if, from evidence aliunde or otherwise, it appears that the ordinance was passed in a particular manner for the evasion of the law, the courts will look beyond the mere face of the ordinance to its effect and operation, and judge it accordingly. Kerfoot v. City of Chicago, 195 Ill. 229, 63 N. E. 101;Ligare v. City of Chicago, 139 Ill. 46, 28 N. E. 934,32 Am. St. Rep. 179.

Looking at the record in this case, we find that the board of local improvements saw fit to recommend at the same time three separate ordinances for the three improvements which it is here claimed are involved in one scheme. While the law is that an improvement shall originate with the board of local improvements, that board has no other power than that of proposing the improvement and submitting an ordinance, with its recommendation and estimate, to the city council for its action, when the discharge of its duty and the exercise of its discretion begin. When these three ordinances were submitted to the city council, acting, as we think, within its discretion, it saw fit to pass only one of them, which it did on February 11, 1901, and an assessment was made under that ordinance, and the improvement was completed. Subsequently, on June 24, 1901...