Tonelli v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWNSHIP OF WYCKOFF
| Decision Date | 28 December 2005 |
| Parties | ALFRED TONELLI, Administrator Ad Prosequendum of the Estate of Virginia T. Tonelli, Deceased, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWNSHIP OF WYCKOFF, NEW JERSEY, Defendant-Appellant, and THE TOWNSHIP OF WYCKOFF, NEW JERSEY, Defendant. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Jeffrey L. Shanaberger argued the cause for appellant (Hill Wallack, attorneys; Mr. Shanaberger and Marilyn S. Silvia, on the briefs).
Donald A. Kessler argued the cause for respondent (Schwartz Simon Edelstein Celso & Kessler, attorneys).
Susan S. Hodges submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae, New Jersey School Boards Association Insurance Group (Archer & Greiner, attorneys).
On this appeal, we are called upon to determine whether, in addition to the immunities provided in the Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12-3, a governmental entity — in this case a public school board — enjoys the benefits of the Charitable Immunity Act. N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7 to -11. The trial judge answered that question in the affirmative and the Appellate Division reversed. We agree with the appellate panel and reaffirm our holding in Winters v. Jersey City, 63 N.J. 7, 8 (1973), that charitable immunity has no applicability to a governmental entity funded exclusively by the public and rendering services to which citizens are entitled as of right.
On March 24, 2002, then 79-year-old Virginia Tonelli and her husband, plaintiff Alfred Tonelli, went to the Lincoln School in Wyckoff to watch their granddaughter play soccer for a local club, the Wyckoff Torpedoes Soccer Club, Inc. (TSC). Lincoln School is a public school "owned and controlled" by defendant Wyckoff Board of Education (Board), a public entity. The Board has adopted a policy that permits non-profit private groups, like TSC, for a nominal fee, to make "full and proper use of the various school plants and facilities to meet the needs of the community." Under that policy, the Board allowed TSC to use Lincoln School's soccer field on the day in question.
Following the soccer game, at about 2:00 p.m., the Tonellis headed toward their car. As they were walking through the Lincoln School parking lot, Mrs. Tonelli tripped over a speed bump and fell, severely fracturing her hip. As a result of complications from her injuries, Mrs. Tonelli died six weeks later.
In September 2002, Alfred Tonelli, as Administrator ad Prosequendum of his wife's estate, sued the Board for negligently creating and maintaining the speed bump. The Board's answer asserted that, as a non-profit entity organized exclusively for educational purposes, the Charitable Immunity Act exempted it from liability.
Both parties moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether the Board was entitled to immunity under the Act. Tonelli relied on our decision in Winters, and on Hamel v. State, 321 N.J. Super. 67 (App. Div. 1999), and Gerber v. Springfield Board of Education, 328 N.J. Super. 24 (App. Div. 2000), Appellate Division decisions that held that local boards of education are not entitled to the protection of the Act. The Board countered that our recent decisions in O'Connell v. State, 171 N.J. 484 (2002), and Ryan v. Holy Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church, 175 N.J. 333 (2003), overruled those prior opinions. The trial judge agreed with the Board and Tonelli appealed.
The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the Legislature did not intend the Charitable Immunity Act to insulate purely public entities, such as public school boards, from liability. Tonelli v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. of Wyckoff, 373 N.J. Super. 421, 422 (App. Div. 2004). We granted the Board's petition for certification, 183 N.J. 215 (2005), along with the application of the New Jersey School Boards Association Insurance Group to appear as amicus curiae.
As might be anticipated, the parties' arguments are rooted in the dueling opinions of the trial judge and Appellate Division. The Board contends that because it satisfies the literal language of the Act it is entitled to immunity, and that the Appellate Division's contrary conclusion confounds our recent decisions in O'Connell and Ryan. Amicus, New Jersey School Boards Association Insurance Group supports that view, and argues that financial considerations warrant insulating Boards from liability.
Tonelli counters that the Legislature never intended charitable immunity to be available to instrumentalities of the state, that affording such immunity to public school boards would violate the legislative intent that animates charitable immunity and that neither O'Connell nor Ryan compels a contrary conclusion.
First recognized in this country nearly 150 years ago, "[t]he doctrine of charitable immunity is rooted in English common law." Parker v. St. Stephens Urban Dev. Corp., Inc., 243 N.J. Super. 317, 321 (App. Div. 1990)(citations omitted); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts §895E (1979). The original rationale stated for immunizing charities from tort liability was preventing the diversion of "charitable trust funds to non-charitable purposes in order to live up to the reasonable expectations of the benefactor." Parker, supra, 243 N.J. Super. at 321. As we later stated, "it would be contrary to the interests of society that funds dedicated to a charitable use be permitted to be diverted or diminished by the payments of judgments . . . where suit is instituted by the beneficiary of the charity." Jones v. St. Mary's Roman Catholic Church, 7 N.J. 533, 537-38 (1951).
Over time, a number of other cognate notions were identified as animating the charitable immunity doctrine, including the maintenance and preservation of charitable organizations and their trust funds for the purposes for which they were donated, the encouragement of altruistic activity through private philanthropy, and the relief of the government from the need to provide beneficent services. Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, §895E (1979). See also O'Connell, supra, 171 N.J. at 496 ().
In 1958, however, in a trilogy of cases, this Court abolished charitable immunity after finding that the doctrine "no longer comported with present day concepts of right, justice and morality." Parker, supra, 243 N.J. Super. at 322-23 (citing Benton v. Y.M.C.A., 27 N.J. 67, 69 (1958); Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 39 (1958); Dalton v. St. Luke's Catholic Church, 27 N.J. 22, 24 (1958)). We declared that such immunity was "counter to widespread principles which fairly impose[d] liability on those who wrongfully and negligently injure[d] others." Id. at 322 (quoting Collopy, supra, 27 N.J. at 47).
In direct response to our action, in 1959 the Legislature promulgated the Charitable Immunity Act, id. at 323, essentially "reinstating the common law doctrine as it had been judicially defined by the courts of this State." O'Connell, supra, 171 N.J. at 489 (emphasis added) (quoting Wiklund v. Presbyterian Church of Clifton, 90 N.J. Super. 335, 338 (Cty. Ct. 1966)(citing Anasiewicz v. Sacred Heart Church, 74 N.J. Super. 532, 535 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 38 N.J. 305 (1962))). Stated differently, because "the verbiage employed [in the Act] closely parallels the cases in which the immunity rule was enunciated," Parker, supra, 243 N.J. Super. at 324, "the effect of this statute was to reinstate the common law doctrine as it existed prior to its demise at the hands of the 1958 trilogy of Benton, Collopy and Dalton." Id. at 323. Thus, the language of the Act should be construed "in light of stare decisis to the end that [the] status quo be preserved." Parker, supra, 243 N.J. Super. at 324 (citing Anasiewicz, supra, 74 N.J. Super. at 535-36). Only those classes of entities that were immunized under common law remain within the sweep of the Act. However, as to those entities, the several provisions of the Act should be liberally construed to afford immunity. N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-10. That is the backdrop for our inquiry.
Accordingly, a statutorily enumerated institution seeking immunity must demonstrate that it "(1) was formed for nonprofit purposes; (2) is organized exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes; and (3) was promoting such objectives and purposes at the time of the injury to plaintiff who was then a beneficiary of the charitable works." Hamel, supra, 321 N.J. Super. at 72 (citations omitted). A non-profit entity that is organized exclusively for educational purposes satisfies the second prong. Ryan, supra, 175 N.J. at 346.
The Board maintains that it literally fits within that construct and that that should be the end of the inquiry. Tonelli asks that we eschew literal interpretation and hold that a school board is outside the scope of the Act even if it technically can satisfy the statutory terms.
We do not agree that the Board fits within the construct of a "non-profit corporation, society or association." N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7a. On the contrary, as "an instrumentality of the State itself," Durgin v. Brown, 37 N.J....
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