Toney v. Berkemer
| Decision Date | 07 September 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 82-1518,82-1518 |
| Citation | 6 Ohio St.3d 455,6 OBR 496,453 N.E.2d 700 |
| Parties | , 6 O.B.R. 496 TONEY, Appellant, v. BERKEMER, Sheriff, et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
It is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to grant a default judgment for failing to respond to discovery requests when the record does not show willfulness or bad faith on the part of the responding party.
On August 28, 1981, plaintiff-appellant, Will W. Toney, filed his complaint and interrogatories in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County against the defendants-appellees, Sheriff Harry Berkemer and several of his deputies. Appellant alleged that he was assaulted and beaten by the appellees-deputies, while incarcerated in the Franklin County Jail.
On October 30, 1981, appellees, having previously obtained an extension, timely filed their answer.
On November 18, 1981, appellees served appellant with their answers to appellant's interrogatories and also filed their own interrogatories and request for production of documents.
By letter dated January 7, 1982, the trial court informed the parties that a pretrial hearing was scheduled for February 16, 1982.
On January 22, 1982, appellant, having previously obtained an extension of time until January 19, 1982, served his answers to appellees' interrogatories.
On February 16, 1982, the trial court conducted the pretrial hearing. Prior to this proceeding, appellees had not filed any objections to appellant's answers to their interrogatories. At this pretrial, counsel for appellant provided counsel for appellees with appellant's emergency room report from the hospital and copies of bills from Evan J. Halas, M.D., a psychiatrist, and Lon Cordell, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist. Apparently, counsel for appellant was informed by the trial court that appellant's responses to appellees' interrogatories were inadequate and that all of appellees' discovery requests were to be answered by February 19, 1982, or appellees could move for a default judgment.
On February 17, 1982, the trial court filed its pretrial order dated February 16, 1982. The order reads in part as follows:
The order of the trial court failed to state with particularity the deficiencies in the appellant's answers to the interrogatories and the deficiencies in the response to the request for production of documents. Moreover, the order failed to state any reason why appellant was given such an unreasonably short period of time within which to comply with the trial court's discovery order.
On February 18, 1982, counsel for appellant received a copy of the trial court's pretrial order. On the very same day, counsel for appellant, notwithstanding that his secretary was ill, personally prepared and mailed "Plaintiff's Answer for Document Request" to counsel for appellees.
On February 22, 1982, appellees filed "Defendants' Motion for Sanctions for Plaintiff's Failure to Comply with Discovery Order." Appellees claimed the following deficiencies in appellant's answers to appellees' interrogatories: The answers did not contain appellant's verification; five questions were not answered; five questions contained an objection without giving any reasons; and twelve questions contained answers which were partially or totally unresponsive. Appellees also contended that appellant's answer to their document request was insufficient; that the two documents supplied at the pretrial were an inadequate response; and that other documents requested, and not supplied, were in appellant's possession or control.
On February 23, 1982, the trial court informed counsel for the parties that appellees' motion for sanctions was set for a non-oral hearing on March 9, 1982.
On March 5, 1982, counsel for appellant filed his "Memorandum Contra Motion for Sanctions" with two attached exhibits. In his memorandum, counsel for appellant informed the trial court of the following: that the reason for the delay in answering appellees' interrogatories and request for documents was that he had been ill and that his wife had been confined in a hospital; that the reason he had not submitted a copy of appellant's emergency room bill was that it had been misplaced, but would be submitted upon his receipt of a duplicate; that the original copy of the six-page medical report dated January 28, 1982, from Dr. Halas had been misplaced and that he had recently obtained a copy thereof and had furnished a copy to the appellees; that through inadvertence appellant's verification had not been set out at the end of his answers to the interrogatories (to remedy this, counsel had attached to this memorandum appellant's affidavit containing his verification to his answers to the interrogatories); that he had not submitted copies of appellant's previous hospital admission records because he did not have such copies, but had offered to provide appellees with appellant's authorization so tht they could obtain the requested documents; and that he had informed counsel for appellees that they were welcome to examine his entire case file and that he would gladly furnish them copies of anything they desired. Lastly, counsel for appellant informed the trial court that in his opinion, appellant had adequately answered the interrogatories and had adequately responded to the request for documents.
On March 10, 1982, the trial court granted appellees' motion for default judgment. The basis of its decision was that appellant had willfully failed to comply with its February 16, 1982 discovery order. The trial court, however, failed to state any factual basis or reasons to support its finding of willful misconduct.
On March 15, 1982, appellant filed his "Motion to Reconsider Decision for Sanctions and Award of Default Judgment."
On March 31, 1982, an oral hearing was conducted on appellant's motion to reconsider. The argument of counsel for appellant was essentially the same one contained in his "Memorandum Contra Motion for Sanctions." He again stressed that appellant had adequately answered the interrogatories and had adequately responded to the request for documents, but was willing to provide additional information, if so requested. The argument of counsel for appellees was essentially the same one contained in their motion for sanctions. However, counsel for appellees never indicated how appellant's delay in responding to the discovery requests had prejudiced the preparation of their case for trial.
On April 1, 1982, the trial court entered its decision overruling appellant's motion for reconsideration. The basis of the decision was
The trial court again failed to state with particularity the deficiencies in the appellant's answers to the interrogatories, and failed to state the particular deficiencies in the response to the request for production of documents. Moreover, the trial court failed to indicate how appellant's delay in responding to the discovery requests had prejudiced appellees' preparation of their case for trial.
Upon appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Robert C. Paxton, II, Walter W. Grelle, Jr., and Russell P. Herrold III, Columbus, for appellant.
Bricker & Eckler and David K. Conrad, Columbus, for appellees.
The issue presented here is whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting the default judgment in favor of appellees.
Civ.R. 37(A) and (B) provide broad discretion to the trial court to impose sanctions for failure to comply with the trial court's discovery orders. However, the United States Supreme Court has held that the harsh remedies of dismissal and default should only be used when the " * * * failure to comply has been due to * * * willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of petitioner." Societe Internationale v. Rogers (1958), 357 U.S. 197, 212, 78 S.Ct. 1087, 1096, 2 L.Ed.2d 1255. A trial court's imposition of the sanction of dismissal cannot be disturbed unless the dismissal was an abuse of the trial court's discretion. See Ward v. Hester (1973), 36 Ohio St.2d 38 , 303 N.E.2d 861.
Our examination of appellant's answers to the interrogatories and appellant's response to the document request reveals the following. This is basically an assault and battery action. Hence, the information sought by the interrogatories and document request, pertaining to the alleged injuries, alleged aggravation of prior injuries and alleged loss of wages, which information is relevant for the purpose of satisfying the discovery rules and is also of considerable weight in determining whether a default judgment sanction is appropriate here. However, the information sought by the other interrogatories and document request, although relevant for the purpose of satisfying the discovery rules, is not so sufficiently relevant to the conduct of the instant case that the appellant must respond or face the drastic sanction of default judgment. Dunbar v. United States (C.A. 5, 1974), 502 F.2d 506. Hence, with regard to the aforementioned essential information (alleged injuries, etc.) requested by appellees, we are of the opinion that appellant has complied with the trial court's discovery order to the extent necessary so as not to...
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