Toohey v. Toohey
Decision Date | 21 April 1950 |
Citation | 97 Cal.App.2d 84,217 P.2d 108 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | TOOHEY v. TOOHEY. Civ. 14256. |
Stanley D. Whitney, Alameda, H. Albert George, Alameda, of counsel, for appellant.
Landels & Weigel, San Francisco, for respondent.
This is a motion by respondent to dismiss an appeal on the ground that such appeal is frivolous.
The appellate courts are reluctant to dismiss an appeal on the ground of frivolity. Normally, the determination that an appeal is frivolous requires a full consideration of the case on its merits, and for that reason should only be considered after full briefing by both litigants. But this is a rule of policy, not one of power. The appellate courts possess inherent power to dismiss an appeal where an examination of the judgment roll discloses that the appeal is frivolous, or where a mere inspection of the record discloses that no relief can be granted appellant. In re Estate of Wunderle's Estate, 30 Cal.2d 274, 181 P.2d 874; Williams v. Duffy, 32 Cal.2d 578, 197 P.2d 341. Stated another way, where the interests of justice require it, the court may exercise such power.
In the present case the appellant has filed his opening brief in which he has fully set forth his contentions. On this motion, the respondent has fully set forth her contentions. The case may be determined upon a mere examination of the clerk's transcript. On the oral argument, counsel for appellant stated that the appeal was taken out of an abundance of caution in order to secure an interpretation of the order appealed from, and that it made no difference to appellant whether such an interpretation was secured as the result of this motion or in an opinion on the merits. Under such circumstances, and because the appeal, by this motion, has already been delayed long past the time it would have been considered on its merits had counsel for respondent briefed the issues involved instead of moving to dismiss, we are inclined to and will consider, on this motion, the issues presented.
The judgment roll discloses that on December 7, 1943, respondent was awarded a decree of divorce against her husband by the United States District Court at Anchorage, Alaska. So far as pertinent here, that decree provided that respondent should have judgment against appellant:
* * *'
Admittedly, respondent has not remarried, and at all times here involved has resided with the minor children.
In April of 1948, respondent filed an action in Alameda County to establish the Alaska decree. After a trial on the merits, the trial court, on November 15, 1948, found that the Alaska decree, a copy of which was annexed to the judgment and incorporated therein by reference 'was and is in every respect a valid judgment and decree for divorce, support of plaintiff, and custody and support of the minor children of plaintiff and defendant, and said judgment and decree is entitled to and shall be given full faith and credit in the courts of this State and is hereby established as such a judgment for divorce and support, entitled to be enforced in this state.' The judgment also awarded to respondent all moneys accrued and due to the date of the decree. No appeal was taken from this judgment.
Respondent apparently was disturbed because of the failure of this Alameda County judgment to direct expressly that payments continue after November 15, 1948. On February 14, 1949, she moved to correct nunc pro tunc the judgment of November 15, 1948, by making the addition suggested above. The motion was granted, and on March 1, 1949, the trial judge signed a corrected judgment and decree which incorporated all of the original decree and added one new paragraph. The nunc pro tunc decree recited that 'by clerical misprision, inadvertence, mistake and oversight, the form of said Conclusions of Law signed on said date failed to state the true conclusions of law of said Court.' The conclusions of law then adopted were identical with the...
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