Top Shelf v. Mayor & Aldermen for Savannah
Decision Date | 27 December 1993 |
Docket Number | No. CV 493-261.,CV 493-261. |
Citation | 840 F. Supp. 903 |
Parties | TOP SHELF, INC., d/b/a/ Classy Kats, Plaintiff, v. The MAYOR AND ALDERMEN FOR the CITY OF SAVANNAH, and the City of Savannah, a municipal corporation, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia |
Roy L. Allen, Jr. and Diane Marie Morrell, Savannah, GA, for plaintiff.
James B. Blackburn and Abda L. Qullian, Savannah, GA, for defendants.
The above-captioned action is plaintiff's second attempt at relief in this Court. As a result of a pending state criminal proceeding, the first action was dismissed pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). See Top Shelf, Inc. v. Mayor and Aldermen for the City of Savannah, 832 F.Supp. 361 (S.D.Ga.1993) ("Top Shelf I"). Following this ruling, plaintiff dismissed the appeal of its criminal conviction and filed the instant action.
At bench trial on November 15, 1993, the parties asked the Court to consolidate the preliminary and permanent injunction stages pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a)(2), and to issue a ruling on the merits based upon the briefs submitted in the instant matter and the stipulations and exhibits filed in the previous action. Accordingly, the Court renders the following finding of facts and conclusions of law as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a).
Plaintiff Top Shelf, Inc. ("Top Shelf") is a Georgia corporation doing business as Classy Kats in Savannah, Chatham County, Georgia. Classy Kats is licensed by the defendant City of Savannah ("the City") to serve alcoholic beverages. It offers nude dancing.
On July 22, 1993, the Mayor and Aldermen for the City adopted and codified an ordinance as 6-1222(h) in the City's code. It reads in pertinent part as follows:
Amendment to Pl.'s Pet. for Prelim.Inj. (hereinafter referred to as "6-1222(h)" or "the ordinance").
In enacting 6-1222(h), the City considered studies and findings of other municipalities and urban counties, including College Park, Georgia; Richmond County, Georgia; Atlanta, Georgia; Manatee County, Florida; Indianapolis, Indiana; Austin, Texas; Phoenix, Arizona; and Los Angeles, California. In addition to considering other areas' findings as to nude dancing, the Mayor and Aldermen considered the studies and recommendations of the city's Metropolitan Planning Commission relating to the zoning and land use effects of adult entertainment establishments, evidence presented to the Mayor and Aldermen in public hearings, and the experience of the Savannah Police Department. These studies indicated that the following adverse effects flowed from nude dancing: prostitution, violent and sex-related offenses, drug trafficking and use, illegal dispensing of alcoholic beverages, disorderly conduct, depression of property values in the surrounding neighborhood, increased expenditure for and allocation of law enforcement personnel, increased burden on the judicial system due to increased criminal behavior, and acceleration of community blight. While discussions at the July 8, 1993, meeting of the Savannah City Council indicate that the ordinance corresponded with the state's definition of lewd conduct, the ordinance itself does not purport to regulate obscenity or lewdness. Instead, the City enacted it to further "public health, safety and welfare."
On July 28, 1993, Steve Richardson, the manager and holder of the alcoholic beverage license for Classy Kats, was cited by officers of the Savannah Police Department for violating 6-1222(h). After a hearing on the citation in the Recorder's Court of Savannah and Chatham County, Richardson was found guilty and fined $500.00; Richardson then appealed this determination to the Superior Court of Chatham County. Before the appeal was adjudicated, Top Shelf filed Top Shelf I, which was dismissed under the abstention doctrine announced in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). Richardson dropped his Superior Court appeal, and Top Shelf filed the instant action.
Since Richardson's citation on July 28, 1993, Classy Kats has not offered nude entertainment and has attempted to comply with 6-1222(h). Its business has suffered from substantial decreases in customers and profits.
Top Shelf mounts three challenges to 6-1222(h): It asserts that the ordinance violates the Equal Protection Clause by having separate standards for mainstream and non-mainstream licensees, violates the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause by failing to adequately define mainstream establishments, and violates the Due Process Clause by setting forth an arbitrary and capricious standard in the mainstream exception.
Top Shelf challenges 6-1222(h) solely under the Constitution of the United States. The City's ordinance is virtually identical to one upheld under the Georgia Constitution by the Georgia Supreme Court in S.J.T., Inc. v. Richmond County, 263 Ga. 267, 430 S.E.2d 726 (Ga.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 601, 126 L.Ed.2d 567 (1993); cf. Harris v. Entertainment Sys., Inc., 259 Ga. 701, 386 S.E.2d 140 (1989) ( ). A challenge under the United States Constitution entails a different analysis, namely consideration of the Twenty-first Amendment.2See Harris, 386 S.E.2d at 142 ( ).
The Twenty-first Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "the transportation or importation into any State ... for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." U.S. Const. amend. XXI, § 2. The state's broad power under the Twenty-first Amendment to ban entirely the sale of alcoholic beverages includes the lesser power to ban the sale of liquor on premises where topless dancing occurs despite possible First Amendment implications. New York State Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 101 S.Ct. 2599, 69 L.Ed.2d 357 (1981) (per curiam); see also City of Newport v. Iacobucci, 479 U.S. 92, 107 S.Ct. 383, 93 L.Ed.2d 334 (1986) (per curiam); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 93 S.Ct. 390, 34 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972). Under this authority, ordinances similar to the "non-mainstream" portions of 6-1222(h) regularly have been upheld. See, e.g., LaRue, 409 U.S. at 111-112, 93 S.Ct. at 393-394 ( ); Iacobucci, 479 U.S. at 93, n. 1, 107 S.Ct. at 2600, n. 1; Bellanca, 452 U.S. at 714, n. 1, 101 S.Ct. at 2600, n. 1; Geneas, 911 F.2d at 580-581, n. 1; Lanier v. City of Newton, 842 F.2d 253, 255, n. 1; Fillingim v. Boone, 835 F.2d 1389, 1391, n. 1 (11th Cir.1988).
While the City clearly may ban the conduct described in the "non-mainstream" portions of 6-1222(h), the Court must determine whether the City may distinguish between mainstream and non-mainstream performances on the ordinance's face. To determine the constitutionality of this differentiation under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Top Shelf advocates application of the strict scrutiny standard given the ordinance's implication of First Amendment rights. The Court concludes, however, that rational relationship scrutiny is appropriate in light of the applicability of the Twenty-first Amendment in this matter.
The Twenty-first Amendment "outweighs any First Amendment interest in nude dancing"3 and allows the governing body to completely ban nude dancing. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 2568, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975)....
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