Torbert v. Jeffrey
Decision Date | 29 March 1901 |
Citation | 61 S.W. 823,161 Mo. 645 |
Parties | TORBERT v. JEFFREY, Appellant |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Saline Circuit Court. -- Hon. Richard Field, Judge.
Affirmed.
Stewart Taylor for appellant.
(1) Plaintiff's cause of action, as stated in the petition and as shown by the evidence, did not entitle him to the appointment of a receiver, because it nowhere appears in the pleadings or evidence that plaintiff had any title to the property itself, or that he had any lien thereon, or that the property itself constituted a special fund to which plaintiff had a right to resort in satisfaction of his claim, and for the further reason that no fraud, or imminent danger, if the immediate possession was not taken by the court, was shown. Moreover, the property was not within the jurisdiction of the court. (2) The court had no jurisdiction to appoint a receiver. The mere filing of a petition therefor did not confer such jurisdiction, especially when it had no jurisdiction of the res. Miller Bros. v. Perkins, 154 Mo. 629. (3) If no partnership existed there was nothing to authorize a court of equity, in a suit for dissolution of partnership, to lay hold of the business, enjoin it, and proceed to wind it up, and the refusal to set aside the restraining order was error and an abuse of judicial power. (4) There was no partnership. Clifton v. Howard, 89 Mo. 192; Ashby v. Shaw, 82 Mo. 76; Donnell v Harshe, 67 Mo. 170; Musser v. Brink, 68 Mo 242; s. c., 80 Mo. 350; Newspaper Co. v. Farrell, 88 Mo. 594; Thompson v. Holden, 117 Mo. 118; McDonald v. Matney, 82 Mo. 358; Newberger v. Friede, 23 Mo.App. 631; Kelly v. Gaines, 24 Mo.App. 506; Lockart v. Forsythe, 49 Mo.App. 654. (5) The contract was one of agency and not partnership. Wiggins v. Graham, 51 Mo. 17; Kelly v. Gaines, 24 Mo.App. 506; Hedges v. Wear, 28 Mo.App. 575; Newspaper Co. v. Farrell, 88 Mo. 594; Darling v. Potts, 118 Mo. 506.
Wallace & Wallace for respondent.
(1) The fact that certain of the partnership property was stored in the warehouse of the Armour Packing Company, in Kansas, did not deprive the court of jurisdiction to appoint a receiver of the partnership effects. This is so for several reasons. This property was under the control of the defendant Jeffrey, who presumably had warehouse receipts therefor. All of the parties were before the court. There were other partnership effects besides the apples stored in Kansas. High on Receivers (3 Ed.), sec. 44, p. 33, also sec. 164, p. 145; Chaffee v. Quidnick Co., 13 R. I. 442; Railroad v. Railroad, 46 Vt. 792; Sercomb v. Catlin, 128 Ill. 556; Langford v. Langford, 5 L. J. (N. S.), ch. 60. (2) The relation of the plaintiff and defendant in this venture was clearly that of partners, and the remedy adopted by the plaintiff was the only one that was open to him. Lengle v. Smith, 48 Mo. 276; Scott v. Caruth, 50 Mo. 120; Plumber v. Troast, 81 Mo. 425; Bank v. Altheimer, 91 Mo. 190; Wifferman v. Stacey, 80 Wis. 345; Ellensworth v. Parker, 62 Ill.App. 650; Carey v. Caldwell, 86 Mich. 570; Farr v. Morell, 53 Hun 31; Dane v. Kempster, 146 Mass. 454; Miller v. Price, 20 Wis. 117; Strauss v. Cann, 83 Ill.App. 497; Setchell v. Foster, 106 Mass. 42; Wright v. Davidson, 13 Minn. 449; Pierce v. Shippee, 90 Ill.App. 371; Couch v. Woodruff, 63 Ala. 446; Emanuel v. Draughn, 14 Ala. 303; Clark v. Ridley, 49 Cal. 105; Robbins v. Lazwell, 27 Ill. 365; Marx v. Stein, 11 La. Ann. 509; Musier v. Trumpbour, 5 Wend. (N. Y.), 275; 1 Bates on Partnership, secs. 18, 28 and 35; Holme v. Hammond, L. R., 7 Exch. 233; Pooly v. Driver, 5 Ch. Div. 458. (3) Even if this should be considered by the court not to be a partnership in the general sense of that term, still, the plaintiff, under the authority of Seymour v. Freer, 8 Wallace, 202, had such an interest in the property involved as entitled him to the relief sought in the petition.
OPINION
This is an appeal from an order of the circuit court of Saline county, refusing to revoke an interlocutory order of said court appointing a receiver. The action in which the order was made was for the settlement of a partnership account, and the property in the possession of the defendant, for which a receiver was appointed, was alleged partnership property. The main question in the case is, whether as to that property the plaintiff and defendant were partners. The only direct evidence as to the alleged contract of partnership is that of the parties themselves, taken by deposition. That of the defendant was first read. His testimony on that subject is as follows:
The testimony of the plaintiff on that subject is as follows:
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