Torgerson v. Craver
| Decision Date | 17 November 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 20312,20312 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | Linda W. TORGERSON, Individually and representing all other taxpayers and property owners within the Charleston County Airport District, Appellant, v. William E. CRAVER, Jr., Chairman, et al., Respondents. |
William B. Regan, Charleston, for appellant.
Edward D. Buckley and Sinkler, Gibbs, Simons & Guerard, Charleston, for respondents.
Appellant brings this suit pursuant to the Declaratory judgment Act, § 10--2001 et seq., 1962 South Carolina Code of Laws, on behalf of herself and all taxpayers and property owners in the Charleston County Airport District (hereinafter District) seeking to have declared unconstitutional the act of 1975 authorizing issuance of Twelve Million, Six Hundred Thousand ($12,600,000.00) Dollars of General Obligation Bonds by the District and the imposition of ad valorem taxes for payment thereof. She further seeks to enjoin the governing authority of the District from issuing the bonds.
The respondents include the members of the Charleston County Aviation Authority, the Charleston County Airport District, and the Attorney General of the State of South Carolina.
The respondent Daniel R. McLeod, as Attorney General of the State of South Carolina, was dismissed as a party on his motion with the consent of the remaining parties by Order dated September 29, 1975.
The Charleston County Airport District was created by Act No. 1235 of the 1970 Acts of the South Carolina General Assembly. When created, the District was coterminous with Charleston County. The Charleston County Aviation Authority (hereinafter the Authority) was established as the governing body of the District to carry out its function of acquiring, constructing, operating, and maintaining an adequate airport for the District.
The Bond Act at issue here (bearing Ratification No. R--297 enacted by the 1975 Session of the General Assembly) authorizes the Authority to issue and sell Twelve Million Six Hundred Thousand ($12,600,000.00) Dollars of General Obligation Bonds of the District for the acquisition and construction of improvements and renovations to airport facilities within the District.
The Authority's present plan is to acquire the existing Charleston Airport owned and operated by the City of Charleston in pursuit of its goal to provide modern air navigation facilities for the southeastern part of the State.
Appellant contends that the Bond Act is unconstitutional on three grounds:
(1) The Act violates Section 7 of New Article VIII of the State Constitution ratified on March 7, 1973 which, appellant contends, requires the General Assembly to vest by general law in county governments the function of operating, maintaining and improving airport facilities;
(2) The Bond Act is a special law where a general law can be made applicable in violation of Subdivision IX, Section 34 of Article III of the South Carolina Constitution;
(3) The Bond Act constitutes a denial of equal protection and due process with respect to taxpayers of the District on the ground that the District taxpayers are subjected to a tax levy to finance entirely the cost of facilities which will also directly benefit persons of adjoining counties.
A hearing was held before the Honorable Wade S. Weatherford, Jr., Presiding Judge, on September 23, 1975 at which time the matter was fully argued.
By order dated September 29, 1975, Judge Weatherford held that the operation of the airport facilities as proposed by the Authority did not constitute a county function within the meaning of Article VIII, Section 7, nor was the Bond Act a special act in violation of Subdivision 9, Section 34 of Article III of the South Carolina Constitution. He further held that the imposition of a tax pursuant to the Bond Act would not constitute a denial of due process and equal protection to the taxpayers of the District. The matter comes before this Court on exception to such Order.
Appellant's first contention is that the Bond Act is prohibited by Article VIII, Section 7, which follows:
In our opinion, the act violates both the letter and the spirit of the constitutional directive quoted above. One of the purposes of Article VIII and of Home Rule is to relieve the General Assembly of the burdens of local governments. The Charleston County Airport District is a Charleston County political subdivision. The Charleston County Aviation Authority, which operates it, is composed of seven members appointed by the Governor upon recommendation of: (1) Charleston County House Delegation, (2) Senators from Charleston County, and (3) the City Council and County Council of Charleston; in addition, the Mayor of the City of Charleston and the Chairman of the Charleston County Council serve Ex officio. Taxes for operation and/or to repay bonds are raised by a levy on the district, which for all practical purposes in the county.
The 1975 act pledges for the payment of the $12,600,000.00 to be borrowed, 'the full faith, credit and taxing power of Charleston County Airport District.' It further directs that there be levied annually 'by the Auditor of Charleston County and collected by the Treasurer of Charleston County, in the same manner as county taxes are levied and collected, a tax without limit on all taxable property in the district sufficient to pay the principal and interest on such bonds.'
Article VIII, § 7, prohibits legislation by the General Assembly for a specific county. Involved here is a matter which the county governing authority can and should deal with instead of the General Assembly.
Kleckley v. Pulliam, 265 S.C. 177, 217 S.E.2d 217 (1975), relied on by the respondents is of no persuasion because the facts are entirely different. In Kleckley, an airport district was formed by joining Richland County and Lexington County. This Court held that an Act of the General Assembly authorizing a bond issue by the District was not violative of Article VIII, § 7, rationalizing that it was absolutely impossible for either the governing body of Richland County or the governing body of Lexington County to provide for the bond issue. There was involved a matter with which only the General Assembly could deal. The bond legislation was not for a specific county; it was for a region.
The matter at hand involves problems which can be solved by the local governing body of Charleston County. In Duncan v. County of York, S.C., 228 S.E.2d 92 (filed August 11, 1976), we pointed out the broad authority conferred upon county governing bodies by Section 14--3705 of Act No. 283 of 1975. This Court, since the adoption of Article VIII, has decided several cases arising under § 7: Thorne v. Seabrook, 264 S.C. 503, 216 S.E.2d 177 (1975); Moye v. Caughman, 265 S.C. 140, 217 S.E.2d 36 (1975); Knight v. Salisbury, 262 S.C. 565, 206 S.E.2d 875 (1974); Neel v. Shealy, 261 S.C. 266, 199 S.E.2d 542 (1973); none of these lend comfort to the position taken by the respondents. The fact that a Charleston County Airport serves travelers from other counties does not change its local status. It would hardly be argued that a Charleston County Hospital, a Charleston County Library, a Charleston County Museum, or a Charleston County Zoo, is not a local county function merely because it served the needs of citizens from other counties.
In summary, we hold that act bearing Ratification No. R--297 of the 1975 Acts of the General Assembly is violative of Article VIII, § 7, of our Constitution, because it is legislation for a specific county. Having so held, it becomes unnecessary to discuss the other exceptions raised by the Appellant.
The Defendants-Respondents are enjoined from issuing bonds provided in the act.
REVERSED.
Appellant brings this suit pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, § 10--2001 et seq., 1962 South Carolina Code of Laws, on behalf of herself and all taxpayers and property owners in the Charleston County Airport District (hereinafter District) seeking to have declared unconstitutional the act authorizing issuance of Twelve Million, Six Hundred Thousand ($12,600,000.00) Dollars of General Obligation Bonds by the District and the imposition of ad valorem taxes for payment thereof. She further seeks to enjoin the governing authority of the District from issuing the bonds. Finding no constitutional infirmities in the bond act, we would affirm the order of the lower court authorizing issuance of the general obligation bonds.
The action was commenced in the Charleston County Court of Common Pleas by the filing of a Summons and Complaint on August 4, 1975.
The respondents included the members of the Charleston County Aviation Authority, the Charleston County Airport District, and the Attorney General of the State of South Carolina.
On motion of the appellant, an Order of Publication dated August 9, 1975 was issued giving notice of the institution of this action and advising that any interested person might seek to intervene within twenty (20) days following the date of publication. No one sought to intervene.
The respondent Daniel R. McLeod, as Attorney General of the State of South Carolina, was dismissed as a party on his motion with the consent of the remaining parties by Order dated September 29, 1975.
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