Del Toro v. Fed. Express Corp.
| Decision Date | 14 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:15-CV-1448 |
| Parties | JANIE DEL TORO, Plaintiff, v. FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
Pending before the Court is the defendant's, Federal Express Corporation (the "defendant"), motion for summary judgment and brief in support (Dkt. No. 19). The plaintiff, Janie Del Toro (the "plaintiff"), has filed a response in opposition to the motion (Dkt. No. 35), to which the defendant has filed a reply (Dkt. No. 36). After having carefully considered the motion, response, reply, the record and the applicable law, the Court determines that the defendant's motion for summary judgment should be GRANTED.
This case concerns the plaintiff's various claims of discrimination and retaliation against her former employer resulting from her termination. The plaintiff, a Hispanic female, began working as a courier for the defendant on June 5, 1989, at its Sam Houston location in Houston, Texas. During the course of her employment, the plaintiff received performance reminders and warning letters in her employee file for various work-related issues.1
On September 12, 2012, the plaintiff allegedly injured her back at work. She reported the injury to the defendant in October 2012. As a result of the injury, the plaintiff was treated by aphysician and restricted to light duty. The defendant gave her a light duty work accommodation and granted her request for time off to make her doctor appointments.
According to the defendant's performance improvement policy, any employee who receives three disciplinary letters within a 12 month period is subject to termination. The plaintiff received three disciplinary letters in a 12 month period for various work-related issues. First, on May 8, 2012, the plaintiff received a disciplinary letter for her involvement in an automobile accident while operating a company truck. On December 18, 2012, the plaintiff received a disciplinary letter for not achieving her company mandated "stops per hour" goals. Finally, on April 26, 2013, the plaintiff received a disciplinary letter for her involvement in a verbal altercation with an African-American co-worker, Flori Hebert ("Hebert"). As a result of receiving three disciplinary letters, the plaintiff was terminated on April 26, 2013. Hebert was not terminated. Subsequently, the defendant replaced the plaintiff by hiring Hector Garcia ("Garcia"), a Hispanic male.
The plaintiff filed suit on April 23, 2015, in the 55th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of: (1) the Americans with Disabilities Act2 ("ADA"), (2) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19643 based on race and national origin, and (3) the Texas Worker's Compensation Act. The defendant timely removed the state court action to this Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction.4 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The defendant now moves for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The plaintiff claims that the defendant discriminated and retaliated against her in violation of Title VII by terminating her because of her race and national origin. She also claims that the defendant discriminated and retaliated against her in violation of the ADA by terminating her because of her perceived disability. The plaintiff seeks damages and attorney's fees urging the Court to deny the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
The defendant denies discriminating or retaliating against the plaintiff. With respect to the plaintiff's Title VII race and national origin discrimination claims, the defendant avers that, even if the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case for discriminatory interference or retaliation, the defendant had legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for each of its employment actions. Regarding the plaintiff's ADA claim, the defendant maintains that the plaintiff cannot show that she was "disabled" as defined under the statute, or that the defendant failed to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff's alleged back injury. Thus, the defendant urges that summary judgment is appropriate; hence, the remaining claims in this action should be dismissed.
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes summary judgment against a party who fails to make a sufficient showing of the existence of an element essential to the party's case and on which that party bears the burden at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). The movant bears the initial burden of "informing the district court of the basis for its motion" and identifying those portions of the record "which it believes demonstrate the absence of agenuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; see also Martinez v. Schlumber, Ltd., 338 F.3d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 2003). Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
If the movant meets its burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to "go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 656 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995); Little, 37 F.3d at 1075). "To meet this burden, the nonmovant must 'identify specific evidence in the record and articulate the 'precise manner' in which that evidence support[s] [its] claim[s].'" Stults, 76 F.3d at 656 (citing Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871, 115 S. Ct. 195, 130 L. Ed. 2d 127 (1994)). It may not satisfy its burden "with some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence." Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Instead, it "must set forth specific facts showing the existence of a 'genuine' issue concerning every essential component of its case." Am. Eagle Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Intern., 343 F.3d 401, 405 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Morris v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998)).
"A fact is material only if its resolution would affect the outcome of the action, . . . and an issue is genuine only 'if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the [nonmovant].'" Wiley v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 585 F.3d 206, 210 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted). When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact has been established, a reviewing court is required to construe "all facts and inferences . . . in the lightmost favorable to the [nonmovant]." Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., Inc., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Armstrong v. Am. Home Shield Corp., 333 F.3d 566, 568 (5th Cir. 2003)). Likewise, all "factual controversies [are to be resolved] in favor of the [nonmovant], but only where there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Boudreaux, 402 F.3d at 540 (citing Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (emphasis omitted)). Nonetheless, a reviewing court is not permitted to "weigh the evidence or evaluate the credibility of witnesses." Boudreaux, 402 F.3d at 540 (quoting Morris, 144 F.3d at 380). Thus, "[t]he appropriate inquiry [on summary judgment] is 'whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'" Septimus v. Univ. of Hous., 399 F.3d 601, 609 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 - 52 (1986)).
The Court grants the defendant's motion regarding the plaintiff's race and national origin discrimination claims. Title VII provides, in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . [race or] national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). In employment discrimination cases such as the one sub judice, a plaintiff can prove Title VII discrimination "through direct or circumstantial evidence." Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 345 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Laxton v. Gap, Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 578 (5th Cir. 2003)).
The plaintiff presents no direct evidence of discriminatory intent5. In such cases, the Court must evaluate proof of circumstantial evidence using the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Alvarado v. Texas Rangers, 492 F.3d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 219 (5th Cir. 2001)); see also Turner, 476 F.3d at 345 (citing Rutherford v. Harris County, 197 F.3d 173, 179-80 (5th Cir. 1999)).
Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework:
[A] plaintiff must first create a presumption of intentional discrimination by establishing a prima facie case. The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. The burden on the employer at this stage is one of production, not persuasion; it can involve no credibility assessment. If the employer sustains its burden . . . the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to establish either: (1) that the employer's proffered reason is not...
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