Torok, In re

Decision Date09 June 1954
Docket NumberNos. 33801 and 33802,s. 33801 and 33802
Citation120 N.E.2d 307,161 Ohio St. 585
Parties, 53 O.O. 433 In re TOROK (two cases). WOOD et al. v. TOROK. TOROK v. WOOD et al.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Under the provisions of Section 1639-16, General Code (Section 2151.23, Revised Code), the Juvenile Court is invested with original jurisdiction to determine the custody of any child not a ward of another court.

2. In order to determine such right of custody, it is not necessary for the court to find first that such child is delinquent, neglected, dependent, crippled, or otherwise physically handicapped. (The syllabus in the case of Paddock v. Ripley, 149 Ohio St. 539, 80 N.E.2d 129, limited and distinguished.)

This unfortunate and confusing controversy relates to the custody of Patricia, a minor illegitimate daughter of Emma Elizabeth Torok, the petitioner in one of the two cases now before this court for consideration.

The petitioners in the other case are Mr. and Mrs. Chester C. Wood who have had the custody of the child since shortly after her birth on July 3, 1949. The mother placed her daughter with the Woods under an agreement whereby the mother and the baby's father, Frank Cragon, paid the Woods $20 per week as compensation for caring for the child. A total of $2,340 was paid. Later when the mother requested the return of her child, the Woods refused.

This refusal resulted in three actions in the Juvenile Court of Ashtabula County.

The first was a complaint instituted on December 17, 1951, by the Woods when they asked that the child be declared neglected and dependent so they could be awarded formal custody of the child inasmuch as they had become attached to her and desired to adopt her. On March 7, 1952, the court held that the child was neither neglected nor dependent and that the mother was entitled to the immediate custody of it.

The second action was instituted later by the mother on March 22, 1952, when she filed an application to determine the right of custody of her child still held by the Woods. On May 8, 1952, the court again held that the right of custody was in the mother, and the Woods were ordered to deliver the child to the mother within one week.

The third step was taken on May 17, 1952, when the mother filed a charge of contempt of court against the Woods for failure to deliver the child to the mother as ordered by the court on May 8, 1952. On June 27, 1952, the Woods were adjudged guilty of contempt of court and fined $250 each.

From the first order and judgment of March 7, 1952, holding that the child was neither neglected nor dependent, the Woods filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals on questions of law and fact. That court dismissed the appeal as on questions of law and fact and retained the appeal as on questions of law alone. Then the court reversed the judgment of the Juvenile Court on the ground that the latter court was without jurisdiction to award custody after finding that the child was neither neglected nor dependent. One member of the Court of Appeals dissented.

No appeal was perfected from the second order of May 8, 1952, requiring the Woods to deliver the child to the mother within one week. Hence, it is contended that this question is res judicata.

An appeal on questions of law was perfected to the Court of Appeals from the third order and judgment of June 27, 1952, adjudging the Woods guilty of contempt of court for failure to deliver the child to the mother within one week as required by the order of May 8, 1952. The Court of Appeals reversed this judgment, too, with one judge dissenting.

The first and third orders and judgments of the Juvenile Court are now before this court by reason of the allowance of the mother's motions to certify the records.

Beach & Warner and James D. McKim, Cleveland, for appellees.

Nazor & Nazor, Ashtabula, and Payer, Bleiweiss & Crow, Cleveland, for appellant.

WEYGANDT, Chief Justice.

As observed by counsel for the mother, the confusion engendered by this bitter prolonged controversy is illustrated by the statement in the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals that it was attempting to review the order entered by the Juvenile Court on April 29, 1952, requiring the Woods to deliver the child to the mother within one week. A careful study of the records discloses that the Juvenile Court did approve such a journal entry on that date but subsequently an amended entry was substituted therefore on May 8, 1952, as above indicated. No appeal was attempted from either of those orders, and hence, as observed by the dissenting member, the Court of Appeals was without jurisdiction to review either. But this error becomes unimportant in view of the opinion hereinafter expressed.

Stripped of the procedural confusion, the sole substantive question of law presented to this court for consideration is a simple one. Fortunately this court is not required to concern itself with the factual questions whether the child is neglected or dependent or the mother a fit person to have custody of her child. The question of law is whether the Juvenile Court lacked jurisdiction to determine the right of custody of the child in view of the decision that the...

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37 cases
  • In re Bonfield
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court
    • December 13, 2002
    ...another court, even though the court has not first found the child to be delinquent, neglected, or dependent. In re Torok (1954), 161 Ohio St. 585, 53 O.O. 433, 120 N.E.2d 307, paragraphs one and two of the syllabus. This exclusive responsibility "to determine the custody of any child not a......
  • Perales, In re
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court
    • November 30, 1977
    ...state; "(3) To hear and determine any application for a writ of habeas corpus involving the custody of a child." In In re Torok (1954), 161 Ohio St. 585, 120 N.E.2d 307, this court allowed a parent who had successfully defended a neglect action to sue for custody of the child in the Juvenil......
  • First Nat. Bank of Wilmington v. Kosydar
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court
    • February 11, 1976
    ...St. 324, 325-326, 154 N.E.2d 623; Goodyear Aircraft Corp. v. Peck (1954), 162 Ohio St. 200, 202, 122 N.E.2d 700; In re Torok (1954), 161 Ohio St. 585, 589, 120 N.E.2d 307; State v. Stevens (1954), 161 Ohio St. 432, 435, 119 N.E.2d Giving effect to the plain and unambiguous meaning of the ph......
  • People v. Guthrie
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • April 24, 1980
    ...not otherwise define the word, we feel the more appropriate rule is set forth in the opinion of the case of In re Torok, 161 Ohio St. 585, at 589 (120 N.E.2d 307, at 310 (1954)), by Chief Justice " 'As this court has repeated in numerous cases involving statutory construction, the question ......
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