Torrence v. Pelkey

• Decision Date: 06 July 2001
• Docket Number: No. Civ. 396CV299HBF.,Civ. 396CV299HBF.
• Citation: 164 F.Supp.2d 264
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: Booker TORRENCE, Plaintiff, v. Christopher PELKEY, et al., Defendants.

164 F.Supp.2d 264

Booker TORRENCE, Plaintiff, v. Christopher PELKEY, et al., Defendants.

No. Civ. 396CV299HBF.

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

July 6, 2001.

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Howard Pierce (Hartford, CT), for plaintiff.

Terrance M. O'Neill (Hartford, CT), for defendant.

RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

FITZSIMMONS, United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendants violated his right under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution to be free from deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Defendants are the State of Connecticut Department of Corrections, Christopher Pelkey, Warden at the Cheshire Correctional Facility ("Cheshire"); and Steven Stein, the medical doctor responsible for the provision of medical services to the inmates at Cheshire. Plaintiff seeks money damages as well as injunctive relief. Pending is Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [Doc. # 88]. For the reasons discussed below, defendants' motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

STANDARD

The standards applicable to a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) are identical to those for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Irish Lesbian & Gay Org. v. Giuliani, 143 F.3d 638, 644 (2d Cir.1998); Sheppard v. Beerman, 18 F.3d 147, 150 (2d Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 816, 115 S.Ct. 73, 130 L.Ed.2d 28 (1994). When considering a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draws inferences from these allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); Easton v. Sundram, 947 F.2d 1011, 1014-15 (2d Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 911, 112 S.Ct. 1943, 118 L.Ed.2d 548 (1992). Dismissal is warranted only if, under any set of facts that the plaintiff can prove consistent with the allegations, it is clear that no relief can be granted. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (citations omitted); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Frasier v. General Elec. Co., 930 F.2d 1004, 1007 (2d Cir.1991). "The issue [on a motion to dismiss] is not whether plaintiff will prevail, but whether he is entitled to offer evidence to support his claims." United States v. Yale New Haven Hosp., 727 F.Supp. 784, 786 (D.Conn. 1990), citing Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236, 94 S.Ct. at 1686. Judgment on the pleadings should be granted if the movant "is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Burns Int'l Security Servs. v. International Union, 47 F.3d 14, 17 (2d Cir.1995).

BACKGROUND

Keeping this standard in mind, the court accepts as true the following allegations taken from the second amended complaint.

In January 1994, plaintiff was received into custody by the State of Connecticut Department of Corrections ("DOC"). [Doc. # 82, para. 10.] A medical exam performed by DOC staff on January 24, 1994, found no evidence that plaintiff suffered from hepatitis, pancreatitis, or diabetes symptoms. [Para. 11.]

From May 25 through June 1, 1995, plaintiff made daily complaints to DOC staff that he felt "acutely ill," described his symptoms as "blurred vision, dry throat and mouth, uncontrollable thirst, abnormally frequent need to urinate, fatigue, a `metallic' breath odor, stomach pain and tenderness, dizziness, and a general feeling of being acutely ill," and requested medical attention. [Paras. 33-42.] During this period, defendants provided no medical care to plaintiff. [See id.]

On June 2, 1995, plaintiff was permitted to go to the Cheshire medical unit where he told staff members he was "suffering from weight loss, uncontrollable thirst, shortness of breath, a `metallic' breath odor, progressive loss of energy, extreme fatigue, stomach pain, vomiting, headaches, blurred vision and the need to frequently urinate." [Para. 43.] Plaintiff was seen later in the day by Dr. Steven Stein, although Stein did not physically examine plaintiff or order any screening tests at that time. [Para. 44.]. Stein wrote in plaintiff's medical file that plaintiff had "multiple minor complaints unassociated." [Id.] After leaving the medical unit on June 2, plaintiff filed a medical grievance emergency form, requesting appropriate medical attention. [Para. 45.] Plaintiff has never received a response to this form. [Para. 46.]

Plaintiff continued to experience the same symptoms on June 3 and June 4, 1995. [Para. 47, 49.] In addition to these symptoms, on June 4 he started spitting up blood. [Para. 49.] On both days, plaintiff reported his symptoms to DOC staff and requested medical attention. [Paras. 47, 49.] Plaintiff did not receive medical care on either day. [Paras. 48, 50.]

Plaintiff was seen again in the medical unit around 2:00 A.M. on June 5, 1995, complaining of the same symptoms. [Para. 52.] Plaintiff did not see a doctor during this visit and did not undergo any screening tests. [Para. 53.] In the afternoon of June 5 and after plaintiff returned to his cell, he again requested medical attention after he began experiencing chest pains. [Para. 54.] Plaintiff returned to the medical unit that afternoon, where a nurse gave him antacids and Maalox for his stomach pains before he returned to his cell. [Paras. 55-56.]

On June 6, 1995, at approximately 1:00 A.M., correctional officers summoned a nurse to plaintiff's cell because plaintiff was too weak to sit, stand, or go to the medical unit. [Para. 57.] Plaintiff was not examined by a doctor, scheduled for screening tests, or taken back to the medical unit at that time. [Para. 56.] At approximately 4:00 A.M., a nurse placed a follow up call to plaintiff's cellblock to check on his status. [Para. 57.] A corrections officer called the medical unit at approximately 8:15 A.M. on June 6 to request wheelchair transport for plaintiff to the medical unit, as plaintiff was unable to sit or stand on his own. At approximately 9:00 A.M., plaintiff was taken to the medical unit where he was seen by Dr. Stein. [Paras. 59-60.] Dr. Stein ordered initial medical screening tests, including blood and urine analyses. [Para. 61.] The blood and urine tests evaluated in the medical unit indicated that plaintiff had elevated levels of glucose, ketones and blood sugar. [Paras. 63-64.] Dr. Stein did not take further action on June 6 to treat plaintiff. [Para. 65.]

Plaintiff requested and was seen by Dr. Swaney, another doctor at Cheshire, on June 6. [Para. 66.] After examining the plaintiff, Dr. Swaney ordered plaintiff be immediately transferred to a hospital for treatment of diabetic acidosis. [Paras. 66-67.] Plaintiff was not immediately transported to the hospital, and was instead placed into a pre-test HIV counseling session lasting twenty minutes, and then left in front of the nurses' station for over an hour. [Paras. 70-72.] During this period, plaintiff drifted in and out of consciousness, was unable to hold his head up and was barely able to speak. [Para. 71.]

Later that same day, plaintiff was admitted to the intensive care unit at St. Mary's Hospital in Waterbury, Connecticut. [Para. 29.] Plaintiff remained in the intensive care unit for three days and was released from the hospital on June 14, 1995. [Para. 29.] While in the hospital, plaintiff was diagnosed with "severe diabetic ketoacidosis/insulin dependent diabetes mellitus." [Para. 29.]

On or about June 7, 1995, laboratory results from the June 6 tests were placed into plaintiff's DOC medical file, showing that he tested positive for the hepatitis C virus ("HCV"). [Para. 31.] Defendants never advised plaintiff that he has HCV, nor have they provided him any treatment for HCV. [Para. 32.] Between June 7, 1995 and March 6, 2000, defendants did not attempt to monitor plaintiff's HCV. [Para. 32.] Plaintiff again tested positive for HCV on January 19, 2000, but received no information on the diagnosis or HCV treatment. [Para. 88.]

On multiple occasions in 1995, 1996, and 1997, plaintiff reported to the medical unit to receive his daily insulin injections and was given improper doses of insulin which posed a serious risk to plaintiff's health. [Paras. 81-83.] On two occasions in 1997, plaintiff was injected with insulin prescriptions for other inmates, resulting in a too large dosage of insulin. [Para. 84.]

On June 5, 1999, plaintiff was transferred to the Carl Robinson Correctional Facility in Enfield, Connecticut. [Para. 85.] Results from a medical screening analysis performed that same day indicated that plaintiff was suffering from liver disease. [Para. 86.] Plaintiff was not advised of the test results and no further testing was ordered. [Para. 86.]

DISCUSSION

Defendants seek judgment on the pleadings on all of plaintiff's claims. In support of their motion, defendants argue that "(1) plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; (2) the claims against the State of Connecticut are barred by the Eleventh Amendment; (3) the negligence claims against the individual defendants are barred by C.G.S. § 4-165; and (4) the plaintiff has failed to allege any facts which would suggest that Defendant Pelkey had any personal involvement in the events ostensibly giving rise to this action." [Doc. # 89, at 1.] These arguments are discussed further below.

1) Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

The defendants contend that the claims against them should be dismissed because plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Plaintiff responds by making four arguments: (1) plaintiff has exhausted the administrative remedies; (2) that § 1997e as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") is not applicable because plaintiff's injuries and the filing of his complaint pre-date the enactment of the statute; (3) even if the court chose to apply...