Torres-santiago v. DÍaz-casiano, Civil No. 08-1650 (GAG/BJM).

• Decision Date: 16 November 2009
• Docket Number: Civil No. 08-1650 (GAG/BJM).
• Citation: 708 F.Supp.2d 178
• Parties: Marta TORRES-SANTIAGO, et al., Plaintiffs,v.Ángel D. DÍAZ-CASIANO, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

708 F.Supp.2d 178

Marta TORRES-SANTIAGO, et al., Plaintiffs,v.Ángel D. DÍAZ-CASIANO, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 08-1650 (GAG/BJM).

United States District Court,

D. Puerto Rico.

Nov. 16, 2009.

Lydia Lizarribar-Buxo, Lizarribar Masini Law Office, Joseph A. Boucher-Martinez, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Jose J. Gueits-Ortiz, Department of Justice of Puerto Rico, Iris Alicia Martinez-Juarbe, Department of Justice, Wandymar Burgos-Vargas, P.R. Department of Justice-Federal Litigation, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

BRUCE J. MCGIVERIN, United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiffs Phillip Cruz-Rosario (“Cruz”) and Marta Torres-Santiago (“Torres”) (collectively, “plaintiffs”) filed a complaint against several Commonwealth of Puerto Rico police officers and the Superintendent of Police, in both their official and personal capacities, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Puerto Rico's constitution and civil law. (Docket No. 47). Defendants Christian Valles-Collazo (“Valles”), Ángel D. Díaz-Casiano (“Díaz-Casiano”), and Nelson Arocho (“Arocho”) filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (Docket No. 52, 59), and defendant Pedro Toledo-Dávila (“Toledo”) filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). (Docket No. 58). Plaintiffs have not opposed any of the motions. As the parties did not timely object to proceeding before a magistrate judge, this case was referred to me by the presiding district judge. (Docket No. 51). 28 U.S.C. § 636; Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 123 S.Ct. 1696, 155 L.Ed.2d 775 (2003). After careful consideration, Valles's motion to dismiss is granted, Díaz-Casiano's and Arocho's motion to dismiss is granted, and Toledo's motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is treated much like a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Pérez-Acevedo v. Rivero-Cubano, 520 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir.2008). In order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion (and, by extension, a Rule 12(c) motion), a complaint must allege “a plausible entitlement to relief.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); see also Pérez-Acevedo, 520 F.3d at 29. However, a court should “accept well-pled factual allegations in the complaint as true and make all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Miss. Public Employees' Retirement System v. Boston Scientific Corp., 523 F.3d 75, 85 (1st Cir.2008). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations in order to withstand dismissal, a plaintiff's “obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (internal citation omitted). The court need not accept as true legal conclusions or “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949-50, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955) (internal alteration omitted); Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 267 (1st Cir.2009). The complaint must allege enough factual content to nudge a claim across the line from conceivable to plausible. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1952 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). The court's assessment of the pleadings is context-specific, requiring the court “to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 1949. The plaintiff must show more than the “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. Where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged, but has not shown, that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 1950 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).

On either a Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) motion to dismiss, “the facts are set forth as alleged in the complaint and inferences [are] taken in the light most favorable to ... the non-moving party.” Diaz-Romero v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 115, 116 (1st Cir.2008); Estate of Bennett v. Wainwright, 548 F.3d 155, 163, 165 (1st Cir.2008). The court may consider documents the authenticity of which are not disputed by the parties, documents central to the plaintiffs' claim, and documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint. Curran v. Cousins, 509 F.3d 36, 44 (1st Cir.2007) (internal citation omitted). When “a complaint's factual allegations are expressly linked to-and admittedly dependent upon-a document (the authenticity of which is not challenged), that document effectively merges into the pleadings and the trial court can review it in deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Beddall v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 137 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir.1998). Indeed, on a motion to dismiss, the court “may properly consider the relevant entirety of a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint.” Clorox Co. v. Proctor & Gamble Commer. Co., 228 F.3d 24, 32 (1st Cir.2000). The rationale for this principle is that “the main problem of looking to documents outside the complaint-lack of notice to plaintiff-is dissipated ‘where plaintiff has actual notice ... and has relied upon these documents in framing the complaint.’ ” Id. (internal citation omitted). Here, the defendants' motions cite and rely on several documents incorporated by reference into the complaint. Therefore, the following facts refer to the allegations contained in the complaint and to the documents incorporated by reference.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs, residents of Carolina, filed their amended complaint on April 30, 2009. (Docket No. 47). The complaint alleges that on September 27, 2006, defendant Díaz-Casiano, a police officer then assigned to the Carolina Area Drug Unit, and three unnamed police officers (referred to in the complaint as Tom Doe, Mark Doe, and Sam Doe) stopped plaintiff Cruz outside the “El Barril” pub in Carolina. ( Id., ¶ 12). One of the officers slapped Cruz while his pockets were searched; the frisk revealed nothing. ( Id.). The police officers punched Cruz in the face approximately five times, causing him to bleed; they then walked him from El Barril to his home in a public housing project, where he lived with his girlfriend, plaintiff Torres. ( Id.).

Upon arrival at the plaintiffs' home, where no one was present, the officers pulled out Cruz's keychain from his pocket and tested each key until they gained entry to the house, without Cruz's consent. ( Id.; Docket No. 7-5, 1). The officers then “stormed” the house, where they illegally searched plaintiffs' room, destroying items including shelves and a dresser. (Docket No. 47, ¶ 12). In the room, they found Torres's purse, which they opened, removing a piece of identification, namely Torres's electoral card. ( Id.; Docket No. 7-5, 1-2). During the search, the officers mocked Cruz and continued slapping and punching him. (Docket No. 47, ¶ 12).

After leaving plaintiffs' house, the officers took Cruz into an unmarked blue SUV and transported him back to El Barril, punching and harassing Cruz nonstop during the ride. ( Id.). Torres was at El Barril when the officers arrived in several unmarked vehicles at approximately 6:00. (Docket No. 7-4, 2). Some of the unnamed officers approached Torres and asked for her name; when she asked why they needed to know, they identified themselves as police officers. ( Id.; Docket No. 47, ¶ 12). After Torres gave her name, the officers placed her under arrest without informing her why she was being arrested. (Docket No. 47, ¶ 12; Docket No. 7-4, 2). The officers harassed and humiliated Torres; one officer attempted to put his hand in her pants pocket, but she removed his hand. (Docket No. 47, ¶ 12; Docket No. 7-5, 2). The officer asked what she had in her pocket; she told the officer that he knew he was not supposed to touch her there, to which he responded by swearing at her, telling her “I'm in charge here,” and threatening her if she “got stupid.” (Docket No. 7-4, 2) (court's translation).

The officers then transported Torres and Cruz in separate vehicles to the Iturregui police station in Carolina, Drugs Division. (Docket No. 47, ¶ 12; Docket No. 7-4, 2; Docket No. 7-5, 2). En route to the station, defendant Díaz-Casiano, who called himself “Colorao” (Docket No. 7-5, 2), punched Cruz in the body and face, removed what appeared to be his official weapon from its holster, and placed it against Cruz's head, repeatedly pulling the trigger; as Cruz was not aware the weapon was unloaded, he feared for his life and thought he would be killed. (Docket No. 47, ¶ 13).

At the police station, Torres observed a group of several people who had been detained, Cruz among them. (Docket No. 7-4, 2). The officers took the plaintiffs to a room where an unnamed police officer (Tom Doe) punched Cruz again in the face while screaming at Torres, asking her where drugs were. (Docket No. 47, ¶ 14). Both plaintiffs denied any knowledge of drugs. ( Id.; Docket No. 7-5, 2). When Cruz denied having any information about drugs, defendant Díaz-Casiano punched the handcuffed Cruz in the face, and screamed, “Are you calling me a liar, you bastard?” (Docket No. 47, ¶ 14) (court's translation). Díaz-Casiano then left the room and returned with a can of roach spray, which he sprayed in both plaintiffs' eyes while calling them “worthless” and “cockroaches.” (Docket No. 47, ¶ 15; Docket No. 7-4, 2; Docket No. 7-5, 2) (court's translation). The plaintiffs felt an intense burning sensation in their eyes and were unable to see; they feared they would lose their vision. (Docket No. 47, ¶ 15).

Díaz-Casiano next hit Cruz in the head with the can, jumped on a table in the room, and began hitting his own chest “like Tarzan” and yelling that he was “drunk with power.” (Docket No. 47, ¶ 15; Docket No. 7-5, 2) (court's translation). He then approached Cruz, who had long hair, and told him, “I have to...