Torres v. Aramark Food & Commissary Servs. of the Orange Cnty. Corr. Facility

• Decision Date: 16 December 2015
• Docket Number: Case No. 14-CV-7498 (KMK)
• Parties: RICARDO TORRES, Plaintiff, v. ARAMARK FOOD AND COMMISSARY SERVICES OF THE ORANGE COUNTY CORR. FACILITY, and CARL DUBOIS, ORANGE COUNTY SHERIFF, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

RICARDO TORRES, Plaintiff, v. ARAMARK FOOD AND COMMISSARY SERVICES OF THE ORANGE COUNTY CORR. FACILITY,and CARL DUBOIS, ORANGE COUNTY SHERIFF, Defendants.

Case No. 14-CV-7498 (KMK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

December 16, 2015

OPINION & ORDER

Appearances:

Ricardo D. Torres

Pro se Plaintiff

Willard, NY¹

Joseph P. Wodarski, III, Esq.

Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP

Stamford, CT

Counsel for Defendant Aramark Food and Commissary

Services of the Orange County Correctional Facility

KENNETH M. KARAS, District Judge:

Ricardo D. Torres ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, initiated this action against Aramark Correctional Services, LLC ("Defendant") alleging claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 forviolations of his rights under the First and Eighth Amendments.² Defendant moves to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

The following facts are drawn from Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and are taken as true for the purpose of resolving the instant Motion. The events giving rise to this action began on June 30, 2014, while Plaintiff was incarcerated at Orange County Correctional Facility ("OCCF"). (Am. Compl. 2-3 (Dkt. No. 9).)³ On that date, Plaintiff began receiving "kosher" meals prepared by Defendant in accordance with the Islamic observance of Ramadan. (Id. at 3.) The religious diet included a morning meal, consisting of a half-pint of milk, a hardboiled egg, two slices of bread, four ounces of cereal, two sugars, one teabag, and either an apple or orange. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that some mornings he received a small quantity of peanut butter and jelly as a "substitute," but he does not allege what it was a substitute for, nor does he allege what he received as a post-sunset meal. (Id.) Furthermore, Plaintiff asserts that he was not allowed to purchase certain halal food at the commissary to supplement his meals. (Id.) Plaintiff assertsthat the Ramadan menu provided by Aramark fell below "a 2000 calorie based diet" and was therefore insufficient "to properly maintain focus p[h]ysically[] and mentally" during the period of "fasting from dawn to dusk." (Id.)

Plaintiff did not file a formal or written grievance, but alleges that he made numerous verbal complaints to prison officials concerning the adequacy of meals. (See id. at 3-4.) Plaintiff also alleges that, in response to his complaints, officials "promised [that the issues] would be taken care of by the next shift or meal." (See id. at 4.) Plaintiff alleges that, in addition to notifying officers at every meal, he wrote to Aramark Food Director, William Vaughn, and to OCCF's Programs Department but did not receive a response. (Id. at 5.) When Plaintiff's numerous complaints went unaddressed, he requested to be removed from the Ramadan menu, insisting that the meals provided by Aramark, "ultimately forced . . . Muslims that were exercising [their] religious beliefs to demand to be taken off the kosher diet." (Id. at 3, 5.) Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of the meals, he suffered "[h]eadaches as well as unnecessary aggravated stress[] and [a]nguish," and was "mentally tormented and spiritually distress[ed]." (Id. at 3.)

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on September 16, 2014, (see Dkt. No. 1), along with a request to proceed in forma pauperis, (see Dkt. No. 2). Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis was granted on October 1, 2014. (See Dkt. No. 5.) Plaintiff then filed an Amended Complaint on November 3, 2014. (See Dkt. No. 9.) Defendant wrote a letter requesting a pre-motion conference on January 7, 2015, (see Dkt. No. 13), to which the Court directed Plaintiff to respond by February 5, 2015, (see Dkt. No. 17). Plaintiff not having responded, Defendant againwrote to the Court on February 6, 2015 seeking permission to file a motion. (See Dkt. No. 18.) The Court set a briefing schedule requiring Defendant to file its Motion To Dismiss by March 1, 2015, Plaintiff to file his Opposition by April 1, 2015, and Defendant to file its Reply by April 22, 2015. (See Dkt. No. 19.) Defendant filed its Motion To Dismiss and accompanying papers on February 27, 2015. (See Dkt. Nos. 20-23.) Plaintiff then wrote to the Court in a letter dated March 26, 2015 asking for an extension of the April 1, 2015 deadline until April 27, 2015, which the Court granted. (See Dkt. No. 24.) However, as of the date of this Opinion, Plaintiff has not submitted his Opposition, nor has he had any other contact with the Court. Moreover, mail sent by the Court to Plaintiff's listed address on April 17, 2015 was returned as undeliverable because Plaintiff was released from custody, (see Dkt. (minute entries for Apr. 17, 2015 and Apr. 28, 2015)), and Plaintiff has not provided the Court with an updated address despite being told that it was his obligation to do so and that the Court may dismiss the case if he fails to do so, (see Order of Service 2 (Dkt. No. 7)).

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations, internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted). Indeed, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement." Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Instead, a complaint's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . ." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Although "once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint," id. at 563, and a plaintiff must allege "only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," id. at 570, if a plaintiff has not "nudged [his or her] claim[] across the line from conceivable to plausible, the[] complaint must be dismissed," id; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 ("Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'show[n]'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" (citation omitted) (second alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2))); id. at 678-79 ("Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.").

"[W]hen ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); see also Dixon v. United States, No. 13-CV-2193, 2014 WL 23427, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2014) ("For the purpose of this motion to dismiss, we assume that the facts alleged in [the plaintiff's] complaint are true."). Further, "[f]or the purpose of resolving [a] motion to dismiss, theCourt . . . draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Daniel v. T&M Prot. Res., Inc., No. 13-CV-4384, 2014 WL 182341, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2014) (citing Koch v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 699 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 2012)). Additionally, "[i]n adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court must confine its consideration to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be taken." Leonard F. v. Israel Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hendrix v. City of N.Y., No. 12-CV-5011, 2013 WL 6835168, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2013) (same).

Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court must "construe[] [his] [complaint] liberally and interpret[] [it] to raise the strongest arguments that [it] suggest[s]." Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Farzan v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 12-CV-1217, 2013 WL 6231615, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2013) (same). However, "the liberal treatment afforded to pro se litigants does not exempt a pro se party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." Bell v. Jendell, No. 12-CV-6666, 2013 WL 5863561, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Caidor v. Onondaga Cty., 517 F.3d 601, 605 (2d Cir. 2008) ("[P]ro se litigants generally are required to inform themselves regarding procedural rules and to comply with them." (italics and internal quotation marks removed)).

B. Analysis

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint on several grounds: (i) that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his claims; (ii) that Defendant is not a state actor or acting under statelaw; (iii) that Plaintiff has failed to plead a deprivation under the Eighth Amendment because he did not allege a sufficiently serious deprivation or that Defendant acted with deliberate indifference; (iv) that Plaintiff failed to allege that his religious beliefs were substantially burdened as is required to state a First Amendment claim; and (v) that Plaintiff failed to allege the existence of any...