Torres v. First Transit, Inc.
| Decision Date | 13 February 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 17-cv-81162 |
| Parties | Juan TORRES and Alejandro Torres, Plaintiffs, v. FIRST TRANSIT, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
John Joseph Shahady, Kopelowitz Ostrow, Fort Lauderdale, FL, Marc Andrew Chandler, Chandler Trial Law, Plantation, FL, for Plaintiffs.
Benjamin Michael Esco, Giancarlo Vito Nicolosi, Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A., Miami, FL, Brigid F. Cech Samole, Katherine Marie Clemente, Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Elliot H. Scherker, Miami, FL, for Defendant.
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant First Transit, Inc.'s Motion for New Trial and Remittitur, ECF No. [137] (the "Motion"). The Court has reviewed the Motion, all supporting and opposing submissions and exhibits, the record, and the applicable law, and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion is denied.
This case arises from an automobile accident that occurred on September 30, 2017. Defendant admitted liability. Following a three-day jury trial commencing on November 6, 2018 on the issue of damages, the jury returned verdicts in favor of each Plaintiff. As to Plaintiff Alejandro Torres, the jury awarded past medical expenses ($ 396,261.13), past pain and suffering ($ 600,000.00), and future pain and suffering ($ 1,500,000.00). As to Plaintiff Juan Torres, the jury awarded past medical expenses ($ 877,604.38), past pain and suffering ($ 1,050,000.00), and future pain and suffering ($ 3,000,000.00). ECF No. [109]. On November 13, 2018, the Court entered Final Judgement in favor of the Plaintiffs for a total award of $ 7,423,855.51. ECF No. [4].
On December 11, 2018, Defendant filed the present Motion for New Trial, or, in the alternative, that remittitur be awarded, based on juror non-disclosure of prior litigation history and because the jury awards for past medical expenses and future pain and suffering are against the weight of the evidence.
Among other relief, a court may grant a new jury trial under Rule 59 "for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court." Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a). For instance, a party may assert that "the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, that the damages are excessive, or that, for other reasons, the trial was not fair to the party moving." Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan , 311 U.S. 243, 251, 61 S.Ct. 189, 85 L.Ed. 147 (1940). Thus, a motion for new trial should be granted "when the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence or will result in a miscarriage of justice, even though there may be substantial evidence which would prevent the direction of a verdict." Brown v. Sheriff of Orange Cnty., Fla. , 604 F. App'x 915 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (quoting Lipphardt v. Durango Steakhouse of Brandon, Inc. , 267 F.3d 1183, 1186 (11th Cir. 2001) ); see Tucker v. Hous. Auth. of Birmingham Dist. , 229 F. App'x 820, 826 (11th Cir. 2007) ();
"[G]ranting motions for new trial touches on the trial court's traditional equity power to prevent injustice and the trial judge's duty to guard the integrity and fairness of the proceedings before [her]." Sherrod v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sch. Dist. , 237 F. App'x 423, 424 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Christopher v. Florida , 449 F.3d 1360, 1366 n.4 (11th Cir. 2006) ). Ultimately, "motions for a new trial are committed to the discretion of the trial court." Montgomery v. Noga , 168 F.3d 1282, 1295 (11th Cir. 1999) ; Steger v. General Elec. Co. , 318 F.3d 1066, 1081 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Deas v. PACCAR, Inc. , 775 F.2d 1498, 1503 (11th Cir. 1985) ) ("A district court is permitted wide discretion in considering a motion for new trial based on an erroneous jury instruction.").
Defendant contends that two jurors, by the initials YC and ES ("Juror YC" and "Juror ES"), concealed material facts during voir dire necessitating a new trial. To obtain a new trial based on a juror's failure to accurately answer a question in voir dire , Defendant must "first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire , and then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause." McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood , 464 U.S. 548, 556, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984). Further, "[t]he motives for concealing information may vary, but only those reasons that affect a juror's impartiality can truly be said to affect the fairness of a trial." Id. In other words, "[t]he second prong [of the McDonough test], that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause, requires a showing of actual bias." BankAtlantic v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc. , 955 F.2d 1467, 1473 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing U.S. v. Perkins , 748 F.2d 1519, 1532 (11th Cir. 1984) ; U.S. v. Casamayor , 837 F.2d 1509, 1515 (11th Cir. 1988) ).
Here, jurors completed a jury questionnaire, which included question 10, stating: "If you and/or a close family member or friend has ever been a party to a lawsuit (i.e., sued someone or been sued by someone) please describe the circumstances." ECF No. [141-1]. Juror YC responded "N/A" and Juror ES responded "No." Id. ; ECF No. [141-3]. Additionally, during voir dire , potential jurors were asked: "Is there anyone that has been involved in a civil lawsuit that has shaped your view either negatively or positively about the legal system that you believe would have an effect on your ability to serve as a fair and impartial juror?" ECF No. [124] at 34:1-5. No jurors responded in the affirmative. Id. at 34:6-7.
Defendant contends that based on information learned in its post-trial investigation, Juror YC and Juror ES concealed material facts during voir dire. Defendant's investigation discovered that Juror YC and Juror ES had been named defendants in prior cases. Specifically, Defendant provided court documents demonstrating that Juror YC had been sued three times by banks to recover debts, twice in foreclosure, and once by the State of Florida1 . See ECF No. [141-2]. Juror ES was involved in one foreclosure, one action by a condominium association to recover unpaid assessments, three cases involving debt collection, and a personal bankruptcy.2 See ECF No. [141-4]. Defendant argues that the responses of Juror YC and Juror ES to question 10 of the juror questionnaire and their silence in response to the oral question concerning prior litigation history amount to a failure to honestly answer a material question.
Under the first prong of the McDonough test, the Court must determine whether a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire. Plaintiff argues that Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the Jurors' answers were dishonest. Plaintiff specifically addresses question 10 of the juror questionnaire, arguing that the question is ambiguous because it defines being "a party to a lawsuit" as having "sued someone or been sued by someone." Because each lawsuit Defendant identified in the litigation history of Juror YC and Juror ES was initiated by a corporation, not an individual, the Plaintiff contends that the jurors could have believed that they had not been sued by someone. The record evidence presented by the Defendant certainly supports the Plaintiffs' argument. However, for purposes of the Motion and further analysis, the Court will assume that the Jurors' answers on the juror questionnaire were dishonest. See BankAtlantic , 955 F.2d 1467, 1473 (11th Cir. 1992) ().
The Court cannot find, however, that Jurors YC's and ES's silence when questioned during voir dire amounts to dishonesty. Jurors were asked: "Is there anyone that has been involved in a civil lawsuit that has shaped your view either negatively or positively about the legal system that you believe would have an effect on your ability to serve as a fair and impartial juror." First, merely being involved in prior litigation does not necessarily shape one's view about the legal system. Second, to the extent that a juror's litigation history did shape his or her view of the legal system, it certainly does not necessarily follow that the juror believes that it has affected his or her ability to serve as a fair and impartial juror. The Court will not engage in second-guessing this kind of opinion-based juror expression which could only be speculated to be dishonest, nor is the Court required to hold an evidentiary hearing to investigate the issue further. See New v. Darnell , 409 F. App'x 281, 284 (11th Cir. 2011) () (internal quotations omitted).3
To satisfy the second prong, there must be a showing "of bias that would disqualify the juror." United States v. Carpa , 271 F.3d 962, 967 (11th Cir. 2001). "Bias may be shown either by express admission or by proof of specific facts showing such a close connection to the circumstances at hand that bias must be presumed." Id. Defendant argues that Juror YC's and Juror ES's concealment of their respective "histories of being sued by large financial entities for non-payment of debt would readily be perceived as likely to sympathize with Plaintiffs in their pursuit of money damages from First Transit" due to the " ‘David versus Goliath’ atmosphere" of the case. ECF No. [137] at 5. Defendant further contends that because "Plaintiff...
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Torres v. First Transit, Inc.
...alleged nondisclosure by waiting to conduct an investigation into the jurors on the panel until it received the unfavorable verdict. See Id. at 1379 n.4. Appeal to the Eleventh Circuit Defendant appealed the Court's Order. On review, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the Order and remanded the c......