Torres v. Jai Dining Servs. (Phoenix) Inc.

• Decision Date: 10 September 2020
• Docket Number: No. 1 CA-CV 19-0544,1 CA-CV 19-0544
• Citation: 476 P.3d 327,250 Ariz. 147
• Parties: Roberto TORRES, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. JAI DINING SERVICES (PHOENIX) INC., Defendant/Appellant.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

250 Ariz. 147

476 P.3d 327

Roberto TORRES, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellees,

v.JAI DINING SERVICES (PHOENIX) INC., Defendant/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 19-0544

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1.

FILED September 10, 2020

Ahwatukee Legal Office, P.C., Phoenix, By David L. Abney, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellees

Osborn Maledon, P.A., Phoenix, By Eric M. Fraser, Joshua David Rothenberg Bendor, Co-Counsel for Defendant/Appellant

Quintairos, Prieto, Wood & Boyer, P.A., Phoenix, By Dominique T. Barrett, Co-Counsel for Defendant/Appellant

Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge David B. Gass joined.

WINTHROP, Judge:

¶1 This case presents questions about the scope of a liquor licensee's liability for injuries its patron caused after a night of drinking and irresponsible decisions. The licensee, JAI Dining Services (Phoenix), Inc ("JAI"), appeals a judgment in favor of Roberto Torres, Orlenda Guillen, Hernan Gastelum Rosas, and Maria Suarez (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), awarding Plaintiffs $2,000,000 plus costs and interest against Cesar Aguilera Villanueva and JAI, forty percent of which was apportioned to JAI.

¶2 JAI appealed the judgment and denial of its renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, see Ariz. R. Civ. P. ("Rule") 50, arguing it should not be held liable for three independent reasons: (1) Villanueva's being awakened and his decision to drive again after previously arriving safely home, getting into bed, and going to sleep was an intervening, superseding cause that cut off JAI's liability; (2) the claims on which the jury found JAI liable have been preempted by statute; and (3) JAI did not breach any duty the law imposed on it and could have done nothing to prevent Villanueva from leaving his house and operating a motor vehicle several hours after he left the licensee's club. Finding the first argument dispositive, we agree with JAI the superior court should have directed judgment in JAI's favor based on a lack of proximate causation. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the judgment against JAI and remand for the superior court to enter judgment in favor of JAI and in favor of Plaintiffs only as to Villanueva.

FACTS¹ AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3 At 5:14 a.m. on November 8, 2015, while traveling at eighty-six miles per hour, Villanueva crashed his Toyota Tundra pickup truck into a car stopped at a red light, killing both the car's occupants. Villanueva was arrested at the scene, convicted of two counts of manslaughter, and sentenced to serve fourteen years in prison.

¶4 The day before the collision, Villanueva worked a twelve-hour shift at his warehouse job, finishing his work at approximately 6:30 p.m. He went directly from work to a family wedding reception, where he had tacos and "some beer." At approximately 9:00 p.m., he went home to shower and change clothes before going out with a group of friends and relatives to Jaguar's, a strip club owned by JAI. On the way to Jaguar's, Villanueva stopped at a convenience store and purchased a twenty-four-ounce container of beer, which he quickly consumed while driving to Jaguar's.

¶5 Villanueva did not appear visibly intoxicated when his group arrived at the club at approximately 11:20 p.m. As the group walked into the club and headed for a table, Villanueva purchased and began drinking a twelve-ounce beer from a tub of beers on ice. The three men in the group (including Villanueva) then ordered a "mega bucket" of beer (which contained fifteen beers), and the four women ordered several mixed drinks and a smaller bucket of beer (which contained approximately six beers).

¶6 At approximately 1:53 a.m., Villanueva escorted his girlfriend, Leticia Morales, and her friend, Wendy, to Villanueva's truck in the parking lot because Leticia was drunk. Wendy and Leticia stayed in the truck, and Villanueva, who at trial asserted he was by that time feeling "drunk" himself, went back into the club fifteen minutes later, at 2:08 a.m. While Villanueva was outside, the other men ordered a second mega bucket of beer. Villanueva drank one beer—his last for the evening— from the second mega bucket and then left to use the restroom. In total, Villanueva drank six or seven beers at the club, but he ostensibly did not display obvious signs of intoxication, a characterization disputed by Plaintiffs.

¶7 When Villanueva returned from the restroom, it was near closing time, and he saw a Jaguar's bouncer trying to take a beer from his sister, who was refusing to relinquish the drink. After momentarily grabbing the bouncer's arm, Villanueva briefly argued with the bouncer, then agreed to leave, and several Jaguar's employees escorted Villanueva's group outside.² The group left the club at approximately 2:20 a.m. By that time, the group had been at the club for approximately three hours.

¶8 Villanueva drove his truck to his brother's house, which was approximately fifteen minutes away. At his brother's house, Villanueva drank an energy drink and hung out for a while to, in his words, "chill out for a little bit and sober up." At approximately 4:00 a.m., a friend drove Villanueva and his sister home in Villanueva's truck. Leticia and Wendy went along.

¶9 The group arrived safely at Villanueva's residence—a home Villanueva shared with his sister and parents—and Villanueva went to bed and fell asleep. Sometime thereafter, Villanueva was awakened by Leticia, and at her prodding agreed to get out of bed and help drive Wendy home. Villanueva agreed, on the condition that Wendy drive the truck to her home because he did not feel as though he could safely drive. Wendy drove Villanueva's truck to her house (which was approximately forty-five minutes away), while Villanueva and Leticia slept.

¶10 On his way back home for the second time that morning, with Leticia still sleeping in the truck, Villanueva caused the fatal vehicle collision, killing the two victims. Approximately two hours after the crash, Villanueva's blood alcohol content ("BAC") was approximately .078 or .079. Assuming Villanueva drank no further alcohol after leaving Jaguar's, as he claimed, Villanueva's BAC when he left Jaguar's was between .128 and .166, and his BAC at the time of the crash was approximately .11. Other than the time he spent sleeping in bed after arriving home and while riding to Wendy's home, Villanueva had been awake for approximately twenty-four hours before the collision.

¶11 One year later, the victims’ relatives (Plaintiffs) sued Villanueva and JAI. Plaintiffs asserted a negligence claim against Villanueva. Against JAI, Plaintiffs asserted common law negligence, dram shop liability, and statutory negligence per se.

¶12 Before trial, JAI moved for summary judgment regarding proximate causation as to JAI, arguing Villanueva's deliberate decision to drive after arriving home safely and falling asleep for a period of time was unforeseeable and constituted a superseding, intervening event of independent origin negating any negligence on JAI's part. After responsive briefing and oral argument, the superior court took the matter under advisement and denied the motion.

¶13 Trial was held in February and March 2019. At the close of evidence, JAI moved for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a), Ariz. R. Civ. P., on the claims of negligence and dram shop liability, arguing both the proximate cause and duty elements of negligence could not be met. JAI argued a superseding intervening cause had occurred because undisputed testimony showed Villanueva "made it to a place of repose, made it home, in his bed at home, and it was his decision then, once he made it home safe, to leave and get in the [truck]." JAI argued Plaintiffs had presented absolutely no facts making it foreseeable to JAI that once Villanueva was home asleep in his bed, he would leave. Consequently, both any ongoing duty and proximate causation necessarily ended. JAI further argued, "[o]therwise, there would be no point in having somebody take a cab home. It would require the club to basically lock him in his house and somehow hold him hostage in his own house until he sobers up. And that's not realistic." Plaintiffs argued that JAI's duty could not legally end until Villanueva was no longer subject to the influence of the alcohol, and that everything he did until then was influenced by, and should be considered proximately caused by, the alcohol. The superior court denied the Rule 50 motion.

¶14 The jury found in Plaintiffs’ favor on negligence against Villanueva and on common law negligence and dram shop liability against JAI,³ but found in JAI's favor on the statutory negligence per se claim. The jury awarded Plaintiffs $2,000,000 in compensatory damages, with fault apportioned sixty percent to Villanueva and forty percent to JAI.

The jury rejected Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages.

¶15 After entry of a signed judgment, JAI renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b), Ariz. R. Civ. P., again based on duty and proximate cause. After further briefing, the superior court denied the motion.

¶16 JAI timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 12-2101(A)(1).

ANALYSIS

¶17 We review de novo the superior court's rulings on questions of law, including motions for summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law. Andrews v. Blake , 205 Ariz. 236, 240, ¶ 12, 69 P.3d 7, 11 (2003) ; Coll. Book Ctrs., Inc. v. Carefree Foothills Homeowners’ Ass'n , 225 Ariz. 533, 536, ¶ 9, 241 P.3d 897, 900 (App. 2010). Summary judgment is appropriate when "the moving party shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Similarly, judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when "a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find...