Torris v. People

• Decision Date: 07 March 1894
• Citation: 19 Colo. 438,36 P. 153
• Parties: TORRIS v. PEOPLE. [1]
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

36 P. 153

19 Colo. 438

TORRIS v. PEOPLE. ^[1]

Supreme Court of Colorado

March 7, 1894

Error to district court, Pueblo county.

Santiago Torris, alias Indian Joe, was convicted of murder, and brings error. Affirmed.

D. M Campbell and George Salisbury, for plaintiff in error.

Eugene Engley, Atty. Gen., and H. T. Sale, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the People.

GODDARD J.

The defendant below (plaintiff in error here) was convicted of the crime of murder of the first degree, and sentenced to death. The evidence was entirely circumstantial, but no question as to its sufficiency is presented upon this review. The principal error relied on for reversal is the admission in evidence of an affidavit made by plaintiff in error to procure compulsory process for witnesses. The affidavit contained a statement that the plaintiff in error expected to prove by certain witnesses (naming them) where he was at the time the alleged homicide was committed, for the purpose of proving an alibi. On the trial of the cause the prosecution introduced this affidavit in evidence, over the objection of plaintiff in error. and, for the purpose of showing the falsity of the statements therein contained as to the whereabouts of plaintiff in error on the day of the homicide, introduced some of the witnesses named in the affidavit. It is insisted that the admission of this affidavit, and the testimony contradicting the statements contained therein, was error. Upon careful consideration, we are of the opinion that the affidavit was properly admitted in evidence for the purpose for which it was offered. Oral declarations of a party accused of crime in respect to matters relevant to the issue, when voluntarily made, are always competent against him. Such declarations are allowed to be proved, and their falsity shown by other evidence. The accused may explain such declarations, and it is for the jury to determine the weight to be attached to them; and, when admissions are made voluntarily and deliberately in a sworn affidavit, there is no reason that we can perceive why they are not equally admissible for the same purpose. It has been frequently held that affidavits for a continuance, which are very analogous in character to the affidavit under consideration, are admissible in evidence for the purpose of showing statements or declarations of the defendant voluntarily made in regard to the crime with which he is charged; and witnesses by whom it is alleged such statements can be verified may be called to show their falsity. State v. Bishop, 98 N.C. 773, 4 S.E. 357; Pledger v State, 77 Ga. 242, 3 S.E. 320; State v. Hayes, 78 Mo. 307; Behler v. State, 112 Ind. 140, 13 N.E. 272; Com. v. Starr, 4 Allen, 301.

It is further contended that the district attorney made an improper use of the affidavit, in argument to the jury, in commenting upon such portions of it as were prejudicial to the accused, and omitting to call the jury's attention to other portions that were in his favor. It is true that a party against whom an admission is introduced is entitled to have the whole...