Total Recycling Serv. of Conn. Inc. v. Conn. Oil Recycling Serv. Llc.

• Decision Date: 07 June 2011
• Docket Number: No. 32243.,32243.
• Citation: 20 A.3d 716,129 Conn.App. 296
• Parties: TOTAL RECYCLING SERVICES OF CONNECTICUT, INC., et al.v.CONNECTICUT OIL RECYCLING SERVICES, LLC.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

129 Conn.App. 296

20 A.3d 716

TOTAL RECYCLING SERVICES OF CONNECTICUT, INC., et al.

v.CONNECTICUT OIL RECYCLING SERVICES, LLC.

No. 32243.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Feb. 3, 2011.Decided June 7, 2011.

William J. Sweeney, for the appellant (defendant).Jonathan J. Klein, Bridgeport, for the appellees (plaintiffs).BEACH, ALVORD and SCHALLER, Js.SCHALLER, J.

The defendant, Connecticut Oil Recycling Services, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying its motion for attorney's fees, rendered on remand following the decision of this court in Total Recycling Services of Connecticut, Inc. v. Connecticut Oil Recycling Services, LLC, 114 Conn.App. 671, 970 A.2d 807 (2009). On appeal, the defendant claims that the court abused its discretion by (1) requiring it to itemize attorney's fees incurred for the litigation on three contracts and (2) denying appellate attorney's fees for its prior appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.¹

The following relevant facts and procedural history were described by this court in Total Recycling Services of Connecticut, Inc. “In a four count complaint filed on October 19, 2006, the plaintiffs, Total Recycling Services of Connecticut, Inc. (Total Recycling), and Whitewing Environmental Corp. (Whitewing), brought an action to enforce their alleged rights under three contracts relating to the sale of an oil recycling business to the defendant.... The plaintiffs sought damages either for breach of contract by the defendant or for unjust enrichment of the defendant, claiming nonpayment of amounts due. The defendant denied any liability to the plaintiffs and filed a five part counterclaim for damages resulting from the plaintiffs' alleged failure to honor their contractual and statutory obligations to the defendant. The defendant also sought attorney's fees in accordance with the provisions of two of the contracts between the parties.” Total Recycling Services of Connecticut, Inc. v. Connecticut Oil Recycling Services, LLC, supra, 114 Conn.App. at 673, 970 A.2d 807.

[20 A.3d 719 , 129 Conn.App. 299]

“In the defendant's motion for attorney's fees, it relied on the terms of the agreement to transfer Total Recycling's customer list and Whitewing's agreement not to compete. Each of these agreements entitled the defendant to recover ‘costs or damages, including reasonable attorney fees resulting from any breach of any representation, warranty or covenant contained in this Agreement.’ The trial court concluded that these provisions were inapplicable because the jury had awarded damages to the defendant only with respect to Total Recycling's breach of the agreement to convey equipment, which did not contain such a clause.” Id., at 679–80, 970 A.2d 807. This court disagreed and, noting that the plaintiffs had “not challenged the jury's findings that Total Recycling breached the agreement to transfer its customer list and that Whitewing breached the agreement not to compete”; id., at 680, 970 A.2d 807; held that “[t]he attorney's fee clauses in these contracts did not require the defendant to prove more than breach.” Id., at 680–81, 970 A.2d 807.

This court remanded the case for further proceedings on the defendant's claim for attorney's fees, holding that “[t]he parties have not had the opportunity, to date, to address the proper construction of the clause, in both contracts, that permits the defendant, on a showing of the plaintiffs' breach, to recover ‘costs or damages, including reasonable attorney fees....' It is, for example, not clear whether the phrase ‘including attorney fees' modifies both ‘costs' and ‘damages.’ ... The parties similarly have not had the opportunity to present evidence on the reasonableness of the fees accrued by the defendant during the course of this litigation. A remand will provide an opportunity for the resolution of these issues and other related questions that the parties may want to present.” Id., at 681, 970 A.2d 807.

Following the remand, the defendant filed a motion for attorney's fees with the trial court. The defendant attached to the motion an affidavit and itemized list of attorney's fees incurred in the course of the litigation. The list did not distinguish the items of work on the separate contracts with respect to which the defendant successfully counterclaimed. By memorandum of decision filed November 30, 2009, the court, Jones, J., refused to award any fees to the defendant because it concluded that it was “necessary for the defendant to identify which reasonable attorney's fees were incurred in prosecuting its breach of contract counterclaim with regard to the contracts that specifically provide for attorney's fees.” ² The court allowed the defendant the opportunity to make the requisite showing at a future hearing.

The defendant filed a renewed motion for attorney's fees, attaching the same affidavit and list of attorney's fees incurred. On March 29, 2010, the court, Bear, J., held an evidentiary hearing, during which the defendant presented the testimony of an expert witness, William Gallagher, a trial attorney with many years of experience. Gallagher testified that it would be “extremely difficult” to sort out the attorney's fees based on the billing in the file because “no one itemized, and that's not the custom to itemize in that great detail.” Gallagher also testified that he believed that a decision of this court, Heller v. D.W. Fish Realty Co., 93 Conn.App. 727, 890 A.2d 113 (2006), allows for fees in any case where “services are intertwined in such a way that it's not possible to sort them out....”

Gallagher's testimony was the only testimony heard by the court, but the attorneys for both parties made arguments to the court. The defendant's attorney argued that he could not parse out his time spent on the three contracts and he does not keep track of his time in that manner. The plaintiffs argued that the defendant failed to satisfy the November 30, 2009 order.

On April 19, 2010, the court denied the defendant's motion for attorney's fees. The court held that the order requiring the defendant to identify the fees associated with the litigation of the two contracts providing for fees was the law of the case. The court also held that Jacques All Trades Corp. v. Brown, 57 Conn.App. 189, 200, 752 A.2d 1098 (2000), governed in the present case, preventing the defendant from recovering all fees. The defendant has appealed.

“[W]e review an award of attorney's fees under the abuse of discretion standard of review. This standard applies to the amount of fees awarded ... and also to the trial court's determination of the factual predicate justifying the award.... Under the abuse of discretion standard of review, [w]e will make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court's ruling, and only upset it for a manifest abuse of discretion.... [Thus, our] review of such rulings is limited to the questions of whether the trial court correctly applied the law and reasonably could have reached the conclusion that it did.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Moasser v. Becker, 121 Conn.App. 593, 595, 996 A.2d 1200 (2010).

I

The defendant first claims that the court improperly refused to grant the defendant's motion for attorney's fees on the basis that it had not identified which attorney's fees were incurred in litigation of the contracts that allowed for such fees.³ The defendant argues that the court should not have applied the law of the case doctrine and that Heller, rather than Jacques All Trades Corp., governs the outcome of this case. We disagree.

“The general rule of law known as the American rule is that attorney's fees and ordinary expenses and burdens of litigation are not allowed to the successful party absent a contractual or statutory exception.... This rule is generally followed throughout the country.... Connecticut adheres to the American rule.... There are few exceptions. For example, a specific contractual term may provide for the recovery of attorney's fees and costs ... or a statute may confer such rights.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) ACMAT Corp. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. Co., 282 Conn. 576, 582, 923 A.2d 697 (2007).

In Jacques All Trades Corp. v. Brown, supra, 57 Conn.App. at 192, 752 A.2d 1098, the plaintiff brought breach of contract claims based on two separate and distinct transactions. The defendant successfully brought a counterclaim for breach under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42–110a et seq., arising out of one of the contracts. Id., at 193, 752 A.2d 1098. The defendant argued that she was entitled to “ all attorney's fees incurred in the defense of [the plaintiff's] action and the prosecution of her counterclaim, relying on [General Statutes] § 42–110g (d)....” (Emphasis in original.) Id., at 200, 752 A.2d 1098. This court upheld the trial court's ruling that the defendant was entitled to recover only the fees incurred for the prosecution of her CUTPA claim because § 42–110g (d) allows for the court to award attorney's fees “only for those expenses that were related to the prosecution of a CUTPA claim.” Id.

In Heller v. D.W. Fish Realty Co., supra, 93 Conn.App. at 727, 890 A.2d 113, the plaintiffs brought claims of breach of contract, negligence and violation of CUTPA for damages arising out of a real estate transaction. The plaintiffs were successful on all claims. Id., at 730, 890 A.2d 113. Subsequently, “[t]he [trial] court ordered the plaintiffs to submit evidence as to the portion of the fees requested specifically related to the CUTPA [claim].... The plaintiffs, however, could not distinguish the amount of attorney's fees related to their CUTPA claim from the amounts related to their breach of contract and negligence claims.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 735, 890 A.2d 113. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees brought under § 42–110g (d). This court...