Toughill v. Toughill
| Decision Date | 09 May 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. C2-99-1485.,C2-99-1485. |
| Citation | 609 N.W.2d 634 |
| Parties | In re the Marriage of Diane ReNee TOUGHILL, Petitioner, Respondent, v. John Kenneth TOUGHILL, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Sarah C. Mardell, Kathleen E. Rusler O'Connor, Mardell Law Office, Apple Valley, for respondent.
Joseph E. Marvin, Alexander M. Dashe, Marvin & Erhart, L.L.C., Anoka, for appellant.
Considered and decided by PETERSON, Presiding Judge, ANDERSON, Judge, and FOLEY1, Judge.
On appeal from marital-dissolution proceedings, appellant challenges the district court's orders (1) denying his motion to vacate the dissolution stipulation; (2) awarding spousal maintenance; (3) limiting his infant son's overnight visitation; and (4) denying his motion to change venue. We affirm the district court's orders denying the motions, limiting visitation and setting the amount and duration of spousal maintenance, and we deny respondent's motion for attorney fees and costs. But, the interests of justice require us to reverse the district court's decision to divest itself of jurisdiction over spousal maintenance.
Respondent Diane ReNee Toughill sought to end her nearly three years of marriage to appellant John Kenneth Toughill and hired an attorney. A few days later, appellant and respondent met at the attorney's office. Appellant was served with a summons and petition for dissolution of marriage, and respondent's attorney discussed a marital termination agreement with the parties. While appellant did not hire his own attorney, he had acted on his own behalf in his first divorce.
Respondent's attorney did not give appellant legal advice. Respondent's attorney did, however, confer with respondent in appellant's presence throughout the meeting. As appellant and respondent agreed to various items, respondent's attorney entered the terms into a document on her computer. After about four hours of negotiation, both appellant and respondent signed that document—the marital termination agreement (MTA). Appellant also executed a waiver of independent counsel.
Two days later, appellant had misgivings about the MTA terms and retained independent legal counsel. Thereafter, appellant promptly moved to change venue from Dakota County to Washington County and filed a notice to rescind the MTA. The district court found that respondent resided with her parents in Dakota County and denied the motion to change venue.
The district court ordered appellant to file a formal motion to vacate the MTA, and he complied. The district court held a hearing on the motion, but found no mistake, duress, or fraud in the four hours of detailed negotiation and denied relief. The case immediately proceeded to a default hearing. Accepting some MTA provisions in their entirety, the district court reserved judgment on the issues of attorney's fees, spousal maintenance, the amount of any insurance payments, and overnight visitation pending a separate evidentiary hearing.
At the evidentiary hearing, respondent established that she is employed as part-time medical transcriptionist for a small clinic, working at home between six and fifty hours per month at $12.56 per hour. Appellant works for a railroad and earns a little less than $50,000 per year. Appellant moved into his mother's home during the marriage dissolution, so the district court rejected his claimed rent and utility expenses, and discounted his claimed monthly food expenses. The MTA provided that appellant would pay respondent up to $600 of spousal maintenance per month for 61 months. The district court awarded respondent monthly maintenance of $500 for 52 months.
The MTA provided that the couple's son would not visit appellant overnight before the age of three. In accordance with a Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force recommendation, the district court ordered that overnight visitation would begin when the child reached age two and a half.
I. Did the district court err by denying appellant's motion to vacate the MTA?
II. Did the district court abuse its discretion by ordering spousal maintenance?
III. Did the district court abuse its discretion by limiting overnight visitation?
IV. Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying appellant's motion to change venue?
V. Is respondent entitled to attorney fees?
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion both by requiring him to bring a motion to vacate the MTA and by denying that motion.
Appellant asserts that he had a right to unilaterally withdraw from the MTA because a dissolution stipulation does not become a binding contract until incorporated into the judgment. Appellant is incorrect. Stipulations are a judicially-favored means of simplifying and expediting dissolution litigation and, for this reason, are "accorded the sanctity of binding contracts." Shirk v. Shirk, 561 N.W.2d 519, 521 (Minn.1997). As "binding contracts," a party cannot repudiate or withdraw from a stipulation without the consent of the other party, except "by leave of the court for cause shown." Id. at 521-22 (quotation omitted). Thus, even though the district court had yet to adopt the parties' stipulation or incorporate it into a dissolution judgment, appellant could not repudiate or withdraw from the stipulation absent respondent's consent or the court's permission. Here, because respondent did not consent to appellant's attempt to withdraw from or repudiate the stipulation, the court's permission, and hence a motion, was required.2
Appellant argues that even if an MTA not yet adopted by a district court is provisionally binding on the parties, this district court should have granted this motion to vacate this MTA because this MTA was void for fraud and duress. Appellant also alleges that as a result of the district court's erroneous refusal to grant his motion, he suffered and will suffer substantial prejudice under the terms of the stipulation-based dissolution judgment. Because appellant alleged both district court error and prejudice caused by that error, we will address the merits of his argument. See Midway Ctr. Assocs. v. Midway Ctr., Inc., 306 Minn. 352, 356, 237 N.W.2d 76, 78 (1975)
(); Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (). We will not disturb a district court's determination whether to vacate a dissolution stipulation absent an abuse of discretion. See Anderson v. Anderson, 303 Minn. 26, 32, 225 N.W.2d 837, 840 (1975).
In dicta, Shirk suggested that a district court may relieve a party from the terms of a dissolution stipulation if, before entry of a judgment based thereon, it is determined that the stipulation was "improvidently made and in equity and good conscience ought not to stand." 561 N.W.2d at 522; (citing John v. John, 322 N.W.2d 347, 348 (Minn.1982)). We adopt that dicta as our holding: When a district court is considering whether to allow a party to repudiate or withdraw from a dissolution stipulation which has not yet been incorporated into a dissolution judgment, the district court is to consider whether the stipulation was "improvidently made and in equity and good conscience ought not to stand." Shirk, 561 N.W.2d at 522; see In re Estate of Bush, 302 Minn. 188, 207, 224 N.W.2d 489, 501 (1974)
(). Stipulations based on fraud or duress and which prejudice the defrauded or coerced party are improvidently made and in equity and good conscience ought not to stand. Cf. Hestekin v. Hestekin, 587 N.W.2d 308, 310 (Minn.App.1998) (); Tomscak v. Tomscak, 352 N.W.2d 464, 466 (1984) ().
Here, in addressing whether this case involved fraud or duress, the district court, among other things, considered the so-called Tomscak analysis and specifically addressed the first two so-called Tomscak factors. Before Shirk, when deciding whether to grant a party's motion to vacate a stipulation-based dissolution judgment, the district court evaluated the Tomscak factors of whether (1) the party was represented by competent counsel; (2) negotiations were extensive and detailed; (3) the party agreed to the stipulation in open court; and (4) when questioned by the judge, the party acknowledged understanding the terms and considering them fair and equitable. See, e.g., Glorvigen v. Glorvigen, 438 N.W.2d 692, 695-96 (Minn. App.1989)
. In 1988, Minn.Stat. § 518.145 was amended to include what is now subdivision 2 of that statute, regarding relief from dissolution judgments, orders, or proceedings. 1988 Minn. Laws ch. 668, § 11. Among other things, Shirk essentially recognized that the 1988 amendment functionally overruled Tomscak and its progeny to the extent that those cases allowed vacation of stipulation-based dissolution judgments on grounds other than those listed in the statute. See Shirk, 561 N.W.2d at 522 ().
Here, the district court's critical findings, including those addressing the first two Tomscak factors, state that (1) the parties agreed to enter into the MTA to save money; (2) before executing the MTA, the parties extensively negotiated visitation, physical custody, access to the child's health and school records, and apportionment of assets, debts, and pensions; (3) appellant was not unfamiliar with MTAs, having entered into an MTA in the dissolution of a prior marriage; (4) appellant signed the waiver of counsel after negotiations and simultaneously with the MTA; and (5)...
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...on the parties to which they did not stipulate and thereby deprive the parties of their `day in court.'" Toughill v. Toughill, 609 N.W.2d 634, 638-39 n. 1 (Minn. App. 2000). That is, "to the extent that the district court does not accept the stipulation, the parties should not, absent unusu......
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