Touko v. United States
| Decision Date | 29 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: GJH-20-1113 |
| Parties | MICHEL "MICHAEL" TOUKO, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Plaintiff Michel "Michael" Touko brings this civil action against Defendants United States of America and John Does 1-12, alleging unlawful search and seizure, excessive force, and battery. ECF No. 1. Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 13.1 No hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2018). For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted, in part, and denied, in part.
On or about May 3, 2017, Plaintiff Michel "Michael" Touko was at the residence of his girlfriend, Sharon Duke, located at 410 Christopher Avenue, Apt. F, Gaithersburg, Maryland 20879. ECF No. 1 ¶ 9. Plaintiff was in the bathroom about to shower when he heard loud knocking and shouting. Id. ¶ 10. Ms. Duke's adult son, Anderson Dukes,3 opened the door. Id. ¶11. A U.S. Marshal pointed a gun at Mr. Dukes and his friend and asked if anyone else was in the apartment. Id. Plaintiff responded that he was in the apartment. Id. He then dressed and began to leave the bathroom. Id. As he did, two U.S. Marshals pointed guns at Plaintiff before jumping on him and placing him in handcuffs. Id. According to Plaintiff, twelve U.S. Marshals raided the apartment and battered him. Id. ¶ 12. One of the Marshals had his foot on Plaintiff's back while another had his knee on the back of Plaintiff's neck. Id. Plaintiff asked why he was being arrested and said the Marshals were hurting him, but they did not respond. Id.
The U.S. Marshals then pulled Plaintiff from the bathroom, through and outside the apartment, and down a flight of stairs. Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiff's shoulder, back, and side were injured when he was dragged down the stairs. Id. A U.S. Marshall asked Plaintiff if he could identify three men from photos on the agent's cell phone. Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiff said he could not. Id. The Marshals then pulled him back into the living room of the apartment. Id. ¶ 16. One Marshal went outside to speak to another before returning, removing the handcuffs from Plaintiff, and leaving. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the U.S. Marshals raided the wrong apartment. Id. ¶ 13.
On April 30, 2020, Plaintiff filed suit in this Court, bringing Bivens claims against twelve unidentified U.S. Marshals ("John Doe Defendants") for unlawful search and seizure and use of excessive force (Counts I and II) and a Federal Tort Claim Act (FTCA) claim against the United States for battery (Count III). ECF No. 1. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on October 20, 2020. ECF No. 13. Plaintiff responded on October 30, 2020, ECF No. 16, and Defendants replied on December 18, 2020, ECF No. 20.
Defendants argue the Court should dismiss this action for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6) "test[s] theadequacy of a complaint." Prelich v. Med. Res., Inc., 813 F. Supp. 2d 654, 660 (D. Md. 2011) (citing German v. Fox, 267 F. App'x 231, 233 (4th Cir. 2008)). Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim do "not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Id. (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999)). To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is plausible when "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.
In evaluating the sufficiency of the plaintiff's claims, the Court accepts factual allegations in the complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994); Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Davidson Cty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005). However, the complaint must contain more than "legal conclusions, elements of a cause of action, and bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement." Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009). The Court should not grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim unless "it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." GE Inv. Priv. Placement Partners II v. Parker, 247 F.3d 543, 548 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co, 492 U.S. 229, 249-50 (1989)).
Plaintiff's battery claim against the United States arises under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which confers jurisdiction on the district courts to hear claims "for . . . personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of theGovernment while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). The FTCA thus serves as a waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity. See Welch v. United States, 409 F.3d 646, 651 (4th Cir. 2005). This means, in effect, that the United States can be held liable for the intentional torts of certain government employees, including battery. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (). Additionally, the United States is liable for tort claims "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances," 28 U.S.C. § 2674, and is entitled to all defenses available to its agents, Norton v. United States, 581 F.2d 390, 393 (4th Cir. 1978).
FTCA claims are governed by the law of the place where the alleged tortious acts occurred. See Cibula v. United States, 551 F.3d 316, 319 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1)); United States v. St. Louis Univ., 336 F.3d 294, 300 (4th Cir. 2003). Here, the alleged battery took place in Maryland, so Maryland law applies, including its choice-of-law rules. See Cibula, 551 F.3d at 319; St. Louis Univ., 336 F.3d at 300. Because Maryland generally follows the principle of lex loci delicti—the law of the state where the injury occurred—Maryland law governs Plaintiff's battery claim. See Johnson-Howard v. AECOM Special Missions Servs., Inc., 434 F. Supp. 3d 359, 371 (D. Md. 2020). Defendants assert that under Maryland law, the U.S. Marshals—and thus the United States—are not liable unless they actedwith malice, as they are otherwise entitled to public official immunity. ECF No. 13-1 at 3.4 In support, Defendants rely on Goehring v. United States, which indeed states that "under Maryland law, a law enforcement officer is not liable for assault and battery or other tortious conduct performed during the course of his official duties unless he acted with actual malice toward the plaintiff, i.e. with 'ill will, improper motivation or evil purpose.'" 870 F. Supp. 106, 108 (D. Md. 1994) (quoting Davis v. Muse, 51 Md. App. 93, 100, 441 A.2d 1089, 1093 (1982)). However, this statement does not accurately reflect Maryland law, at least as it stands today.
Goehring cites Davis for the proposition that law enforcement officers are not liable for tortious conduct in the absence of malice. See 870 F. Supp. at 108 (citing 51 Md. App. at 100, 441 A.2d at 1093). Davis, in turn, relies on the public official immunity standard outlined in James v. Prince George's County, and finds that, in the absence of malice, police officers—as public officials—are free from liability. 51 Md. App. at 98-99, 441 A.2d at 1092 (citing James v. Prince George's County, 288 Md. 315, 323, 418 A.2d 1173, 1177 (1980)). But Davis omitted the language in James confining public official immunity to negligence claims, instead extending public official immunity to assault and battery claims as well. See James v. Prince George's County, 288 Md. at 322, 418 A.2d at 1177 () (emphasis added). Maryland courts have since repeatedly clarified that public official immunity does not apply in the case of intentional torts, such as battery. See, e.g., Cooper v. Rodriguez, 443 Md. 680, 714 n.14 (2015) () (emphasis added); Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 117 (1995) (); Cox v. Prince George's Cnty., 296 Md. 162, 169 (1983) (); see also Johnson v. Prince George's Cty., Maryland, No. CIV.A. DKC 10-0582, 2011 WL 806448, at *7 & n.10 (D. Md. Mar. 1, 2011) ().
Accordingly, regardless of whether Plaintiff adequately pleaded malice, Defendant cannot claim public official immunity under Maryland law because Plaintiff has alleged an intentional tort. See Johnson, No. CIV.A. DKC 10-0582, 2011 WL 806448, at *7 ( ). Because Defendants have not asserted any...
To continue reading
Request your trial