Towbin v. Antonacci

Decision Date07 August 2012
Docket NumberCase No. 12–80069–CV.
Citation885 F.Supp.2d 1274
PartiesJulie TOWBIN, Plaintiff, v. Peter ANTONACCI, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

James Kellogg Green, James K. Green, West Palm Beach, FL, Randall C. Marshall, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Florida, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff.

Charles M. Fahlbusch, Attorney General Office, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Defendants.

ORDER

KATHLEEN M. WILLIAMS, District Judge.

In 2011 according to the allegations set forth in the verified complaint initiating this proceeding—Plaintiff Julie Towbin was invited to attend a local political event organized by the Palm Beach County Democratic Executive Committee. (Compl. ¶ 9.) As a former Page in the United States House of Representatives, Ms. Towbin professes a keen and abiding interest in politics. (Compl. ¶ 7.) However, at an entry price of $150 and being only seventeen at the time, Ms. Towbin was concerned that her purchase of a ticket to attend the event would violate Section 106.08 of the Florida Statutes, which prohibits political contributions by minors of more than $100 to individual candidates or political organizations.

More specifically, the statute provides that “an unemancipated child under the age of 18 years of age may not make a contribution in excess of $100 to any candidate or to any political committee supporting one or more candidates.” Fla. Stat. § 106.08(1)(a)-(b). The limit for others, including adults, is $500. Id. § 106.08(1)(a) (“Except for political parties or affiliated party committees, no person, political committee, or committee of continuous existence may, in any election, make contributions in excess of $500 to any candidate for election to or retention in office or to any political committee supporting or opposing one or more candidates.”). A single unlawful contribution is classified as a first degree misdemeanor, while making multiple such contributions is punishable as a third degree felony. Id. § 106.08(7)(a)-(b).

When Ms. Towbin asked if she was constrained by the law, the Defendants refused to provide an “advisory opinion,” although the State's Attorney General informed her that the statute “remains applicable” and carries criminal penalties. (Compl. ¶¶ 16, 18, 20–21.) The State has not subsequently disavowed the contention that it would enforce the statute against minors making excess political contributions. Ultimately, Ms. Tobin did not attend the political event, but steadfastly holds on to a “definite, and serious, desire and intention to contribute in excess of $100 to a political committee and/or candidates of her choice in 2012 were it not for the criminal penalties she faces. (Compl. ¶ 25.) Consequently, Ms. Tobin (through her mother and next friend) brought suit against the State Attorney and members of the Florida Elections Commission, claiming that unless the statute is declared unconstitutional, she will be deprived of significant First Amendment rights. (Compl. ¶ 29.)

In this motion for a preliminary injunction (DE 5), Plaintiff argues that the cap on contributions by unemancipated minors violates the First Amendment's protection of free speech and association, both on its face and as applied to her. The State does not dispute that the statute infringes at least somewhat on rights secured by the First Amendment. Instead, the State argues that the law is constitutionally permissible in that it prevents wealthier minors from expressing themselves more than others of modest means; it, like campaign contribution laws generally, reduces the risk of political corruption; and it prevents minors from being used as straw contributors by their guardians to circumvent contribution limits applicable to adults. Further, and to achieve these legitimate interests, the State argues that the regulation is closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of speech rights and associational freedoms.

The State contends that the following facts are sufficient to justify the intrusion. First, without citing any legislative history (indeed, it was conceded at oral argument that there is none), it contends that the Florida legislature enacted the law because it felt that corruption was a threat. 1 Second, it relies upon a state grand jury report (DE 12, at 20, 25, 27) commissioned in 2010 (and post-dating the law by nearly two decades) that found that Florida had the most convictions of public officials on corruption charges in the country and noted “66 cases relating to violations of F.S. 106.19 (excessive contributions, false reports, fail[ure] to report) and 13 cases involving other provisions of the statute at issue here (i.e., making a contribution in another's name). Significant to the discussion below, the grand jury report, while speaking to corruption generally, neither commented on the harm posed by excessive contributions by minors nor the use of minors as conduits.

Third, and presumably the source of the violations recognized in the grand jury report, the State points to consent decrees from actions brought by the Florida Elections Commission to show that individuals and companies in Florida conceded making contributions in the name of others in violation of Section 106.08(5). In one case, for instance, a computer component distributor reimbursed several employees for contributions made in the 1996 mayoral race in Miami, Florida. (DE 12 at 81.) The distributor stipulated to making excess contributions and to making contributions through another (in violation of Sections 106.08(1) and (5) of the Florida Statutes). (Id. at 85.) In another case, a consent decree recognized that a non-partisan committee called the Florida Leadership Coalition funneled money sent by U.S. Sugar, a Florida company, to the Republican Party of Florida in 1994. (Id. at 70.) The Coalition acknowledged violating Section 106.08 and agreed to pay a civil fine of $2,500. (DE 12 at 73.) U.S. Sugar acknowledged violating the statute as well and agreed to a civil penalty of $5,000. (DE 12 at 78.) Yet another case involved a hospital in Brevard County that acknowledged asking 74 employees to make $500 contributions to state elections in 1997 and 1998, for which they would be reimbursed. (DE 12 at 88–89, 92–93.) The hospital paid a fine of $4,000. (Id.) And in 2001, the Florida Supreme Court issued a 90–day order of suspension for an attorney who “loaned” money to his employees and their family members, as well as his own wife and daughter, who in turn made 37 contributions for $500. Florida Bar v. Brown, 790 So.2d 1081, 1083 (Fla.2001). Like the grand jury report, none of these cases specifically involved a minor, was tied to an instance of political corruption by the contributions of a minor, or predated the statute setting a cap on contributions by minors.

Finally, the State cites a law review student note. The note discusses a Los Angeles, California newspaper article that described two instances where children made $1,000 donations to presidential campaigns in 1994 and one where a teenager made a $20,000 contribution to the Democratic Party in 1996, along with other articles reporting similar, unrelated instances of cash contributions by minors. See Heather Davis, Note, Breaking the Piggy Bank: An Alternative Approach to Campaign Contributions by Minors After McConnell v. FEC, 73 Geo. Wash. L.Rev. 353, 356 n. 26 (2005) (citing Alan C. Miller, Minor Loophole: Young donors are Increasingly Padding Political Coffers; Officials Fear that Children Are Being Used to Evade Election Laws, L.A. Times, Feb. 28, 1999, at A1; David Mastio, The Kiddie–Cash Caper, Slate Mag. (May 22, 1997, 3:30 AM), http:// www. slate. com/ id/ 2446; Michelle Malkin, “Kid die Cash” Political Gifts Circumvent the Law, USA Today, Oct. 10, 1996, at A14; Alex Knott, Members Cash in on Kid Contributions, Roll Call, June 5, 1995, at A–24; and John Kruger, Youths 2–17 Follow Parents Lead in Political Contributions, Hill, Oct. 27, 1999, at 1). The note also references a New York Times article stating that individuals identifying themselves only as “students” contributed $12.2 million over a ten year period at the national level. Id. at 354–355 & n. 8 (citing Glen Justice, Too Young to Vote, Old Enough to Donate, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 2004, at A17). However, neither the note nor its sources reveal that any such event occurred in Florida, that Florida has identified or even prosecuted one situation involving a minor contribution, or that an attendant concern about such contributions motivated Florida's legislature.

The parties have stipulated that this evidence, along with Plaintiff's evidence in the verified complaint, provides the Court with a sufficient basis to address the constitutional issues raised in the instant motion for injunctive relief (DE 18). As is typical in a case of this nature, the most salient question is whether Ms. Towbin can show a likelihood of success regarding whether the statute is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Ala. Educ. Ass'n v. Bentley, 788 F.Supp.2d 1283, 1301–02 (N.D.Ala.2011). For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that while Ms. Towbin can establish an impingement of her constitutional rights, the State has not proffered sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the law achieves an important state interest; nor has it shown that the law is sufficiently limited in order to sustain the restriction it imposes on minors' First Amendment rights. After considering the remaining requirements relevant to Plaintiff's motion, the Court concludes that a preliminary injunction should issue.

I. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARD

“A district court may grant injunctive relief only if the moving party shows that: (1) it has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury will be suffered unless the injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) if issued, the...

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  • Messina v. City of Fort Lauderdale
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida
    • 23 Junio 2021
    ...to exercise one's free-speech rights lies at the very heart of our irreparable-injury jurisprudence. Cf. Towbin v. Antonacci , 885 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1295 (S.D. Fla. 2012) ("[T]he Court rejects the notion that Plaintiff is not entitled to an injunction either because her injury (a slight int......

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