Tower Rock Stone Co. v. Quarry & Allied Workers Local No. 830

• Decision Date: 14 January 2013
• Docket Number: Case No. 4:12–CV–00606 CDP.
• Parties: TOWER ROCK STONE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. QUARRY AND ALLIED WORKERS LOCAL NO. 830, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

918 F.Supp.2d 902

TOWER ROCK STONE COMPANY, Plaintiff,

v.QUARRY AND ALLIED WORKERS LOCAL NO. 830, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 4:12–CV–00606 CDP.

United States District Court,

E.D. Missouri,

Eastern Division.

Jan. 14, 2013.

Theresa A. Phelps, John J. Gazzoli, Jr., Rosenblum and Goldenhersh, P.C., St. Louis, MO, for Plaintiff.

Sherrie A. Schroder, Hammond and Shinners, P.C., St. Louis, MO, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CATHERINE D. PERRY, District Judge.

Plaintiff Tower Rock Stone Company brings this action to vacate an arbitration award in favor of defendants Quarry and Allied Workers Local No. 830 and the Eastern Missouri Laborers District Council.Defendants have counterclaimed for enforcement of the award and have also moved for an award of attorneys' fees and prejudgment interest. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. I find that the arbitrator acted within the scope of his authority, so I will enforce the award and enter judgment in the defendants' favor, but I will not award them fees or prejudgment interest.

I. Background

Tower Rock operates a limestone quarry in Ste. Genevieve, Missouri, where it employs members of Local 830. Tower Rock and Local 830 are parties to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) effective 2010–2013, which governs the employment relationship between the company and the union. The CBA provides that employees will only be discharged for “just cause,” but it does not define that term.

Haul driver Jeff Williams, a member of Local 830, has worked at Tower Rock for more than nine years. While driving a Tower Rock haul truck in September 2011, Williams reached down to grab a milk bottle from the floorboard, lost control, and crashed into a rock wall. The accident caused significant damage to the vehicle. As a result of the accident, Tower Rock found that Williams had engaged in the “Class 4 Offense” of:

deliberately or recklessly misusing, destroying or damaging Company property or property of any employee.

Tower Rock then discharged Williams. The CBA provides that an employee who commits one of the enumerated Class 4 Offenses “will be subject to discharge immediately.”

Local 830 grieved Williams' discharge through the multi-step sequential process set out in the CBA. At “step three” of that process, the CBA provides that if Tower Rock and Local 830 are “unable to resolve the grievance within fifteen (15) working days after meeting together,” the grievance would proceed to the District Council and finally to binding arbitration before an impartial arbitrator selected by the parties. Though the parties did not actually conduct a “step three” meeting, they did in fact choose Ruben Armendariz as arbitrator and submit the grievance to arbitration. Tower Rock and Local 830 agreed that the issue before Armendariz was:

Whether [Tower Rock] had just cause to discharge Jeffrey Williams, the grievant herein, and, if not, what is the appropriate remedy?

Armendariz held a hearing on the grievance and considered briefs from both parties. Ultimately, he decided that Williams had not committed the “deliberate or reckless” Class 4 Offense, but rather the Class 3 Offense of “a serious (Company discretion) careless misuse of Company property.” Armendariz accepted Local 830's argument that Tower Rock's “eating policy” ¹ had contributed to the haul truck accident, and he found that the company had not made the requisite showing of Williams' intent. Armendariz concluded:

It is the Opinion of the arbitrator the Company did not meet its burden of proof for they failed to prove grievant's conduct was deliberate and reckless—a Class 4 Offense. In order to prove grievant was reckless, there must be a showing of intent and none exists here. This was an unfortunate accident. The company would have been better off classifying this accident as a Class 3 Offense. The alleged inconsistencies in grievant's statements are not sufficient to support a finding that his conduct was reckless and a Class 4 Offense. Companyfailed to interview the grievant at the 3rd step of the grievance procedure in the presence of a union representative who could have explained the inconsistencies. Company failed to have [Tower Rock's vice president] testify to support the Company's determination as to why he opted for grievant's discharge. Company's refusal to hold a 3rd step grievance meeting makes a mockery of the grievance process and is a due process violation as stated above. Company was contributory negligent because it permits employees to eat and drink (eating policy) in their vehicles while working. Moreover, the grievant's long and exemplary work history warrants mitigation of the penalty.

Armendariz sustained the grievance in part and issued an award reinstating Williams with full back pay and benefits, less a 14–day suspension. In his award, he reclassified the haul truck accident as the “careless misuse” Class 3 Offense. The CBA provides that, for Class 3 Offenses, it “will be the practice of [Tower Rock] to give only a disciplinary layoff prior to discharge.”

After Armendariz issued his award, Tower Rock reinstated Williams, but it has refused to restore Williams' back pay and benefits as ordered by the arbitrator. Instead, Tower Rock filed this action to set aside the arbitrator's award. Local 830 and the District Council counterclaimed for enforcement of the award, and the parties have now moved for summary judgment on their claims. In addition, the defendants request prejudgment interest, as well as attorneys' fees, arguing Tower Rock brought this action in bad faith.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

The summary judgment standards are well-established, and they do not change when both parties have moved for summary judgment. See Wermager v. Cormorant Twp. Bd., 716 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir.1983). In determining whether to grant either party's motion, the court views the facts—and any inferences from those facts—in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The movant bears the burden of establishing that (1) it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and (2) there are no genuine issues of material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Here, although the parties disagree on how certain facts should be interpreted, there are no material facts in dispute.

Tower Rock contends that the arbitration award should be set aside because (1) it does not “draw its essence” from the parties' CBA, as required by the Labor–Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 et seq., and (2) it violates public policy as set forth in a Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) regulation, 30 C.F.R. § 56.9101 (“Operators of self-propelled mobile equipment shall maintain control of the equipment while it is in motion”).

III. Standard of Review of Arbitration Award

A court's review of an arbitration award is “extremely limited.” United Food & Comm. Workers v. Shop 'N Save Warehouse Foods, Inc., 113 F.3d 893, 894 (8th Cir.1997). The reviewing court “must accord an extraordinary level of deference to the underlying award.” Boise Cascade Corp. v. Paper Allied–Industrial, Chem. & Energy Workers, 309 F.3d 1075, 1080 (8th Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). For example, the court may not disturb the arbitrator's “view of the facts.” Alvey, Inc. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 688, 132 F.3d 1209, 1212 (8th Cir.1997). Indeed, it may not revisit the merits of an award even if it believes the arbitrator “committed serious error” when interpreting the CBA at issue. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987). “An arbitrator's award must be enforced as long as he is arguably construing or applying the collective bargaining agreement rather than dispensing his own brand of industrial justice.” Homestake Mining Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 153 F.3d 678, 680 (8th Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). That standard is met as long as the award “draws its essence from” the governing CBA. Int'l Paper Co. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 215 F.3d 815, 817 (8th Cir.2000).

IV. The Award Draws Its Essence from the CBA

“An arbitrator's award draws its essence from the parties' agreement as long as it is derived from the agreement, viewed in the light of its language, its context, and any other indicia of the parties' intention.” Williams v. National Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 883 (8th Cir.2009) (internal brackets omitted). If an agreement's language is plain or “unmistakably clear,” an arbitrator must enforce it as written, but if “the plain language of the parties' agreement is silent or ambiguous with respect to a disputed issue, an arbitrator is obliged to consider other relevant sources of the parties' intent.” Boise Cascade, 309 F.3d at 1082.

Here, Tower Rock first argues that the arbitration award fails to draw its essence from the CBA because arbitrator Armendariz determined that the “Class 4 Offense” at issue required a showing of intent. Tower Rock had initially found that Williams committed the Class 4 Offense of:

deliberately or recklessly misusing, destroying or damaging Company property or property of any employee.

Armendariz determined the haul truck accident was not a Class 4 Offense because the company had failed to prove that Williams' conduct:

was deliberate and reckless—a Class 4 Offense. In order to prove grievant was reckless, there must be a showing of intent and none exists here.

Tower Rock essentially argues that Armendariz ignored the plain language of the CBA when he required a showing of intent to prove “recklessness.” In support of this argument, Tower Rock points to a 2000 interpretation of the CBA language describing this Class 4 Offense by arbitrator Josef Rohlik ². Rohlik concluded that, in that case, a truck...