Town Com'rs of Centreville v. County Com'rs of Queen Anne's County

• Decision Date: 04 April 1952
• Docket Number: No. 144,144
• Citation: 87 A.2d 599,199 Md. 652
• Parties: TOWN COM'RS OF CENTREVILLE v. COUNTY COM'RS OF QUEEN ANNE'S COUNTY.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 652

199 Md. 652

87 A.2d 599

TOWN COM'RS OF CENTREVILLE v. COUNTY COM'RS OF QUEEN ANNE'S COUNTY.

No. 144.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

April 4, 1952.

Richard T. Earle and Clayton C. Carter, Centreville, for appellant.

John Palmer Smith, Centreville, for appellee.

Before MARBURY, C. J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, HENDERSON and MARKELL, JJ.

DELAPLAINE, Judge.

This injunction suit was brought by the County Commissioners of Queen Anne's County, a body politic, to prohibit the Town Commissioners of Centreville, a municipal corporation, from installing parking meters on the sidewalks of three of the streets around Court House Square in Centreville.

The county's second amended bill of complaint alleged: (1) that the Justices of the Levy Court of Queen Anne's County were authorized by Chapter 25 of the Laws of 1789 to acquire approximately two acres of land in what is now Centreville on which to build a courthouse and to pay for it from the funds arising from the sale of the courthouse property at Queenstown; that the tract was laid off and stones were planted to mark its four corners; that the present boundaries of Court House Square include Commerce Street on the east, Liberty Street on the west, Broadway on the north, and Lawyers' Row on the south; that, although there is no deed or condemnation proceeding on record to show the county's title, the county owns this tract in fee simple, having held possession of it more than 20 years immediately preceding the institution of suit; (2) that several years before the institution of suit the town of Centreville installed parking meters on the east side (the front) of the square without any objection from the county; (3) that on July 5, 1950, the town, against the county's protests, proceeded to erect parking meter posts in the cement pavement on the west side of the square and in the grass plot on the south side, and threatened to erect others on the north side; (4) that while the town has an easement in the streets, it has no easement in the sidewalks, and therefore the erection of the posts is a trespass on the county's property and an unlawful exercise of power.

This appeal is from a decree ordering the town to remove all posts from the sidewalks on the west and south sides of the square, and enjoining it from erecting any posts or installing any parking meters on the west, south and north sides.

The law of Maryland provides that the county commissioners of each county in the State shall have charge of and control over the property owned by the county and over county roads and bridges. Code 1939, art. 25, sec. 1. On the other hand, the charter of the town of Centreville gives to the Town Commissioners 'the exclusive charge and control of the roads, streets and bridges within the limits of said town of Centreville, and the construction and repair of the same, * * *'. Laws 1914, ch. 441, Code P.L.L.1930, art. 18, sec. 112. In 1949 the Legislature, in an amendment to the charter, empowered the Town Commissioners to regulate the use of streets and public ways and to make 'reasonable charges for parking within areas set aside exclusively for that purpose.' Laws 1949, ch. 575, § 47(24)(c). The Maryland Motor Vehicle Act expressly declares that its provisions shall not prevent local authorities from regulating the standing or parking of vehicles with respect to streets and highways under their jurisdiction and within the reasonable exercise of the police power. Laws 1943, ch. 1007, Code Supp.1947, art. 66 1/2, sec. 135.

The decisive question in this case is not whether the town of Centreville acquired the fee simple title to the sidewalks in question, but whether they are public ways over which the town has the right to exercise control. Counties are created for the purpose of carrying out the policy of the State for the administration of matters of political government, including taxation, education, improvement of roads, and care of the poor, and for the administration of justice. The powers and functions of the county, as distinguished from municipal corporations, have a direct reference to the general, rather than the local, policy of the government of the State. Municipal corporations are created principally for the advantage and convenience of the people of the locality. The powers of the counties under the general law of the State do not include the police power. The police power is delegated to the municipal corporations. The counties must comply with reasonable police regulations in the interest of the general welfare. Cook County v. City of Chicago, 311 Ill. 234, 142 N.E. 512, 516, 31 A.L.R. 442.

This is not a case of dedication of private property for public use. The land was dedicated to public use more than a century and a half ago. It is still dedicated to public use. Only the kind of public use has been changed. It is held in this State that title to land dedicated to public use cannot be acquired by private individuals by prescription. Cushwa v. Williamsport, 117 Md. 306, 83 A. 389; Brady v. City of Baltimore, 130 Md. 506, 513, 101 A. 142. However, a county may be abandonment relinquish its control over land conveyed to it, especially where it continues to be for the use and benefit of the public. McLennan County v. Taylor, Tex.Civ.App., 96 S.W.2d 997, 1000; Borough of Milford v. Burnett, 288 Pa. 434, 136 A. 669; City of Savannah v. Barnes, 148 Ga. 317, 96 S.E. 625, 9 A.L.R. 419; 26 C.J.S., Dedication, § 62.

The county conceded that the town has acquired an easement in the streets surrounding the square. We see no logical reason to make a distinction in this respect between a street and a sidewalk. Generically the term 'street' includes sidewalks. Wehr v. Roland Park Co., 143 Md. 384, 396, 122 A. 363. While a sidewalk is appropriated to the use of pedestrians, it is open to all persons desiring to use it and the difference in the manner of use does not render the sidewalk any less a public highway than the rest of the street. Chicago v. O'Brien, 111 Ill. 532, 53 Am.Rep. 640; Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Redding, 124 Ark. 368, 187 S.W. 651. In any event, parking meters are only a means of regulating traffic in the street. The county admitted that it surrendered long ago to the town the maintenance of the streets and the regulation of traffic.

Centreville is not the only county seat in the United States where installation of parking meters has aroused the protest of county authorities. A similar controversy arose between Audrain County, Missouri, and its county seat, Mexico. The plat of the city, which was filed in 1836, provided for blocks and streets and reserved one block for the Public Square. The block was conveyed to the county in consideration of the location of the county seat in that city, and the courthouse was erected upon it. In 1899 the city established the width of the streets around the square at 50 feet, but subsequently increased the width. The sidewalks around the square were laid in 1937, the county paying a portion of the cost. In 1945 the city passed an ordinance authorizing the installation of parking meters on the sidewalks. The county showed that the sidewalks and streets encroached on its land, and contended that, although it had permitted the city to regulate traffic and parking around the square, the city could not extend its privilege by charging for parking without the county's consent. The Supreme Court of Missouri, however, said: 'The law of the road extends to all public highways, de jure or de facto, embracing ways on private property if used for public travel. The necessity for regulation inherent in the use permitted gives rise to and makes the police power applicable to private land when used as a de facto public highway. * * * Counties have not been delegated authority to regulate traffic over city streets within their boundaries. We are cited to no authority, and our search has revealed none under the instant facts, taking land devoted to public use as a city street out of the police power delegated to cities because owned by a county.' State ex rel. Audrain County v. City of Mexico, 1946, 355 Mo. 612, 197 S.W.2d 301, 304.

Another contest arose between Graves County, Kentucky, and its county seat, Mayfield. That county acquired a tract of land for the Court House Square in 1824. The courthouse was built thereon and an iron fence was erected on the boundary lines. Some years afterwards a new fence was erected back of the original fence line, and the land outside the fence was used for sidewalks on all four sides. In 1909 the fence was removed and a concrete curb was built on the fence line. The sidewalks were paved at the county's expense. The county in its protest against parking meters around the square, contended that, since the tract had been acquired for public use by the county, the county had no right to rededicate it as a public way. In rejecting that contention, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky said: 'We cannot agree, as the rededication, if any, is entirely consistent with the general public purposes for which the court house square was originally conveyed to the County. * * * This is public property, and the benefit to the public is the paramount consideration. Obviously the present and past use of the property as a passway is highly beneficial to the public, and we conclude that this particular use is not contrary to the purposes of the original grant.' Graves County ex...