Smith v. City of Baltimore

• Decision Date: 15 April 2004
• Docket Number: No. 2588,2588
• Citation: 846 A.2d 1121,156 Md. App. 377
• Parties: Janet SMITH, et al. v. CITY OF BALTIMORE.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

846 A.2d 1121

156 Md. App. 377

Janet SMITH, et al. v. CITY OF BALTIMORE.

No. 2588, Sept. Term, 2002.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

April 15, 2004.

Alan Hilliard Legum, Annapolis, for appellant.

Justin J. King (Thurman W. Zollicoffer, Jr., City Solicitor, Gwen B. Trombley, Asst. Solicitor, on brief), for appellee.

Argued before DEBORAH S. EYLER, KRAUSER, LAWRENCE F. RODOWSKY (Ret'd, Specially Assigned), JJ.

DEBORAH S. EYLER, J.

The Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted summary judgment to the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore ("City"), the appellee, in a wrongful death and survival action brought against it by Janet Smith and Cheryl Holland, the appellants. On appeal, the appellants contend the court's ruling was legally incorrect. For the following reasons, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

This case stems from a fatal accident that happened on September 14, 2000, at the intersection of Fayette and Caroline Streets in Baltimore City. Buster Holland, the appellants' father, was walking south on Caroline Street when he reached the northwest corner of that street's intersection with Fayette Street. At the time, the pedestrian crossing signal on the southwest corner of Fayette and Caroline Streets was approximately 90 degrees out of alignment. Instead of facing north, the signal was facing east, so that a pedestrian taking Mr. Holland's route would be unable to see it.

Mr. Holland stepped off the northwest corner of the intersection, entered the crosswalk on Fayette Street, and walked across Fayette, toward the southwest corner of Fayette and Caroline Streets. Although Mr. Holland could not see the pedestrian crossing signal, he could see that the traffic light for Caroline Street was green, in his favor. As Mr. Holland reached the center of Fayette Street, however, the traffic light turned red. Upon noticing that the light had changed, Mr. Holland reversed course and attempted to return to the northwest corner. A westbound car in the southernmost lane on Fayette Street stopped to let him pass. At the same time, a second car, traveling in the same direction and lane as the first, approached the intersection.

The second car was driven by Raphael Saint Patrick Hubbins. Mr. Hubbins, unaware that the car in front of him had stopped because Mr. Holland was in the crosswalk, accelerated around the stationary car, into the northernmost lane of Fayette Street and the intersection where Mr. Holland was walking. Mr. Hubbins did not see Mr. Holland until it was too late; he skidded through the crosswalk and struck Mr. Holland, injuring him critically.

Police and fire department personnel responded, and an accident report was completed. Mr. Holland was transported by ambulance to The Johns Hopkins Hospital. On January 16, 2001, he died from his injuries.

On August 23, 2001, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, the appellants, who are Mr. Holland's adult daughters, filed suit individually and as the personal representatives of Mr. Holland's estate against the City, stating a survival action and a wrongful death action.¹ They alleged that the City had breached its duty to use reasonable care in maintaining the pedestrian crossing signal on the southwest corner of Fayette and Caroline Streets, and that, as a result, Mr. Holland was fatally injured.

On September 21, 2001, the City answered the complaint and filed a third-party complaint against Mr. Hubbins. Following a period of discovery, on November 1, 2002, the City filed a motion for summary judgment, supporting memorandum, and exhibits, including a witness's affidavit, both plaintiffs' and defendant's answers to interrogatories, and an excerpt from the deposition of an accident reconstructionist. The City argued that there was no admissible evidence to show that it had had actual or constructive notice of the misaligned pedestrian crossing signal, and therefore that it had been under a duty to repair the signal. The City also argued that the misaligned signal was not the proximate cause of Mr. Holland's injuries—Mr. Hubbins was—and that Mr. Holland was contributorily negligent, as a matter of law. The appellants opposed the motion.

The evidence presented to the court on summary judgment showed that the City does not conduct routine inspections of its roads to learn whether its traffic signals, including pedestrian crossing signals, are functioning properly. Instead, the City relies on reports from citizens (including police officers and others who are on the City streets often by virtue of their work) to learn of malfunctions. The evidence also showed that some City employees know that occasionally pedestrian crossing signals will be struck by passing vehicles and become misaligned.

The court held a hearing on the City's motion for summary judgment on December 27, 2002. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted the City's motion, on the issue of notice. In its ruling, the court explained:

I think everyone is in agreement that the City had no actual notice of the misalignment of this pedestrian traffic signal. Clearly the issue is one of constructive notice and there is no evidence in the record—I think the parties also agree—that there is no evidence in the record of how long the pedestrian signal had been misaligned.

It is the view of this court, in the absence of that evidence, the plaintiff cannot prove constructive notice, and I will note that there is no history of problems with the light. Plaintiff has not been able to point the court to any authority for the position that the [C]ity has constructive notice for failing to do any regular, systematic inspections. I think the plaintiff's argument here only works if the problem with the light was one of long standing and the City didn't find it after a prolonged period of time. However, here again, since there is no evidence in the record of how long the signal was misaligned, the plaintiff can't make that argument and can't impose upon the City constructive notice.

I am not deciding this motion on the basis of proximate cause, I am deciding it strictly on the basis of lack of notice and for that reason, I am granting the City's Motion for Summary Judgment.

The appellants noted a timely appeal to this Court.

We shall recite additional facts as necessary to our discussion of the issues.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review an order granting summary judgment de novo. Beyer v. Morgan State Univ., 369 Md. 335, 359, 800 A.2d 707 (2002)

; Schmerling v. Injured Workers' Ins. Fund, 368 Md. 434, 443, 795 A.2d 715 (2002); Fister v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 366 Md. 201, 210, 783 A.2d 194 (2001).

Under Rule 2-501, the circuit court may grant summary judgment if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Beyer, supra, 369 Md. at 359-60, 800 A.2d 707; Schmerling, supra, 368 Md. at 443, 795 A.2d 715; Lippert v. Jung, 366 Md. 221, 227, 783 A.2d 206 (2001). A fact is material when its resolution will somehow affect the outcome of the case. Matthews v. Howell, 359 Md. 152, 161, 753 A.2d 69 (2000) (quoting King v. Bankerd, 303 Md. 98, 111, 492 A.2d 608 (1985) (citing Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Prods., Inc., 273 Md. 1, 8, 327 A.2d 502 (1974))).

On appeal of the grant of a motion for summary judgment, our first inquiry is whether there was a genuine dispute as to a material fact. See Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 178, 757 A.2d 118 (2000). If the material facts were not disputed, or were assumed favorably to the non-moving party, we next inquire whether, on the applicable law, the moving party was entitled to judgment. Beyer, supra, 369 Md. at 360, 800 A.2d 707; Okwa, supra, 360 Md. at 178, 757 A.2d 118.

DISCUSSION

Generally, a municipal corporation owes a duty to persons lawfully using its public streets and sidewalks to make them reasonably safe for passage. Pierce v. City of Baltimore, 220 Md. 286, 290, 151 A.2d 915 (1959); Haley v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 211 Md. 269, 273, 127 A.2d 371 (1956); Town Com'rs of Centreville v. County Com'rs of Queen Anne's Co., 199 Md. 652, 656, 87 A.2d 599 (1952); Birckhead v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 174 Md. 32, 37, 197 A. 615 (1938); Hagerstown v. Hertzler, 167 Md. 518, 521, 175 A. 447 (1934); Baltimore v. Eagers, 167 Md. 128, 136, 173 A. 56 (1934); Keen v. City of Havre de Grace, 93 Md. 34, 39, 48 A. 444 (1901). This duty is not absolute and the municipality is not an insurer of safe passage. Weisner v. Mayor & Council of Rockville, 245 Md. 225, 228, 225 A.2d 648 (1967) (quoting E. Coast Lines v. M. & C.C. of Baltimore, 190 Md. 256, 277, 58 A.2d 290 (1948)). If, however, a person is injured because a municipality failed to maintain its streets, and the municipality had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition that caused the injury, the municipality may be held liable in negligence. Keen, supra, 93 Md. at 39, 48 A. 444. See also Neuenschwander v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Com., 187 Md. 67, 72, 48 A.2d 593 (1946); Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Thompson, 171 Md. 460, 468, 189 A. 822 (1937); Eagers, supra, 167 Md. at 136, 173 A. 56.

Keen, supra, was a suit to recover damages for an injury alleged to have been caused by a hole in a city sidewalk. At trial, the circuit court granted a directed verdict in favor of the city. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that evidence that the hole had pre-existed the plaintiff's injury for enough time so as to have made it a matter of common knowledge to the townspeople was sufficient to...