Town of Bennington v. Knight
| Decision Date | 28 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 2019-021,2019-021 |
| Citation | 2020 VT 17 |
| Parties | Town of Bennington v. Clay Knight |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions by email at: JUD.Reporter@vermont.gov or by mail at: Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801, of any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.
On Appeal from Superior Court, Bennington Unit, Civil Division
John D. Stasny of Woolmington, Campbell, Bent & Stasny, P.C., Manchester Center, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Matthew M. Shagam of Rich Cassidy Law, South Burlington, for Defendant-Appellant.
PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Robinson, Eaton and Carroll, JJ., and Skoglund, J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned
¶ 1. ROBINSON, J. Defendant appeals a decision of the civil division affirming a small-claims award to the Town of Bennington for reimbursement of defendant's salary and benefits pursuant to a contract between defendant and the Town. Defendant signed an "employment agreement" with the Bennington Police Department under which, in exchange for receiving full-time training, he agreed to repay the Town a portion of his salary if he was unable or unwilling to remain employed by the Town for three years. The issue before this Court is whether this agreement conflicts with the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that set defendant's rate of pay during training. We conclude that the employment agreement conflicts with the CBA, and therefore reverse.
¶ 2. The facts are largely undisputed. The Bennington Police Department hired defendant to work as a full-time patrol officer starting February 1, 2015. As a condition of his employment, the Town required him to sign an "[e]mployment agreement" promising to work for the department for three years in exchange for receiving full-time training at the Vermont Training Academy. The agreement provided that if defendant was unable or refused to comply with the three-year commitment, he agreed to "reimburs[e] the cost paid in stipend/salary and benefits (employer's social security contribution and workman's compensation insurance) by the Bennington Police Department" during the training period, "pro-rated at 1/36 reduction per month of service." Defendant left his position on June 30, 2017, with seven months left on his three-year term. The department informed defendant by letter that he owed the department $3831.15 pursuant to the employment agreement. That amount included $3296.93 in salary, $230.72 in retirement benefits, $252.21 in social-security and Medicare contributions, and $51.29 in life/disability insurance.
¶ 3. The Town sued in small claims court to recover the reimbursement. As a defense to the Town's claims, defendant argued that his repayment obligation contradicted the CBA between the Town and defendant's union, the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees. The CBA sets the rate of pay for police officers, including officers who have not yet completed training. It states, The CBA is silent as to any form of reimbursement related to training or early termination. Defendant argued that the "salary clawback" provision in the employment agreement conflicted with the salary provisions in the CBA, and that the CBA's merger clause stating that it was "the complete and entire Agreement between the parties" invalidated the employment agreement. Additionally, he argued that the employment agreement violated the "free and clear" provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and that even if the agreement was enforceable, he would still be owed at least minimumwage under the FLSA. The court concluded that the agreement was enforceable because it did not conflict with the CBA, and that there was no evidence on which the court could find a FLSA violation.
¶ 4. Defendant then appealed to the civil division of the superior court.* The superior court noted during the hearing that the Town had a legitimate reason to try to reduce its costs: The court affirmed the decision of the small claims court. Defendant requested permission to appeal, reiterating the same arguments he made before the small claims and superior courts, and we accepted the appeal. See V.R.S.C.P. 10(e); V.R.A.P. 6(b).
¶ 5. This case presents a legal question, which we review without deference. "As the trial court is limited to the record from the small claims proceeding and may address only questions of law, we in turn review the small claims court decision [without deference]." Cheney v. City of Montpelier, 2011 VT 80, ¶ 7, 190 Vt. 574, 27 A.3d 359 (mem.).
¶ 6. We agree with defendant that the employment agreement conflicts with the CBA's salary terms and is therefore not an enforceable side agreement. This is true even if the employment agreement predated the present version of the CBA. Although the Town's desire to recoup the cost of training its employees may be reasonable, it may not do so by undercutting the salary provisions of the CBA. Because we reverse on this basis, we do not reach the issue of whether defendant's arguments under the FLSA were preserved, or the merits of that argument.
¶ 7. In the context of collective bargaining, side agreements or contracts that affect only one employee raise special issues. In re Aleong, 2014 VT 15, ¶ 32, 196 Vt. 129, 94 A.3d 1150. "The very purpose of a collective bargaining agreement is to supersede individual contracts withterms which reflect the strength and bargaining power and serve the welfare of the group." Morton v. Essex Town Sch. Dist., 140 Vt. 345, 350, 443 A.2d 447, 449 (1981) (motion for reargument) (citing J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338 (1944)). Because of this, "[t]he practice and philosophy of collective bargaining looks with suspicion on [side agreements that confer] individual advantages." Aleong, 2014 VT 15, ¶ 32 (quoting J.I. Case Co., 321 U.S. at 338). Side agreements that affect only one employee "violate the general rule that union members receive similar rights and benefits under the CBA and cannot be singled out for better or worse treatment." Aleong, 2014 VT 15, ¶ 32.
¶ 8. Nevertheless, we have recognized that "there are issues which arise in individual cases that may be resolved through a side agreement with an individual employee," and that these agreements are generally enforceable even though they create individual contract rights outside of the CBA as long as they "do not violate the terms of the CBA." Id.
¶ 9. Here, the employment agreement signed by defendant conflicts directly with the salary provisions of the CBA. Under the CBA, as a trainee who had not yet received police certification, defendant was entitled to his Step I salary, which at the time was $22.31 per hour. The employment agreement required that he refund a prorated portion of that salary to the Town unless he remained in employment for three years. This payback requirement directly conflicts with the CBA, which unconditionally promised defendant a specified salary during his training period without any provision for repayment of the salary and benefits to the Town. The Town cannot promise defendant specified wages in the CBA, and then condition or retract those wages in a side agreement. See J.I. Case Co., 321 U.S. at 339 ().
¶ 10. We reject the Town's argument that this side agreement is enforceable because the CBA did not promise defendant free training...
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