Town of Berlin v. Santaguida

• Decision Date: 01 July 1980
• Citation: 181 Conn. 421,435 A.2d 980
• Parties: , 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2055 TOWN OF BERLIN et al. v. Frank SANTAGUIDA et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 980

435 A.2d 980

181 Conn. 421, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2055

TOWN OF BERLIN et al. v. Frank SANTAGUIDA et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 9, 1980.

Decided July 1, 1980.

A. L. Zwerdling, Washington, D. C., with whom were William S. Zeman, Hartford, and Joel M. Ellis, Glastonbury, and, on the brief, Michael T. Leibig, Washington, D. C., for appellant (defendant American Federation of State, County and Municipal Emp., AFL-CIO, et al.).

Michael J. Lombardo, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Carl R. Ajello, Atty. Gen., for appellants (named defendant et al.).

Edward Hickey, Jr., and Thomas A. Woodley, Washington, D. C., for appellant (defendant Intern. Ass'n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO).

Gerald A. Heffernan, New Haven, for appellants (defendant Connecticut Council of Police Unions No. 15, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Emp., AFL-CIO, et al.).

George C. Hastings, Hartford, with whom were Richard B. Cech, Hartford, and, on the brief, Barry K. Stevens, Hartford, for appellees (plaintiffs).

R. Theodore Clark, Jr., Chicago, Ill., and John M. Romanow, New Haven, filed a brief as amici curiae.

Jeffrey C. Pingpank, Farmington, filed a brief as amicus curiae.

Before COTTER, C. J., and BOGDANSKI, PETERS, SHEA and DALY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Eight Connecticut municipalities and John Barth, a private individual, resident, taxpayer and elector of the town of Plainville, which is not a party herein, commenced the present action seeking injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment determining the constitutionality of the compulsory binding arbitration provisions of Public Acts 1975, No. 75-570 entitled An Act Concerning Binding Arbitration For Municipal Collective Bargaining Agreements which amended various provisions of the Municipal Employees Relations Act (hereinafter MERA). General Statutes §§ 7-467 through 7-477. The case was submitted to the trial court on the following stipulation of facts: The plaintiff municipalities have employees represented by employee organizations designated under MERA as exclusive representatives of municipal employees in collective bargaining. At the time the case was submitted to the trial court, the plaintiff municipalities and the town of Plainville had in effect collective bargaining agreements which had been negotiated with various employee organizations. These agreements contained provisions covering, inter alia, wages, hours of work and fringe benefits. Between the time the complaint was filed and the date judgment was rendered, several of the plaintiff municipalities had engaged in compulsory binding arbitration pursuant to the statutory provisions challenged herein although none of the awards had been confirmed by the court. After concluding that the plaintiffs had standing to maintain the action and that a justiciable controversy was presented, the trial court found the issues for the plaintiffs, rendered judgment declaring the compulsory binding arbitration provisions of Public Acts 1975, No. 75-570 violative of both the Connecticut and United States constitutions and granted the injunctive relief requested by the plaintiffs. This appeal by the defendants followed.

A preliminary question raised by the defendants is whether the plaintiffs have standing to challenge the constitutionality of a legislative enactment. "The 'fundamental aspect of standing ... (is that) it focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before (the) court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated.' Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1952, 20 L.Ed.2d 947." Hartford Kosher Caterers, Inc. v. Gazda, 165 Conn. 478, 485, 338 A.2d 497. "When standing is put in issue, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of the issue and not whether the controversy is otherwise justiciable, or whether, on the merits, the plaintiff has a legally protected interest that the defendant's action has invaded." Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, 175 Conn. 483, 492, 400 A.2d 726.

We deal first with the issue of standing as it pertains to the plaintiff municipalities. It has been recognized as a general rule ¹ that "(t)owns ... are creatures of the state, and though they may question the interpretation, they cannot challenge the legality, of legislation enacted by their creator. New Haven v. New Haven Water Co., 132 Conn. 496, 513, 45 A.2d 831; Sanger v. Bridgeport, 124 Conn. 183, 188, 198 A. 746." Waterford v. Connecticut State Board of Education, 148 Conn. 238, 245, 169 A.2d 891; Windsor v Windsor Police Department Employees' Assn., Inc., 154 Conn. 530, 539, 227 A.2d 65. An exception to this rule has been carved out to allow a municipality, adversely affected by a statute, which is properly in court on a nonconstitutional question to challenge the constitutionality of that statute. Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Norwalk, 179 Conn. 111, 425 A.2d 576; Hillier v. East Hartford, 167 Conn. 100, 355 A.2d 1; Tough v. Ives, 162 Conn. 274, 294 A.2d 67; Ducharme v. Putnam, 161 Conn. 135, 285 A.2d 318. The present case does not fall within this exception since the sole issue presented herein is the constitutionality of Public Acts 1975, No. 75-570; there are no nonconstitutional issues raised in this case. It is also significant to note that in the cases establishing the exception to the municipality standing rule, the municipalities were in court as defendants whereas in the present case, they are the plaintiffs. ² The plaintiff municipalities do not offer, nor do we see any compelling justification for further eroding the rule denying a municipality standing to challenge the constitutionality of legislation enacted by its creator.

Regarding the standing...