Town of Brighton v. W. Brighton Fire Dep't, Inc.

• Citation: 173 A.D.3d 1822,105 N.Y.S.3d 653
• Decision Date: 28 June 2019
• Docket Number: CA 18–00655,263
• Parties: TOWN OF BRIGHTON and West Brighton Fire Protection District, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. WEST BRIGHTON FIRE DEPARTMENT, INC., Defendant–Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

173 A.D.3d 1822

105 N.Y.S.3d 653

TOWN OF BRIGHTON and West Brighton Fire Protection District, Plaintiffs–Appellants,

v.WEST BRIGHTON FIRE DEPARTMENT, INC., Defendant–Respondent.

263

CA 18–00655

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

Entered: June 28, 2019

HANNIGAN LAW FIRM PLLC, DELMAR (TERENCE S. HANNIGAN OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFFS–APPELLANTS.

PINSKY LAW GROUP, PLLC, SYRACUSE (DAVID B. GARWOOD OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT–RESPONDENT.

PRESENT: PERADOTTO, J.P., LINDLEY, DEJOSEPH, TROUTMAN, AND WINSLOW, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: On appeal from an order that, inter alia, directed them to pay defendant $5,000 per month for their "use and occupancy of any realty owned by [defendant]," plaintiffs contend that Supreme Court abused its discretion in granting any amount of rent to defendant inasmuch as the pleadings in the underlying action were devoid of any claim by defendant for such relief. Even assuming, arguendo, that plaintiffs are not precluded from raising that contention despite the fact that the court ordered rental payments "a year" before a December 2013 court appearance as well as in a 2014 order (see generally Burke v. Crosson , 85 N.Y.2d 10, 15, 623 N.Y.S.2d 524, 647 N.E.2d 736 [1995] ), we conclude that the contention lacks merit. In a 2012 order to show cause application in this action, plaintiffs sought an order directing defendant to allow them or their representative to occupy defendant's firehouse and to use defendant's equipment. Thus, the issue of rent, although not raised in the underlying pleadings, was properly before the court because it was "relief that [was] warranted by the facts plainly appearing on the papers ... [, the relief was] not too dramatically unlike the relief sought [by plaintiffs in the order to show cause], the proof offered support[ed] it, and there [was] no prejudice to [plaintiffs]" in awarding it ( Frankel v. Stavsky , 40 A.D.3d 918, 918–919, 838 N.Y.S.2d 90 [2d Dept. 2007] ; see Tirado v. Miller , 75 A.D.3d 153, 158, 901 N.Y.S.2d 358 [2d Dept. 2010] ). The rental obligation flows directly from plaintiffs' own request to use defendant's property and equipment, and plaintiffs could not reasonably expect to occupy the fire station and use its equipment for free.

Contrary to plaintiffs' additional contention, the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to refer the matter to a referee after initially suggesting that such a reference would be made. " CPLR 4212 provides in pertinent part that, [u]pon the motion of a[ ] party ... or on its own initiative, the court may submit any issue of fact required to be decided by the court to an advisory jury or, upon a showing of some exceptional condition requiring it ..., to a referee to report ... [T]he exceptional condition requirement of CPLR 4212 ... is not met if the issue can be decided by the court without extraordinary impingement on [its] regular business" ( Luppino v. Mosey , 103 A.D.3d 1117, 1119, 958 N.Y.S.2d 823 [4th Dept. 2013] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see e.g. Martin–Trigona v. Waaler & Evans , 148 A.D.2d 361, 363, 539 N.Y.S.2d 9 [1st Dept. 1989] ; Barcelona Hotel v. Mahoney Hadlow & Adams , 82 A.D.2d 790, 791, 440 N.Y.S.2d 660 [1st Dept. 1981] ). Here, once the court concluded that the matter "was more simple than [it] thought" and could be decided "without extraordinary impingement on its regular business" ( Luppino , 103 A.D.3d at 1119, 958 N.Y.S.2d 823 [internal quotation marks omitted] ), no reference was necessary.

Contrary to plaintiffs' further contention, we conclude that the court properly admitted and considered defendant's documentary evidence (see CPLR 4518[a] ; see generally Federal Express Corp. v. Federal Jeans, Inc. , 14 A.D.3d 424, 424–425, 788 N.Y.S.2d 113 [1st Dept. 2005] ). In addition, we reject plaintiffs' contention that the court erred in relying on inadmissible and speculative testimony and certain statements in a witness's affidavit. Plaintiffs failed to preserve that contention for our review (see Volino v. Long Is. R.R. Co. , 83 A.D.3d 693, 694, 919 N.Y.S.2d 914 [2d Dept. 2011] ). In any event, even assuming, arguendo, that some of that evidence was inadmissible, we presume that the court, in this bench hearing, was "able to distinguish between admissible evidence and inadmissible evidence and ... render[ed] a determination based on the former" ( Matter of Backus v. Clupper , 79 A.D.3d 1179, 1181, 913 N.Y.S.2d 359 [3d Dept. 2010], lv denied 16 N.Y.3d 704, 919 N.Y.S.2d 119, 944 N.E.2d 657 [2011] ; see Matter of State of New York v. Parrott , 125 A.D.3d 1438, 1439, 2 N.Y.S.3d 711 [4th Dept. 2015], lv denied 25 N.Y.3d 911, 15 N.Y.S.3d 287, 36 N.E.3d 90 [2015] ), and there is no basis in this record to conclude that the court did otherwise (see People v. O'Neill , 169 A.D.3d 1515, 1516, 93 N.Y.S.3d 501 [4th Dept. 2019] ). Based on...