Town of Brownsburg v. Annexation
| Decision Date | 05 April 2018 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 32A01–1702–PL–215 |
| Citation | 98 N.E.3d 114 |
| Parties | TOWN OF BROWNSBURG, Indiana, Town Council of Brownsburg, Indiana, and Jeanette M. Brickler, Appellants/Cross–Appellees, v. FIGHT AGAINST BROWNSBURG ANNEXATION, et al., Appellees/Cross–Appellants. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Attorneys for Appellants/Cross–Appellees , Thomas F. Bedsole, Maggie L. Smith, Frost Brown Todd, LLC, Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorney for Appellees/Cross–Appellants , Gregory W. Black, Gregory W. Black, P.C., Plainfield, Indiana
[1] The Town of Brownsburg, Indiana, Town Council of Brownsburg, Indiana, and Jeanette M. Brickler (collectively "Brownsburg") appeal the trial court's entry of judgment against them and in favor of Fight Against Brownsburg Annexation ("FABA"), which finds that Brownsburg did not meet its burden under Indiana's annexation statute and that, accordingly, the annexation may not proceed. We revise and restate the issue as whether the trial court's findings and judgment that Brownsburg did not satisfy its requirements are clearly erroneous. We affirm.
[2] On July 11, 2013, Brownsburg adopted Ordinance No. 2013–06 (the "Annexation Ordinance") to annex approximately 4,462 acres (the "Annexation Area") outside of Brownsburg's corporate boundaries. On October 7, 2013, FABA, a political action committee created to oppose the annexation, filed a Remonstrance and Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Damages. On November 12, 2015, Brownsburg filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Damages and Brief in Support of the Motion to Dismiss. On December 14, 2015, FABA filed a Brief in Opposition to Brownsburg's Motion to Dismiss, and on May 31, 2016, the court held a hearing on the motion.
[3] On June 1, 2016, Brownsburg filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Designation of Evidence in Support of Partial Summary Judgment, and a supporting Brief. On June 28, 2016, FABA filed in response a Brief in Opposition to Brownsburg's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and a Designation of Evidence. On July 7, 2016, Brownsburg filed a Motion to Strike Certain Evidence Designated in Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and a supporting memorandum of law, to which FABA responded on July 12, 2016.
[4] On July 11, 2016, the court granted Brownsburg's motion to dismiss the petition for declaratory judgment, finding that "FABA's claims will be addressed and fully adjudicated in the remonstration proceedings" and that "there are no set of facts under which FABA could be granted relief under a declaratory judgment." Appellee's Appendix Volume 2 at 27–28. On August 11, 2016, the court issued an order granting in part and denying in part Brownsburg's motion to strike evidence designated in opposition to the motion for partial summary judgment and also granting in part and denying in part its motion for partial summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment "on the issue of whether [Brownsburg] is the 'Provider Unit' for providing the fire protection services for the Annexation Area." Appellants' Appendix Volume 5 at 179.
[5] On August 16, 17, and 18, 2016, the court held a bench trial and on November 16, 2016 entered its "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order on [FABA's] Petition for Remonstrance". Id. at 237. On December 13, 2016, Brownsburg filed a motion to correct error and, on January 24, 2017, the court granted the motion and entered its "Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on [FABA's] Petition for Remonstrance," finding in favor of FABA and against Brownsburg. Appellants' Appendix Volume 2 at 31. The court found that Brownsburg had not met its burden under §§ 36–4–3–13(b) or (c), and that the annexation may not proceed.
[6] When, as here, the trial court enters findings of fact and conclusions, our standard of review is well-settled:
We may not set aside the findings or judgment unless they are clearly erroneous. In our review, we first consider whether the evidence supports the factual findings. Second, we consider whether the findings support the judgment. Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference. A judgment is clearly erroneous if it relies on an incorrect legal standard. We give due regard to the trial court's ability to assess the credibility of the witnesses. While we defer substantially to findings of fact, we do not defer to conclusions of law. We do not reweigh the evidence; rather we consider the evidence most favorable to the judgment with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the judgment.
State v. IBM , 51 N.E.3d 150, 158 (Ind. 2016) (internal quotations and citations omitted). In order to determine that a finding or conclusion is clearly erroneous, an appellate court's review of the evidence must leave it with the firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Town of Fortville v. Certain Fortville Annexation Territory Landowners , 51 N.E.3d 1195, 1198 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Yanoff v. Muncy , 688 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind. 1997) ).
[7] Annexation is subject to judicial review only so far as the General Assembly has authorized it by statute, and the larger object of the annexation statute is, as it has always been, to permit annexation of adjacent urban territory. City of Carmel v. Certain Sw. Clay Tp. Annexation Territory Landowners , 868 N.E.2d 793, 797 (Ind. 2007) (quotation omitted). Annexation "is essentially a legislative function." City of Fort Wayne v. Certain Sw. Annexation Area Landowners , 764 N.E.2d 221, 224 (Ind. 2002). Therefore, courts play only a limited role in annexations and must afford the municipality's legislative judgment substantial deference. Id.
Town of Fortville , 51 N.E.3d at 1198.1
[9] Ind. Code § 36–4–3–13 lists the prerequisites for annexation, and the municipality bears the burden of showing that it has complied with these statutory conditions. City of Carmel , 868 N.E.2d at 797–798. If the municipality meets the requirements of either Subsections 13(b)2 or 13(c)3 , and also Subsection 13(d)4 , the court must order the annexation to proceed unless the remonstrators establish that all of the conditions set forth in clauses Subsection 13(e)(2)(A) through (D) exist in the territory proposed to be annexed.5
[10] Because Brownsburg had the initial burden to establish compliance with the requirements of Ind. Code § 36–4–3–13, it is appealing from a negative judgment.
A judgment entered against a party who bore the burden of proof at trial is a negative judgment. On appeal, we will not reverse a negative judgment unless it is contrary to law. To determine whether a judgment is contrary to law, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee, together with all the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. A party appealing from a negative judgment must show that the evidence points unerringly to a conclusion different than that reached by the trial court.
Town of Cedar Lake v. Certain Cedar Lake 2014 Annexation Territory Landowners , 85 N.E.3d 643, 655 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (internal quotations and citations omitted), trans. denied .
[11] Brownsburg argues that it has met the requirements of Subsections 13(b) through (d) and that the proposed annexation should be allowed to proceed since FABA cannot establish the requirements of Subsection 13(e). Specifically, Brownsburg contends that the trial court erred in holding that Brownsburg failed to satisfy Subsection 13(b)(2)(B)'s subdivision requirement and in concluding that its evidence failed to establish Subsection 13(c) requirements that the Annexation Area is "needed and can be used ... in the reasonably near future."
[12] FABA contends that the trial court did not err as a matter of law in concluding that Brownsburg failed to prove the subdivision requirements and that the court did not err in finding that Brownsburg failed to prove that the Annexation Area was needed and could be used for its development in the reasonably near future. Specifically, it argues that the trial court properly applied the plain meaning of the word "subdivided" to the facts of the case because the term is left undefined in the annexation statute and that Brownsburg does not "need" the vast Annexation Area and instead "wants" it for the additional tax revenue because the town has not run out of room and a large amount of "undeveloped/underdeveloped land" exists within its current boundaries. Appellee's Brief at 30.
[13] To the extent that Brownsburg's arguments challenge the court's findings other than those regarding the requirements of Subsections 13(b) through (d) and that FABA raises arguments on cross-appeal, we need not address them.6 Rather, we find an analysis of Subsections 13(b) and (c) to be dispositive.
[14] We begin by addressing Brownsburg's argument that it satisfied its subdivided requirement. Brownsburg argues that its expert, using six different methods, produced twelve...
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Town of Brownsburg v. Fight Against Brownsburg Annexation
...The Town then appealed, the Remonstrators cross-appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. Town of Brownsburg v. Fight Against Brownsburg Annexation, 98 N.E.3d 114 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). The Town sought transfer, which we now grant, thus vacating the appellate decision.Discussion and Decis......