Town of Bucoda v. Swaney

• Decision Date: 26 May 1931
• Docket Number: 22954.
• Citation: 299 P. 652,163 Wash. 43
• Parties: TOWN OF BUCODA v. SWANEY.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

299 P. 652

163 Wash. 43

TOWN OF BUCODA v. SWANEY.

No. 22954.

Supreme Court of Washington

May 26, 1931

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, Thurston County; D. F. Wright, Judge.

L. L Swaney was convicted of conducting a drug store without a license, contrary to an ordinance of the Town of Bucoda, and he appeals.

Affirmed.

Harry L. Parr, of Olympia, for appellant.

H. E Grimm, of Centralia, for respondent.

MITCHELL J.

L. L Swaney was convicted of the crime of conducting a drug store in Bucoda, Wash., a town of the fourth class without complying with an ordinance requiring a license to carry on such business, and has appealed from a fine and judgment of $1 and costs.

The facts were stipulated. The case presents the sole question of the validity of the ordinance enacted by the town council of Bucoda under section 1, chapter 207, Session Laws 1927; § 9175, Remington's 1927 Supp., relating to the power of municipal corporations of the fourth class to levy and collect taxes and license certain kinds of business, subdivision 10 of which provides that such municipal corporations shall have power 'to license, for purposes of regulation and revenue, all and every kind of business, authorized by law and transacted and carried on in such town,' etc. Concededly the ordinance is a revenue measure and prescribes license fees for forty-one different kinds of business, fixing the amount for each and providing that such fee shall be paid by all persons, firms, or corporations carrying on such business.

The question of power conferred by the Legislature upon municipal corporations to levy taxes for revenue purposes upon different kinds of business conducted in the city was discussed and sustained in Stull v. De Mattos, 23 Wash. 71, 62 P. 451, 454,

51 L. R. A. 892, the court saying, among other things: 'All presumptions and intendments are in favor of the validity of the tax.'

Appellant, admitting that the purpose of the ordinance is revenue, does not claim that the amount of the license fee for conducting a drug store is unreasonable, nor that there is any discrimination or unjust classification in the scheme of the ordinance. One objection urged by him, as we understand, is that his business, being a common and useful one, can be made to pay only such license fee as is necessary to make compensation for services of inspection and regulation, but that it cannot be taxed. He relies on the case of Seattle v. Dencker, 58 Wash. 501, 108 P. 1086, 1087, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 446, 137 Am. St. Rep. 1076. That case involved the validity of an ordinance providing a license tax for the sale of goods by means of an automatic device, and, while it was conceded that the ordinance was a revenue measure rather than a regulatory one, it was held to be violative of the constitutional provision against special privileges.

In that case it was said: 'That it is a well-known attribute of sovereignty to tax occupations for the purpose of raising revenue, and that such tax may be imposed in the form of a license fee.' It is true that in a somewhat general discussion in that case, upon speaking of the useful trades and employments, it was said to be well settled that the license required of employments of that character 'can carry with it only such fee as is necessary to make compensation for the regulation services, and cannot be perverted into a tax.' Clearly, however, that statement was not necessary to the decision because the case did not involve either a statute or ordinance providing for the exercise of the power to license for revenue, but only involved 'an ordinance licensing certain automatic devices, and provided a penalty for violation,' which ordinance was held to be invalid because discrimanatory as heretofore stated.

Later in Seattle v. King, 74 Wash. 277, 133 P. 442, the same question as the one involved in the present case was presented. There the city passed an ordinance, in effect, making it unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation to drive or operate within the city any vehicle used...