Town of Cambridge v. Town of Underhill, 741

Decision Date06 October 1964
Docket NumberNo. 741,741
Citation124 Vt. 237,204 A.2d 155
PartiesTOWN OF CAMBRIDGE v. TOWN OF UNDERHILL.
CourtVermont Supreme Court

Clifton G. Parker, Morrisville, for plaintiff.

Gravel & Bing, Burlington, for defendant.

Before HOLDEN, C. J., and SHANGRAW, BARNEY, SMITH and SYLVESTER, JJ.

BARNEY, Justice.

Does widowhood alter the statutory determination of pauper settlement? The trial court answered this question in the negative, and the case is here on appeal.

The facts are agreed. Antonia Pecor was married to Harold Pecor in 1933. The couple lived in Essex, Vermont, at the time and remained there until Harold died in 1935. Antonia has never remarried. In 1947 she moved to Underhill, Vermont, and remained there until 1955. She lived in Underhill for more than three consecutive years without public assistance. In 1951, 1952 and 1953 she received assistance from Underhill in the form of $288.65 paid on hospitalization charges. In 1955 she moved to Cambridge, Vermont, where her poor health required medical and nursing home care. This has been furnished as public assistance by the Town of Cambridge since that time. Appropriate and timely statutory notice was given to Underhill by Cambridge upon the furnishing of assistance. These facts would place the pauper settlement in the town of Underhill in the usual case. Town of Randolph v. City of Barre, 116 Vt. 557, 559, 80 A.2d 537.

Underhill offers a rational for keeping the pauper settlement of Mrs. Pecor in Essex, which it claims is required by a close reading of the statutes involved. To understand the argument we must begin with section 3919 of the General Laws, as amended by No. 76 of the Public Acts of 1935:

'A married woman who lived with her husband in a town where he last resided for three years, supporting himself and family, shall be deemed to have gained a residence in such town, and such town shall be liable for her support as a pauper. An illegitimate child shall be deemed to have the residence of his mother, and the town liable for the support of the mother shall be liable for the support of such child.'

As a consequence of the general revision of the statutes in 1947, this section took the following form, effective February 1, 1948:

'The settlement of a married woman shall be that of her husband, and such settlement shall continue, even though such woman becomes a widow, is divorced or legally separated from her husband. However, a married woman may gain a separate settlement if divorced or legally separated from her husband, or if her husband has deserted her for a period of three years, in the same manner as any other person. When a widow, divorced woman or unmarried mother gains a new settlement by marriage, the settlement of her minor child shall follow that of his mother, except as provided in the following section.'

In 1957, by No. 20 of the Acts of 1957, this section was amended to its present form, now 33 V.S.A. § 741:

'The settlement of a married woman shall be that of her husband, and such settlement shall continue, even though such woman becomes a widow or is divorced or legally separated from her husband. However, a woman may gain a separate settlement after the death of her husband and a married woman may gain a separate settlement if divorced or legally separated from her husband, or if her husband has deserted her for a period of three years, in the same manner as any other person. When a widow, divorced woman or unmarried mother gains a new settlement by marriage, or otherwise, the settlement of her minor child shall follow that of his mother, except as provided in section 742 of this title.'

Until the revision of 1947 became effective, G.L. 3919, the applicable statute, had been construed to allow a widow to acquire a separate settlement, just as any other unmarried person. Town of St. Johnsbury v. Town of Lyndon, 107 Vt. 404, 406, 180 A. 892. Justice Powers, in writing the opinion as he did, presumably felt that the question the statute was intended to settle was whether the husband's settlement would prevail over the wife's in pauper cases. When the death of the husband extinguished the marriage it also disposed of the question to which the statute related.

The argument of Underhill is that the 1947 revision overrode that interpretation of G.L. 3919, and required the settlement of a widow to remain that of her deceased husband, no matter where she moved herself, or in spite of any periods of self-support elsewhere. This remained so, says Underhill, until 33 V.S.A. § 741 became the law in 1957. It was during this very period from 1948 to 1957 that Mrs. Pecor's situation was such that, but for her widowhood, she concededly acquired a new Underhill settlement.

There are two aspects to Underhill's contention. First, it is claimed that the 1947 revision effected a substantive change in...

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17 cases
  • Nelson v. Town of St. Johnsbury Selectboard
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • January 16, 2015
    ...codification does not intend to change the substance of the law “unless the contrary clearly appears.” Town of Cambridge v. Town of Underhill, 124 Vt. 237, 240, 204 A.2d 155, 157 (1964) ; see also Weale v. Lund, 2006 VT 66, ¶ 8, 180 Vt. 551, 904 A.2d 1191 (mem.) (same); State v. Brennan, 17......
  • Daniels v. Elks Club of Hartford
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • August 3, 2012
    ...in a statute, we are guided by the rule that the Legislature intended to change the law.”), with Town of Cambridge v. Town of Underhill, 124 Vt. 237, 240, 204 A.2d 155, 157 (1964) (“When changes in statutes come about only as a result of a revision, caution is required in determining whethe......
  • Tarrant v. Department of Taxes
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • April 9, 1999
    ...the meaning of a statute, unless "the circumstances clearly indicate clarification to be intended." Town of Cambridge v. Town of Underhill, 124 Vt. 237, 241, 204 A.2d 155, 158 (1964). The Department fails to point to any persuasive evidence indicating the Legislature intended § 5916 as a cl......
  • Elkins v. Microsoft Corp.
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • November 1, 2002
    ...this Court's construction of a statute must be governed by the disclosed intent of the Legislature. See Town of Cambridge v. Town of Underhill, 124 Vt. 237, 241, 204 A.2d 155, 158 (1964); see also In re Shantee Point, Inc., 174 Vt. ___, ___, 811 A.2d 1243, 1251 (2002) (where authorization i......
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