Town of Charlestown v. Beattie
Decision Date | 13 November 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 79-327-A,79-327-A |
Citation | 422 A.2d 1250 |
Parties | TOWN OF CHARLESTOWN et al. v. Patricia E. BEATTIE. ppeal. |
Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
This is an action for enforcement of the Zoning Ordinance of the Town of Charlestown brought by the town solicitor in accordance with G.L.1956 (1970 Reenactment) § 45-24-7. The complaint alleged that the defendant, a Charlestown landowner, had altered a dwelling house in an R-40 zone from a single family use to a multi-family use in violation of the zoning ordinance of the town. After the action had been brought by the town solicitor, a petition to intervene by abutting landowners, Timothy R. and Margaret C. Splaine, was granted by a justice of the Superior Court. (Hereinafter the town and the intervenors may sometimes be referred to collectively as plaintiffs.) At the close of presentation of evidence by the town of Charlestown, the trial justice declined to allow the intervenors to present further testimony by recalling certain witnesses and entertained a motion to dismiss made by the defendant pursuant to Rule 41(b)(2) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. After considering such motion, the trial justice in an abbreviated bench decision dismissed the action as to the town and the intervenors. Thereafter, both intervenors and the town moved for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The motions were denied, and the parties plaintiff appealed from the judgment dismissing the action and also from the denial of the motions for new trial.
In the posture in which this case is presented, the only issue we shall address is the propriety of the dismissal of the action pursuant to Rule 41(b) (2), and we shall not reach the question raised in respect to the denial of the motions for new trial. We believe that the trial justice neglected to make requisite findings of fact and conclusions of law as mandated by Super.R.Civ.P. 52(a) when ruling on the Rule 41(b)(2) motion.
The standards to be followed by a justice of the Superior Court passing on such a motion have been recently stated in Judd Realty, Inc. v. Tedesco, R.I., 400 A.2d 952, 955 (1979).
We earlier pointed out in Rowell v. Kaplan, 103 R.I. 60, 235 A.2d 91 (1967), that it was required by Rule 52(a) that " '(i)n all actions tried upon the facts without a jury * * * the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon * * *.' " Id. at 69, 235 A.2d at 96. We further stated that "(w)e cannot be kept in the dark when we review, and noncompliance with the rule will entail the risk of reversal or remand unless the record will yield a full understanding and resolution of the controlling and essential factual and legal issues." Id. at 70, 235 A.2d at 97. Because the record in this case does not yield a full confrontation and resolution of the controlling and essential factual and legal issues, this case is unreviewable; therefore, we must remand it to the Superior Court for a new trial.
Mrs. Beattie purchased the real estate in question in November 1975. It was alleged by the town that when purchased, the structure was a one-family dwelling, a conforming use under the zoning ordinance of Charlestown. At some point after the purchase of the land and prior to the filing of the complaint, the dwelling underwent structural modifications. The town alleged that as a result of the construction the Beattie property was converted into a two-family dwelling in violation of the zoning ordinance and without zoning board approval. The defendant's answer denied that the structure is a nonconforming two-family dwelling. A statement was made by counsel for defendant that the Beattie property was a duplex unit, which is an allowed use in that district. Finally, defendant asserted that she had obtained a building permit authorizing the change to her property.
The trial justice based the decision to dismiss plaintiffs' action upon two grounds. Holding that the intervenors in this action were the real parties in interest, the court denied them relief because they had been guilty of laches. In support of the decision as to the town, the trial justice also found that a building permit had been granted.
The decision of the trial court is not dispositive of the fundamental issues raised in the action. The reliance of the trial...
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...Court has "never departed from the statutory dictate that only the town has standing to initiate the action." Town of Charlestown v. Beattie, 422 A.2d 1250, 1252 (R.I. 1980) (citing Hickory Ridge Campground, Inc., supra and Cournoyer, supra.). The current General Laws provide that "[t]he ci......
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