Town of Clive v. Colby, 50764

Decision Date09 April 1963
Docket NumberNo. 50764,50764
Citation121 N.W.2d 115,255 Iowa 483
PartiesTOWN OF CLIVE, Iowa, Appellee, v. Clark A. COLBY et al., Appellant, City of Windsor Heights, Iowa, Intervenor-Appellant.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Herrick, Langdon, Sandblom & Belin, Des Moines, for appellant.

Joseph M. Coppola and Volney Diltz, Des Moines, for appellee.

Emmert, Lindgren, Eller & Miller, and John J. Yeager, Des Moines, for intervenor-appellant.

STUART, Justice.

The incorporated Town of Clive, Polk County, Iowa brought this action to annex a tract of about 67.2 acres lying between Clive and the City of Windsor Heights under the provisions of 362.26, 1958 Code of Iowa, I.C.A. This particular tract of ground is part of the former Town of Crestwood and has been involved in prior litigation. See State of Iowa ex rel. Mercer v. Incorporated Town of Crestwood, 248 Iowa 627, 80 N.W.2d 489, 81 N.W.2d 452; and Windsor Heights v. Colby, et al., 249 Iowa 802, 89 N.W.2d 157. That portion of the annexation territory which has been developed is part of the 'Plaza Hills' development and is a residential area of brick homes costing between $30,000 and $40,000. The remainder of the Town of Crestwood and the Plaza Hills development has been annexed to Windsor Heights.

On December 9, 1957 while the last of the above cases was pending, the Town of Clive passed a resolution authorizing publication of notice of a meeting to consider a resolution of annexation as provided in Section 362.26(1) of the Iowa Code, I.C.A. On April 21, 1958 residents of this territory filed a 100% petition for voluntary annexation to the City of Des Moines. At this time Crestwood was still a de facto corporation which was not dissolved until May 9, 1958. On the evening of May 9, 1958 the town council of Clive ordered publication of a notice similar to the one published December 9, 1957 and stated this resolution 'in no way alters, supersedes, or in any way affects' the previous resolution.

The Town of Clive proceeded under Section 362.26. This lawsuit was filed in equity on July 29, 1958 following a vote of 62-6 by the residents of Clive in favor of annexation. The City of Des Moines filed a petition of intervention which was later dismissed upon its motion after another annexation proceedings, upon which the 100% application was contingent, failed. On March 14, 1960 a 100% application for voluntary annexation to the City of Windsor Heights was filed and assented to by the Town council of Windsor Heights. On November 3, 1960 Windsor Heights intervened in the present action.

On May 8, 1962 the trial court in ruling upon an Application for Adjudication of Law Points held: (1) The Town of Crestwood was a de facto corporation from February 1, 1956 until May 9, 1958 at 3:59 p. m. (2) This territory was still part of the de facto corporation of Crestwood on April 21, 1958 and was not available for annexation to Des Moines by petition of 100% of the residents on that date. (3) The Town of Clive had exclusive jurisdiction over the annexation territory by virtue of its resolution of May 9, 1958 and the 100% petition for annexation to Windsor Heights was an attempt to intrude upon this exclusive jurisdiction. (4) The legality of the proceedings instituted by the Town of Clive can be attacked only by a separate action in quo warranto and is not being attacked in this case. (5) The exclusive jurisdiction of the Town of Clive over the annexation territory continues until the final determination of this case. (6) After 3:59 p. m. on May 9, 1958 the annexation territory was unincorporated and subject to annexation proceedings. The court also concluded on the record up to that point the plaintiff was not dilatory in completing the annexation. The petition of intervention of Windsor Heights was dismissed.

After hearing on the merits, the trial court concluded that Clive was capable of furnishing the annexation territory 'substantial municipal services and benefits not heretofore enjoyed by such territory' and decreed that it be annexed to the Incorporated Town of Clive.

I. Defendants urge six propositions upon which they rely for reversal. We shall first discuss the proposition the plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence it 'is capable of extending into such territory substantial municipal services and benefits not theretofore enjoyed by such territory'. This is an ultimate fact which must be pleaded under the annexation statute 362.26 Code of Iowa, I.C.A. The statute also provides that the court must find plaintiff has made an affirmative showing on this allegation.

The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to establish the allegations of its petition by a preponderance of the evidence. In this instance the burden of proving such allegation requires an affirmative showing that it is capable of furnishing "substantial municipal services and benefits' not theretofore, enjoyed'. City of Cedar Rapids v. Cox (1961) 252 Iowa 948, 956, 108 N.W.2d 253, 258. City of Des Moines v. Lampart, 248 Iowa 1032, 82 N.W.2d 720. This is strictly a question of fact. The trial court found plaintiff had made such an affirmative showing. We do not believe this finding is supported by the evidence.

The capabilities of the plaintiff to furnish municipal services must be determined on the conditions existing when the annexation proceedings were initiated. In most situations this would be of little importance, but in the instant case four years elapsed between the time proceedings were instituted and the trial on the merits. Plaintiff's case is based upon exclusive jurisdiction obtained May 9, 1958 by virtue of its resolution passed that date. The petition was filed July 29, 1958 setting forth the statutory allegations. Plaintiff cannot claim exclusive jurisdiction from May 9, 1958 and expect to prove its allegations by conditions which exist four years later. Such a holding would permit a municipality to tie up territory for extended periods of time while striving to attain the capabilities alleged in the petition. Although plaintiff offered evidence as to conditions at time of trial as well as in 1958, it does not argue the 1958 conditions should not govern.

Clive was incorporated in 1956 and in 1958 had a population of either 575 or 774. In 1958 University Avenue extension from the City of Des Moines was the only paved street in the town. There were no street lights. The city hall was a room in the mayor's residence which was rented to the town. The town was budgeted to its full capacity for streets, public safety and sanitation. Funds available for these purposes were: streets $1300, public safety $1900, sanitation $1000, road use fund for streets $3400, liquor profits $850 and agricultural land tax for streets $100.

The police department consisted of one officer employed at a salary of $100 per month who also operated a radio repair shop in his home. The police car was the mayor's personal station wagon for the use of which he was compensated. The mayor also did some police work.

The Town of Clive had no sewer system or fire department. Only 45 to 50 homes were served by a water system. The town water system was not commenced until December 1959 and water is now furnished under contract with the City of Des Moines. The town does not claim to have had natural gas service available. Clive has refused to accept responsibility for the payment for fire calls made in the town by the Windsor Heights fire department and informed the department it should look to the individuals for payment.

The only road access into the annexation territory from Clive was by a circuitous route exceeding 1 1/2 miles through the City of Windsor Heights.

Clive had a mayor's court in 1958 in which about 500 cases a year were disposed of. The town had a zoning ordinance and a comprehensive plan for community development. Street equipment consisted of a road grader, truck with snow removal blade and a tractor for mowing. The mayor was also in charge of street work and drove the grader himself at times. He did have additional help. There were regular council meetings. Electricity was furnished under franchise with Iowa Power & Light at Des Moines rates.

In 1958 the annexation area was a residential area of brick, homes in the $30,000 to $40,000 class. The streets were paved and lighted. Water, gas, electricity and sewer were furnished by others than the Town of Clive. Some houses on Marilyn Drive were not on sewer at that time.

Plaintiff does not meet defendants' proposition discussed in this division head on. Its argument seems to assume that these facts constitute an affirmative showing that Clive is capable of extending substantial municipal services into the annexation territory and directs its attack against defendant's evidence tending to prove the wishes of the residents of the annexation territory, comparative facilities of Clive and Windsor Heights, and the desirability of annexation to Windsor Heights rather than Clive. It is correct in its contention that none of these factors are relevant or material to the issues in this case. We have held that annexation is a legislative function and that a statute which vests discretionary power in the courts to determine the advisability of annexation is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. State ex rel. Klise v. Town of Riverdale, 244 Iowa 423, 57 N.W.2d 63. If we were to weigh the facts to determine the best interest of the parties, ...

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