Town of East Greenwich v. O'Neil
| Decision Date | 04 December 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-477-A,91-477-A |
| Citation | 617 A.2d 104 |
| Parties | Util. L. Rep. P 26,273 The TOWN OF EAST GREENWICH et al. v. James E. O'NEIL et al. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
This case comes before this court on appeal by both the plaintiffs and the defendants from a Superior Court judgment. The trial justice granted the plaintiffs partial relief and enjoined the State of Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission (PUC or the commission) from conducting certain proceedings but ruled in favor of the defendants regarding the constitutionality of an ordinance. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial justice's decision.
The plaintiffs are the town of East Greenwich (the town) and the president and the members of the East Greenwich Town Council, individually and in their capacity as town council members, and Morris Roth (the town council). The defendants are the Attorney General for the State of Rhode Island (the Attorney General), in his official capacity, the PUC, the members of the PUC, individually and in their capacity as members of the commission, and the Narragansett Electric Company (Narragansett Electric). The principal defendant, Narragansett Electric, is a public utility that provides electrical power to most of the state.
Narragansett Electric proposed to construct 345-kilovolt (kV) and 115-kV high-voltage transmission lines along existing rights of way in East Greenwich. The 115-kV transmission line would run from Warwick to North Kingstown. The 345-kV line would span forty-four miles, from Burrillville to Warwick, 3.3 miles of which would run through the town.
The citizens of East Greenwich expressed concern about the possible harmful effects of electromagnetic fields that emanate from power lines. On October 9, 1990, the town adopted Ordinance No. 553 (the ordinance) which created a moratorium period of three years on the construction of electric transmission lines exceeding sixty kilovolts. 1 Narragansett Electric is thus prohibited from constructing its planned high-voltage transmission lines through the town of East Greenwich.
On October 17, 1990, Narragansett Electric filed a petition with the PUC for review of the town's ordinance pursuant to G.L.1956 (1990 Reenactment) § 39-1-30, docket No. 194. Section 39-1-30 requires an appeal to the PUC from issues affecting electric utility companies. City of East Providence v. Public Utilities Commission, 566 A.2d 1305, 1306 (R.I.1989). Hearings on the petition before the PUC were scheduled for February 1991 but were deferred pending the outcome of this matter.
The town commenced this action in Superior Court, seeking a declaration that § 39-1-30 violated the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions. Considering the questions presented, the trial justice permitted the Attorney General to intervene. Narragansett Electric filed a counterclaim challenging the legality of the ordinance on the grounds that because the PUC has exclusive jurisdiction to regulate public utilities, the ordinance constituted an impermissible attempt by the town to regulate Narragansett Electric. The town filed a motion to dismiss Narragansett Electric's counterclaim, contending it was barred by the election of remedies doctrine. The court denied the town's motion to dismiss Narragansett Electric's counterclaim.
On May 20, 1991, the Superior Court issued a decision based upon the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial justice found § 39-1-30 to be a constitutional enactment. However, the court ruled that the PUC lacked jurisdiction under § 39-1-30 to determine the validity of the ordinance and enjoined the PUC from conducting proceedings on Narragansett Electric's petition for review. The trial justice also ruled that the ordinance was an unlawful exercise of the town's home rule powers and was beyond the authority with which plaintiffs could act because the statutory scheme establishing the PUC pre-empted the ordinance. The trial justice granted the town's motion for a stay, postponing any construction of electric transmission lines until the parties' appeals were heard by this court.
The plaintiffs argue that by previously filing a petition for review of the ordinance under § 39-1-30, Narragansett Electric waived its right to have the Superior Court consider its counterclaim because it had elected another forum. The trial justice decided that the election of remedies doctrine did not bar Narragansett Electric's counterclaim and denied plaintiffs' motion to dismiss it. See Wellington Hotel Associates v. Miner, 543 A.2d 656, 659 (R.I.1988); Easton's Point Association v. Coastal Resources Management Council, 522 A.2d 199, 201-02 (R.I.1987). We agree with the trial justice because defendants were responding to the town's suit and were not challenging the enabling act of the PUC. We find that the election of remedies doctrine is inapposite.
The trial justice agreed with plaintiffs' contention that the challenged statute, § 39-1-30, violates the separation of powers doctrine because it permits the executive branch, through an administrative agency, to review an enactment of the town's legislative branch. We disagree. The trial court misapplied the law.
The separation of powers doctrine prohibits the usurpation of the power of one branch of government by a coordinate branch of government. We recently stated that a " 'constitutional violation of separation of powers [is] an assumption by one branch of powers that are central or essential to the operation of a coordinate branch.' " In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Ethics Commission), 612 A.2d 1, 18 (R.I.1992). The PUC is an agency of the executive branch of the State of Rhode Island. The town council, however, is not a coordinate branch of the state government. The town is a creature of the state. See Lynch v. King, 120 R.I. 868, 876-77, 391 A.2d 117, 122 (1978); R.I. Const. art. XIII, § 4. Its conflicting or overreaching legislative enactments are subordinate to those promulgated by a branch of state government. Accordingly the PUC's review of the ordinance does not involve a coordinate branch of government exercising powers in violation of the separation of powers doctrine.
In her decision the trial justice ruled that Narragansett Electric erroneously brought the matter regarding the validity of the ordinance before the commission. The court ruled that § 39-1-30 empowers the commission only to review municipal actions that are administrative in nature or are zoning board decisions. On appeal the parties agree that the trial court erred in construing § 39-1-30 to exclude town council ordinances from review. 2
It is apparent that the trial court based part of its ruling upon the commission's past use of § 39-1-30 and an interpretation of its language. The court noted that prior to the time Narragansett Electric filed its challenge to the ordinance, the PUC had only exercised jurisdiction in zoning matters. The trial justice also observed that the statute refers to the word "ordinance" in the context of zoning matters and the general statutory scheme of § 39-1-30 is one that directs itself only to zoning review. Furthermore, the trial justice relied upon the title of the section in concluding that the section relates to zoning review.
In part of her analysis, the trial justice presumed that the separation of powers doctrine precluded the PUC's review of municipal ordinances. She ruled that the PUC's review extended to the town's executive actions and not to its legislative functions.
The plaintiffs and defendants contend that § 39-1-30 provides two types of review. The first part of the statute pertains to decisions of zoning boards of review and the second part applies to "[e]very ordinance enacted * * * affecting the mode or manner of operation * * * of any company under the supervision of the commission." Section 39-1-30. The parties assert that the second part of § 39-1-30 is plain and unambiguous and refers to the commission's review of ordinances that affect the mode or manner of operation of Narragansett Electric, a company under the supervision of the commission.
Legislative enactments are not always models of style and drafting. It is, however, " 'the function and duty of this court to construe statutes.' " D'Ambra v. North Providence School Committee, 601 A.2d 1370, 1374 (R.I.1992). To discern the proper role of the PUC, it is our task " 'to establish and effectuate the intent of the Legislature.' " Id. "Legislative intent is determined 'through an examination of the language of the statute itself, giving the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meaning.' " Krikorian v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services, 606 A.2d 671, 675 (R.I.1992).
Narragansett Electric argued that the court's misapplication of the separation of powers doctrine led directly to its misconstruction of § 39-1-30. The court was reluctant to construe the meaning of the word "ordinance" to permit an executive branch agency, the PUC, to review an enactment of the local legislative branch. As we discussed in the previous section, this is an erroneous foundation.
Equally erroneous is the trial justice's limitation of § 39-1-30 to zoning matters. When we review the trial justice's decision, it appears that her consideration of the title of the statute was misplaced. The title of an act may only aid in a court's interpretation if there is doubt about the meaning of a provision of the statute. Fiske v. MacGregor, Division of Brunswick, 464...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State ex rel. City of Providence v. Auger
...as occurred in the cases in which we have held that the General Assembly intended to occupy the field. See, e.g., Town of East Greenwich v. O'Neil, 617 A.2d 104, 110 (R.I.1992) (recognizing the “complex regulatory scheme” within the statute to be evidence of implied preemption). In addition......
-
Moreau v. Flanders
...doctrine prohibits the usurpation of the power of one branch of government by a coordinate branch of government.” Town of East Greenwich v. O'Neil, 617 A.2d 104, 107 (R.I.1992). In addition, we have said without equivocation that “a constitutional violation of separation of powers [is] an a......
-
Southern Union Co. v. Lynch
...preempt town and city regulatory activity in the `field of public-utilities regulation.'") (citation omitted); Town of East Greenwich v. O'Neil, 617 A.2d 104, 110 (R.I.1992) (the PUC has exclusive authority to regulate public Similarly, the Court cannot discern any meaningful ambiguity in t......
-
Gem Plumbing & Heating Co., Inc. v. Rossi
...act may only aid in a court's interpretation if there is doubt as to the meaning of a provision of the statute." Town of East Greenwich v. O'Neil, 617 A.2d 104, 109 (R.I.1992). 24. At oral argument, we raised the question of whether the amended statute places the burden of proof on either t......