Town of Edenton v. Wool

• Decision Date: 30 June 1871
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: TOWN OF EDENTON v. JACOB WOOL and GEORGE CRAWLIN.

65 N.C. 379

TOWN OF EDENTON

v.JACOB WOOL and GEORGE CRAWLIN.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June Term, 1871.

The Legislature cannot confer on the Mayor of a town the judicial powers of a Justice of the Peace in civil actions. Article 4, section 33, confers exclusive original jurisdiction on Justices of the Peace wherever the sum demanded does not exceed two hundred dollars.

The State Constitution requires that Justices of the Peace shall be elected by townships, whilst Mayors are elected only by towns and cities. Wilmington v. Davis, 63 N. C. 582, cited and approved.

This was an appeal from an alleged judgment rendered by the Mayor of Edenton against the defendants for a violation of a town ordinance, and known as Ordinance No. XVI--in which it is declared that “no bar room or house where liquors are sold shall be opened on the Sabbath,” &c. The defendants were fined twenty-five dollars and costs, and the said appeal was tried before Pool, J., at Spring Term, 1871, of CHOWAN Superior Court.

The defendants moved to dismiss the action, because, amongst other grounds, that the Mayor of Edenton had no jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Smith, for defendants , cited Wilmington v. Davis, 63 N. C. 582.

RODMAN, J.

The town of Edenton was originally incorporated many years ago. At the session of 1869-'70, ( Private Acts ch. 123, p. 232,) the Legislature re-incorporated it, and attempted to give to the Mayor of the town, the jurisdiction of a Justice of the Peace.

This is an action for a penalty for breach of a town ordinance; and is technically, a civil action arising out of a contract.

The question presented is, whether the Legislature could constitutionally confer on an officer elected by the voters of a town, but not of a township, the judicial powers of a Justice of the Peace in such an action?

We think the principles on which the case of Wilmington v. Davis 63, N. C. 582, was decided, must control our decision. It would probably be convenient to the inhabitants of towns for their chief officer to have such powers.

The generality of the question presented, has induced us to re-consider with care the reasoning pursued in that case. We have not been able to see how any other decision could be reconciled with the provisions of the Constitution. That instrument, (Art. IV. s. 33,) enacts: “The several Justices of the Peace, shall have exclusive original jurisdiction, under such regulations as the General Assembly shall prescribe, of all civil actions founded...