Town of Exeter v. State
| Citation | 226 A.3d 696 |
| Decision Date | 29 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | PC 17-1549,No. 2018-274-Appeal.,No. 2018-307-Appeal.,PC 17-1666,2018-274-Appeal.,2018-307-Appeal. |
| Parties | TOWN OF EXETER, BY AND THROUGH its Solicitor, James P. MARUSAK v. STATE of Rhode Island et al. Town of Richmond, Rhode Island v. State of Rhode Island et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island |
James P. Marusak, Esq., Karen R. Ellsworth, Esq., for Petitioners.
Sean Lyness, Esq., Department of Attorney General, for Respondents.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
These consolidated cases came before this Court on appeals by the petitioners, the Town of Exeter and the Town of Richmond (the towns or petitioners), from a final judgment in favor of the respondents, the State of Rhode Island; Janet Coit, in her capacity as Director of the Department of Environmental Management; and Michael DiBiase,1 in his capacity as Director of the Department of Administration (collectively the state or respondents), entered on August 17, 2018, following the denial of the towns’ motion for summary judgment and the grant of the state’s cross-motion for summary judgment.2 After each appeal was assigned to the regular argument calendar, the towns moved to consolidate the appeals, and this Court granted the motion on May 17, 2019. On appeal, the towns argue that the trial justice erred in finding that the Comprehensive Planning and Land Use Regulation Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 22.2 of title 45 (the Act), provides the proper procedure to resolve zoning disputes between the state and municipalities. The towns assert that the state, in its capacity as a developer of land, should be required to submit to local zoning procedures and that the test set forth in the Act was not intended to replace the balancing-of-interests test set forth in Blackstone Park Improvement Association v. State Board of Standards and Appeals , 448 A.2d 1233 (R.I. 1982). The parties appeared before this Court on February 27, 2020, for oral argument. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we vacate the judgment of the Superior Court.
The facts of this case are largely undisputed. Annually, between the 2012 and 2018 fiscal years, funding for the Arcadia Natural Resources and Visitors Center (the building or project), which included office spaces for respondent Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management (DEM), laboratory space, and a visitor center, was included in the Governor of Rhode Island’s Capital Budgets. According to the state’s written submissions, "funding for the [building] was vetted as part of the annual budget process[,]" "considered at public hearings, and included in multi-year Rhode Island Capital Asset Protection * * * budgets approved by the General Assembly over several years." Intent on use of the public funds for this proposed project, DEM began planning construction of a 12,716-square-foot building in the Arcadia Management Area, adjacent to Browning Mill Pond, in 2014. It appears from the blueprints that the primary purpose of the building was to serve DEM employees.3 According to the state, the plans and specifications for the building were posted for public bid on the website of the Rhode Island Department of Administration Division of Purchases from January through November 2016. The state then accepted a bid and entered into a contract to build with Mill City Construction, Inc., on January 20, 2017.4
The proposed building was to be located entirely in the Town of Richmond, in an area zoned for residential use. A portion of the building’s parking lot, a driveway, and a wastewater treatment system for the project was to be located within the Town of Exeter, in an area zoned for open space public land. According to the state, Richmond was notified of the project in 2015 and Exeter was notified in 2014 or 2015. In connection with this litigation, the state provided a letter dated December 2, 2015, that indicates that an Exeter building official was aware of the project. Exeter disputes this, asserting that the town did not learn of the project until 2017.
In February and March 2017, at the Richmond Town Council’s request, officials from DEM met with Richmond town officials, attended a Richmond Town Council meeting to explain the project, and attended a public meeting to answer questions from town residents. The state, however, indicated that it would not agree to alter the project in any way. On February 16, 2017, Exeter sent a cease and desist letter to DEM, the respondent Rhode Island Department of Administration (DOA), and the Rhode Island Department of Attorney General, demanding that the project stop "until proper local permits are obtained and administrative review has been completed[,]" to which Exeter received no response. It is unclear from the record whether a meeting between Exeter and the state took place.
On April 6, 2017, Exeter filed a "verified petition for declaratory and injunctive relief" in Providence County Superior Court against respondents, seeking a declaration that (1) the project was subject to development plan review by the town; (2) the project required town planning board and zoning board review and approval; (3) the project violated environmental quality standards; and (4) the state failed to obtain permitting for earth removal, soil erosion, and drainage. Exeter also asked for issuance of an injunction preventing the state from proceeding with the project.
On April 12, 2017, Richmond filed its own action for declaratory and injunctive relief in Superior Court against the State of Rhode Island and the Director of DEM. Richmond likewise sought a declaration that the state was required to consult with the town and comply with the town’s zoning ordinance, comprehensive plan, and subdivision regulations. Richmond also sought to enjoin the state’s construction of the building until the state complied with the town’s zoning, planning, and subdivision requirements.
On May 25, 2017, an order was entered consolidating the two actions in Superior Court. On July 19, 2017, the towns filed a joint motion for a preliminary and/or permanent injunction, to which the state objected. In a written decision issued on December 15, 2017, a hearing justice (the first hearing justice) denied the towns’ motion for a preliminary injunction; an order implementing the decision followed. The first hearing justice had found that the state was immune from the towns’ zoning ordinances.
The towns and the state thereafter filed cross-motions for summary judgment as to the towns’ requests for declaratory judgment. A hearing justice (the second hearing justice) issued a bench decision on the motions on August 6, 2018. The second hearing justice found that the state was not required to obtain municipal approval and permits before beginning a project and, further, that the Act was the proper mechanism to resolve land-use issues that arise between the state and municipalities. Specifically, the second hearing justice noted that a municipality must conform its zoning ordinance to its comprehensive plan and that § 45-22.2-10(g) governs the process a state agency must follow when it wishes to pursue a project that does not conform with a municipality’s land-use regulations. She thereafter granted summary judgment in favor of the state and denied the towns’ motion for summary judgment with regard to the towns’ requests for declaratory judgment. She also denied the towns’ requests for a permanent injunction. An order memorializing that decision was entered on August 17, 2018. Final judgment in favor of the state was also entered on August 17, 2018. Exeter filed a notice of appeal on August 21, 2018, and Richmond filed a notice of appeal on September 4, 2018.
"A motion for summary judgment ‘is designed to decide in an expeditious fashion cases presenting groundless claims.’ " Hexagon Holdings, Inc. v. Carlisle Syntec Incorporated , 199 A.3d 1034, 1038 (R.I. 2019) (deletion omitted) (quoting Gallo v. National Nursing Homes, Inc. , 106 R.I. 485, 487, 261 A.2d 19, 21 (1970) ). This Court reviews a hearing justice’s grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo . See id. "If we conclude, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be decided and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we will affirm the grant of summary judgment." McGovern v. Bank of America, N.A. , 91 A.3d 853, 857 (R.I. 2014) (quoting Pereira v. Fitzgerald , 21 A.3d 369, 372 (R.I. 2011) ).
To resolve this case, we must interpret several statutory provisions. "We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo ." Lang v. Municipal Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island , 222 A.3d 912, 915 (R.I. 2019) (quoting Bluedog Capital Partners, LLC v. Murphy , 206 A.3d 694, 699 (R.I. 2019) ). "In so doing, our ultimate goal is to give effect to the purpose of the act as intended by the Legislature." Id. (quoting Bluedog Capital Partners , 206 A.3d at 699 ). "When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings." Id. (quoting In re B.H. , 194 A.3d 260, 264 (R.I. 2018) ). "The Legislature is presumed to have intended each word or provision of a statute to express a significant meaning, and the Court will give effect to every word, clause, or sentence, whenever possible." Id. (quoting In re B.H. , 194 A.3d at 264 ).
On appeal, the towns argue that the Act is not intended to provide the exclusive remedy to resolve local land-use conflicts between the state and its municipalities. Instead, the towns argue that the test set forth in Blackstone Park remains valid, despite the later enactment of the Act, and that the Blackstone Park test applies to zoning conflicts, whereas the Act applies exclusively to comprehensive-planning conflicts. The...
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