Town of Glastonbury v. Metro. Dist. Comm'n

Decision Date06 March 2018
Docket NumberSC 19843
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
Parties TOWN OF GLASTONBURY v. METROPOLITAN DISTRICT COMMISSION

Jeffrey J. Mirman, with whom, on the brief, was Alexa T. Millinger, for the appellant (defendant).

Proloy K. Das, with whom were Joseph B. Schwartz and Robert E. Kaelin, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Palmer, Robinson, D'Auria, Mullins and Vertefeuille, Js.*

PER CURIAM.

The defendant in this declaratory judgment action, the Metropolitan District Commission, a quasi-municipal corporation that provides potable water to eight member and five nonmember towns in the greater Hartford area, appeals1 from the judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff, the town of Glastonbury. The plaintiff, one of the nonmember towns, brought this action, seeking a determination by the court that, prior to 2014, the defendant unlawfully had imposed surcharges on it and the other nonmember towns. Thereafter, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that the plaintiff was required but failed to join the other nonmember towns as indispensable parties. While this action was pending, the legislature enacted No. 14–21 of the 2014 Special Acts (S.A. 14–21),2 which amended the defendant's charter by authorizing the defendant to impose a surcharge on nonmember towns in an amount not to exceed the amount of the customer service charge. Following the passage of S.A. 14–21, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the special act was retroactive and rendered the plaintiff's claim moot because it answered in the affirmative the question then pending before the court, namely, whether the defendant had the authority to impose a surcharge on nonmember towns. The trial court disagreed and denied the motion, concluding that S.A. 14–21 was not retroactive, and, therefore, it remained to be determined whether the plaintiff was entitled to relief because the surcharges imposed prior to the passage of the special act were unlawful. Thereafter, the parties filed motions for summary judgment, and the trial court concluded that the surcharges imposed on the plaintiff prior to the passage of S.A. 14–21 were unlawful, the plaintiff's claim was not barred by the equitable doctrine of laches, and the plaintiff's claim was justiciable because the plaintiff was entitled to reimbursement for the payments it had made to the defendant on account of the unlawful surcharges. In accordance with these conclusions, the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court incorrectly determined that the plaintiff's claim was justiciable and not rendered moot by S.A. 14–21 or barred by the doctrine of laches.

After examining the record and briefs and considering the arguments of the parties, we are persuaded that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. The issues raised by the parties in their motions for summary judgment were resolved properly in the thoughtful and comprehensive memorandum of decision filed by the trial court.3 Because that memorandum of decision also fully addresses the arguments raised in the present appeal, we adopt the trial court's well reasoned decision as a statement of the facts and the applicable law on those issues. See Glastonbury v. Metropolitan District Commission , Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. HHD–CV–14–6049007–S, 2016 WL 3179757 (May 12, 2016) (reprinted at 328 Conn. 245, 330, 177 A.3d 1157[2018] ). It would serve no useful purpose for us to repeat that discussion here.4 See, e.g., Tzovolos v. Wiseman , 300 Conn. 247, 253–54, 12 A.3d 563 (2011).

The judgment is affirmed.

APPENDIX

This case concerns an action brought pursuant to General Statutes § 52–29 by the plaintiff, the town of Glastonbury, against the defendant, the Metropolitan District Commission, on February 21, 2014. The plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment to establish that a surcharge imposed by the defendant on the plaintiff and other nonmember towns for water usage prior to October 1, 2014, was illegal. The complaint sets forth the following allegations. The plaintiff is a municipal corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of Connecticut. The defendant is a quasi-municipal corporation, established in 1929 by the Connecticut General Assembly. See 20 Spec. Acts 1204, No. 511 (1929). The defendant provides drinking water, water pollution control, mapping and household hazardous waste collection to eight member towns.1 In addition, the defendant provides drinking water to residents and businesses in portions of Farmington, Glastonbury, East Granby, Portland and South Windsor. These towns are referred to as "[n]on-member" towns. Customers in the nonmembers towns receive only drinking water from the defendant. Approximately 9000 customers are located in the nonmember town areas. The plaintiff is a customer of the defendant. The plaintiff receives and pays for drinking water at various town facilities and properties.

The powers, duties, and obligations of the defendant are compiled in the Charter of the Metropolitan District (charter). When authorizing the defendant to provide water to nonmember towns in 1931, the General Assembly expressly mandated that the defendant must charge customers in nonmember towns "rates uniform with those charged within said district ...." 21 Spec. Acts 328, No. 358 (1931). The only additional charge the General Assembly authorized during this change was that the cost of pipe construction between the district and the nonmember town would be paid by the nonmember town. The plaintiff asserts that the defendant currently imposes a "nonmember surcharge" on recipients of water in nonmember towns, including the plaintiff. In 2011, the defendant added a nonmember surcharge of $52.68 to the annual bill of all water recipients in nonmember towns, irrespective of how much water, if any, was used. The surcharge was subsequently increased in 2013 to $423. In 2014, the amount was reduced to $198.96 after complaints from various nonmember towns. According to the defendant, it intended to offset the 2014 surcharge reduction by extending the time period during which it would be paid to twenty-five years. The plaintiff further asserts that, although the defendant's representatives have stated that the addition of the foregoing surcharges reflect costs associated with capital improvements necessary to provide or maintain water service to each particular nonmember town, other information from the defendant has indicated that the surcharges in fact were an attempt to recapture district wide costs long ago incurred for capital improvements to the defendant's water infrastructure, beyond those relating to providing or maintaining water service to a particular community.

The plaintiff asserts that the General Assembly has not authorized the defendant to impose such surcharges, that the defendant does not have any legislative authority to impose these nonmember surcharges on the plaintiff, and, therefore, the surcharges are unlawful. Pursuant to § 52–29,2 the plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment ruling that the defendant has acted unlawfully, exceeded its legislative authority, and acted to the detriment of the plaintiff. On May 7, 2014, the Senate passed No. 14–21 of the 2014 Special Acts (S.A. 14–21), amending the charter to allow for surcharges.

On August 13, 2015, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the defendant, as a matter of law, exceeded its statutory authority by imposing a nonmember surcharge on the plaintiff and cannot establish any of its special defenses. On December 11, 2015, the defendant filed a memorandum in opposition. That same day, the defendant filed its own motion for summary judgment on the ground that there is no justiciable case or controversy between the parties. On February 2, 2016, the plaintiff filed a brief in reply to the defendant's opposition and in opposition to the defendant's motion. The defendant filed a reply on February 10, 2016. The parties submitted evidence in support of their own motions and in opposition to the motions against them, which will be discussed below as necessary. Oral argument was held on the motions on February 11, 2016.

I

THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The defendant's motion for summary judgment is premised on the ground that the plaintiff's claim is moot and otherwise nonjusticiable. Because this motion implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction, it is addressed first. "Mootness is a question of justiciability that must be determined as a threshold matter because it implicates [a] court's subject matter jurisdiction .... Because courts are established to resolve actual controversies, before a claimed controversy is entitled to a resolution on the merits it must be justiciable.... Justiciability requires (1) that there be an actual controversy between or among the parties to the dispute ... (2) that the interests of the parties be adverse ... (3) that the matter in controversy be capable of being adjudicated by judicial power ... and (4) that the determination of the controversy will result in practical relief to the complainant.... A case is considered moot if [the trial] court cannot grant ... any practical relief through its disposition of the merits ...." (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Valvo v. Freedom of Information Commission , 294 Conn. 534, 540–41, 985 A.2d 1052 (2010).

The defendant argues that there is no practical or effective relief being sought by the plaintiff, or which could otherwise be awarded, because members of the plaintiff's town council were unable to identify the plaintiff's objectives in seeking a declaratory judgment. Additionally, the defendant argues that S.A. 14–21...

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